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REPUBLICAN MOMENTS

Those who profess tofavorfreedom and yet deprecateagitation, are people
who want crops without plowing up the ground, they want rain without
thunder and lightning.
1
-Frederick Douglass
Even [political turbulence] is productive of good. It prevents the
degeneracy of government and nourishes a generalattention to the public
affairs. I hold it that a little rebellion now and then is a good thing, and
as necessary in the political world as storms in the physical.
2
-Thomas Jefferson
It is, infact, at such moments of collective ferment that are born the great
ideals upon which civilizations rest. The periods of creation or renewal
occur when [people]forvarious reasons are led into a closer relationship
with each other, when reunions and assemblies are most frequent,
relationshipsbetter maintainedand the exchange of ideas most active....
Once the criticalmoment has passed,the social life relaxes, intellectualand
emotional intercourse is subdued, and individuals fall back to their
ordinary level.
-Emile Durkheim3

INTRODUCTION
The image of thunder storms seems out of place in constitutional discourse. We are accustomed to the more solid metaphors of
governmental machinery or the "body politic." If, as John Adams
envisaged, government is a "complicated piece of machinery, the
nice and exact adjustment of whose springs, wheels, and weights" is
poorly understood by the people, 4 then a stormy popular upheaval
could only upset the adjustment. Surely no self-respecting physician
of the body politic would willingly expose it to the turbulent winds
of popular rebellion.
The mechanical and biological metaphors reflect a tendency to
view the constitutional order as a stable system, and the mission of
1 P.

FONER, FREDERICK DOUGLASS 11 (1964) (quoting Frederick Douglass).
2 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Jan. 30, 1787), in 11 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 92, 93 (J. Boyd ed. 1955) [hereinafter JEFFERSON
PAPERS].
3 E. DURKHEIM, SOCIOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY 91-92 (1965).
4 Letter from John Adams to ThomasJefferson (May 19, 1821), in 10 THE WORKS
OFJOHN ADAMS 398 (C. Adams ed. 1856).

290

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 139:287

constitutional law as promoting the smooth functioning of that
system. For the past several decades, this tendency toward systemsthinking has taken the form of liberal or interest group pluralism.
At first, liberal pluralism embodied a happy convergence of
descriptive and prescriptive visions.
Not only were American
politics characterized by interest group bargaining, but that was the
best possible state of affairs. As Madison had predicted, a polity
divided into numerous competing interest groups would not give
rise to a single dominating faction. 5 All groups would be able to
press their concerns and make alliances, thereby ensuring that their
interests received fair consideration. 6 It followed that the legislative products of this fair process should be broadly construed to
achieve their purposes, 7 and that the power of judicial review need
8
only be exercised to correct occasional malfunctions.
In the short decade since John Ely and Jesse Choper "perfect[ed]" this view, 9 interest group bargaining has fallen so low in
scholarly esteem that it can now be called a "disease" in the pages
of a law journal.' 0 Although the system still has its defenders, it
is no exaggeration to say that contemporary legal scholarship is
"haunted by the idea that. statutes are nothing more than deals
11
between contending interest groups."
5See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 83 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
6 Initially, it was enough that pluralism would serve as a defense against
totalitarianism. See D. RODGERS, CONTESTED TRUTHS: KEYWORDS IN AMERICAN
POLITICS SINCE INDEPENDENCE 209 (1987). Claims of fairness and efficiency were
added later. See, e.g., D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL
INTERESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION 51.0-15 (1951) (contending that citizens' overlapping
membership in interest groups provides a "balance wheel" in the system, and that
pluralist politics are characterized by "widespread, frequent recognition of and
conformity to the claims of ... unorganized interests").
7 See H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING
AND APPLICATION OF LAw 1156-57 (tentative ed. 1958). On the influence of interest
group pluralism on Hart & Sacks and the Legal Process school, see Eskridge, Politics
Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theo7yfor Statutoty Inteipretation,74 VA.
L. REV. 275, 281-83 (1988); Minda, Interest Groups, PoliticalFreedom, and Antitrust: A
Modern Reassessment of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 905, 940-41
(1990).
8

SeeJ. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REViEw AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980);

J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRusT (1980).
9 See Parker, The Pastof ConstitutionalTheory-And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223,
223 (1981) (analyzingJ. CHOPER, supra note 8;J. ELY, supra note 8).
10 See Epstein, Modern Republicanism-Or the Flight From Substance, 97 YALE L.J.
1633, 1641 (1988). For an early and influential diagnosis of the disease, see E.
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE (1960).

11 Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudenceof Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 925
(1987).
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While the pluralist prescription has thus been seriously
undermined, its descriptive vision is more firmly entrenched than
ever. The highly influential economic (or "public choice") theory of
legislation depicts the polity as a political marketplace dominated by
special interest groups.' 2
For most citizens, the benefits of
political participation do not exceed the costs. 13 Hence, it would
be "irrational" for them to engage in political action. 14 With most
of the citizenry thus relegated to the sidelines, the field is left open
for the few groups that are able, because of advantages like
compactness and wealth, to overcome the problem of organizational
costs.

15

For those who are not impressed with the economic diagnosis,
there is always the problem of size. The proponents of the
"republican revival," for example, are not especially concerned
about the purported irrationality of collective action; according to
republican theory, political activism can be a source of happiness in
itself.16 Unfortunately, the republican ideal of deliberative democracy was designed for societies the size of city-states. The notion
that ordinary citizens can engage in deliberative self-government
17
seems utopian in a polity as large as the United States.
This pessimism is partly a product of systems-thinking. If we set
ourselves the task of designing a system that can maintain a steady,
high level of nationwide political participation, then the prospects
for democracy are indeed bleak. Locked in systems-thinking, we
cannot conceive of alternatives to interest group politics that are not
themselves capable of continuous, smooth functioning. Hence, it
is not surprising that the most ambitious proposals for reform rely
not on the uncontrollable remedy of popular power, but on the free
market system 18 or the "independent" judiciary. 19 Those who
12SeeMacey, PromotingPublic-RegardingLegislation
Through Statutoylnteipretation:
An Interest Group Mode 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 224 (1986).
is The pathbreaking work explaining the rationale for individual inaction is M.
OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
14 See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
15See M. OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS 34-35 (1982). For additional
discussion and sources, see infra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
16 See H. ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 22-69 (1958); infra notes 120-21 and
accompanying text.
17 Fora classic treatment of the difficulty of achieving republican ideals in a state
too large for direct democracy, seeJ. ROUSSEAU, The Social Contract, in THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 1, 93-96 (G. Cole ed. 1950). The problem of size is
discussed infra notes 39-71 and accompanying text.
18Richard Epstein, for example, urges the courts to strike down legislation that
infringes common law economic rights. See R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY
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are not so sanguine about markets or courts seem condemned to
apologize for suggesting "disturbingly modest weapons with which
to confront the seemingly awesome problem posed by special
interest groups."

20

A glance at history suggests that systems-thinking ignores a
major part of the American political experience. Our history has
from the outset been characterized by periodic outbursts of
democratic participation and ideological politics. And if history is
any indicator, the legal system's response to these "republican
moments" 2 1 may be far more important than its attitude toward
interest group politics. The most important transformations in our
political order-independence, abolition, the rise of economic
regulation, the integration of the industrial working class into

AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); Epstein, Taxation, Regulation, and
Confiscation, 20 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 433, 437-38 (1982).
19 Among the new republicans, for example, the most far-reaching proposal is
Frank Michelman's suggestion that instead of deferring to the elected branches, the
Supreme Court should itself model "the active self-government that citizens find
practically beyond reach." Michel man, Foreword: Traces ofSelf-Government; 100 HARV.
L. REV. 4,74(1986). For a proposal grounded in feminist theory that would similarly
call upon the Court to "enact and preside over" the normative dialogue, see Minow,
Foreword: Justice Engendered 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 95 (1987).
20 Macey, supra note 12, at 268; see also Farber & Frickey, supra note 11, at 926
(apologizing for failing to provide a "panacea" for the problem of special interest
groups). Although some of these weapons would undoubtedly be useful, few rely on
the power of democracy. Instead, they propose incremental transfers of power from
the legislative or executive branches to the judiciary or the private market. See, e.g.,
Sunstein, Interest Groups in American PublicLaw, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 69-72 (1985)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Interest Grovps] (recommending that the level ofjudicial scrutiny
in rationality review be heightened); Macey, supra note 12, at 264-65 (suggesting the
revival of the principle that a statute in derogation of the common law should be
narrowly construed because it "limits the scope of inefficient statutes by protecting
the domain of efficient common law rules from encroachmentby ill-conceived, special

interest statutes"); Mashaw, ConstitutionalDeregulation: Notes Toward a Public Public
Law, 54 TUL.L. REV. 849, 873-75 (1980) (recommending the expansion of suspect or
quasi-suspect classification analysis to all politically disadvantaged groups); Ackerman,
Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HAR. L. REV. 713, 742 (1985) (same); Eskridge, Public
Values in Statutoiy Inteipretation,137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1093 (1989) (suggesting that
statutes should be construed so as to effectuate "substantive values-such as
nondiscrimination, first amendment concerns, and environmental policy"); Sunstein,
Beyond the Republican Reviva4 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1583 (1988) [hereinafter Sunstein,
Republican Revival] (approving of "a judicial perception that statutes should be
construed so that the aggregate social benefits are proportionate to the aggregate
social costs"); Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the New Dea4 101 HARV. L. REV. 421,
463-78 (1987) [hereinafter Sunstein, Constitutionalism](arguing that courts should
more closely scrutinize administrative action); Macey, supra note 12, at 263-64 (same).
21 For readers who cannot wait for a fully developed presentation of this
construct, a definition is located infra text accompanying notes 106-10.
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capitalist democracy, and the extension of formal legal rights to
women and minorities-were brought on by republican moments.
Not only do republican moments upset systems-thinking, they
also violate the axiom that ours is a system of representativegovernment in which, according to Publius and others, the people have no
direct role. 22 During republican moments, social movements exert
direct popular power on governmental and private institutions.
Before proceeding further, it will be useful to specify what is meant
by the term "Direct Popular Power" in this essay.
"Direct" means outside the formal structure of representative
democracy. An example in pure form would be the replacement of
representative institutions by assemblies of "the whole people."
Less pure and more common examples include efforts to secure
government or private action by mass demonstrations, civil
disobedience, boycotts, or other nonelectoral means.
"Popular," as used here, is the opposite of aristocratic or elitist.
A form of political participation is popular if it is not limited to
elites. Again, the example in pure form would be an assembly of
the whole people. And again, less pure but more common examples
include demonstrating, withholding patronage, and refusing to obey
unjust laws. Here, however, the defining characteristic is not
directness, but inclusiveness. A form of participation may be
popular but not direct-as in the case of voting for representatives,
or direct but not popular-as in the case of bribing public officials
or threatening to move a factory.
Max Weber's definition of power, which accords with commonsense understandings, is adequate for present purposes. According
to Weber, power is "the possibility of imposing one's will upon the
behavior of other persons." 23 Power may be, but need not be,
exercised through economic or physical coercion. The "power of
24
persuasion" is also, as the phrase indicates, a form of power.
22 See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison).
23 M. WEBER, MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 323 (M. Rheinstein

trans. 2d ed. 1954).
24 Indeed, in the emerging post-industrial era, organization and persuasion may
be more potent sources of power than property or the means of violence. See, e.g.,

J. GALBRAITH, THE ANATOMY OF POWER 131-59 (1983) (arguing that traditional
sources of power, such as property, are effective mainly in terms of the amount of
"social conditioning" their possessors can buy or otherwise bring to bear in order to
attain their ends). Although this form of power may be exerted subtly-sometimes
so subtly that the target is unaware of its exercise-we are more concerned here with
the overt varieties. Hidden conditioning is a tool of established elites. Popular
movements lack the centralization, discipline, and secrecy necessary to engage in
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Direct popular power should not be equated with the formal
mechanisms of initiative and referendum. The Supreme Court's
view that the referendum -procedure is a "classic demonstration of
'devotion to democracy"' that "ensures that all the people of a
community will have a voice in a decision" 25 may hold for highly

politicized electorates, but referendum voting-unlike more active
forms of participation like demonstrating or boycotting-can also
make law without mobilizing popular activity or even attracting
much public attention. In the common situation of large and

apathetic electorates, referendum outcomes may be less reflective
of the popular will than of the amount of campaign spending by
competing elites. 26 Thus, although referenda can function as a
form of direct popular power, they are by no means the form or
even necessarily the most democratic form.
Part I of this Article addresses the problem of popular democracy from the republican perspective and concludes that the problem
of size has channeled the new republicans*toward elitist solutions.
Part II develops the theory of republican moments.
Part III

suggests that in bringing on republican moments, direct popular
power provides a partial corrective not only to the problem of size,
but also to the main concerns posed by the critique of interest
group pluralism. Part IV finds a constitutional home for the politics
of republican moments in the first amendment. Part V applies the
theory of republican moments to some first amendment problems,
while Part VI discusses its implications for statutory construction
and administrative law.

subtle manipulation; of necessity they conduct their politics out of doors.
25 Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 678-79 (1976) (quoting
James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141, 143 (1971)). For criticisms of Eastlake on this
point, see Michelman, PoliticalMarkets and Community Self-Determination: Competing
JudicialModels of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 185 (1978) and Sager,
Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest City
Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARv. L. REV. 1373, 1408-11, 1414-15 (1978).
26
See T. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM,
AND RECALL 109-13 (1989) (summarizing the empirical literature and concluding that
money is extremely effective in defeating referendum initiatives, especially when it is
used to purchase "tricky and subtle" advertising); Berg & Holman, The Initiative
Process and its Declining Agenda-Setting Value, 11 LAW & POL'Y 451, 451-52 (1989)
(observing that the initiative qualifying process has become "professionalized,"
resulting in increased dominance by well-financed interest groups).
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I. POPULAR VS. ELITIST REPUBLICANISM ON DIRECT POPULAR
PARTICIPATION
By the early 1980s, interest group pluralism was already under

heavy attack in the law reviews. 27 The critics, however, lacked an
alternative vision of comparable scope. For aficionados of the free
market, this posed no particular difficulty; the obvious solution was
to remove decisions from the political realm and entrust them to
the market. 28 However, to critics who favored positive government, the lack of an alternative vision presented a serious problem.
To fill the gap, Frank Michelman and Cass Sunstein turned to the
classical republican tradition of political thought, including its
elements of relative equality of wealth, direct citizen participation,
29
and civic virtue.

27 The publication of Ely's and Choper's books, for example, aroused a storm of
criticism. See, e.g., Symposium: JudicialReview Versus Democracy, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 1
(1981) (featuring fifteen articles criticizing Ely's and Choper's books); Estreicher,
Platonic Guardians of Democracy: John Hart Ely's Role For the Supreme Court in the
Constitution's Open Texture (Book Review), 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547 (1981) (criticizing
Ely for his argument that the Court should use judicial review only to correct the
excesses of interest group politics); Sager, Constitutional Triage (Book Review), 81
COLUM. L. REV. 707, 719 (1981) (criticizing Choper for his "too comfortabl[e]"
acceptance of the present standard of judicial deference to the legislative and
executive branches).
28 See supra note 18.
29 This project was suggested by Richard Parker in an article critiquing Ely. See
Parker, supra note 9, at 258 n.146. For Michelman's and Sunstein's pioneering
efforts, see Michelman, supra note 19; Sunstein, Interest Groups,supra note 20, at 29.
Suzanna Sherry has suggested that the republican revival shares common themes with
feminist theory. See Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional
Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986).
The rise of republican legal scholarship is one part of a broader revival of
interest in the republican tradition, popularized in the best-seller Habits of the Heart.

R. BELLAH, R. MADSEN, W. SULLIVAN, A. SWIDLER & S. TIPTON, HABITS OF THE
HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985) [hereinafter

HABITS OF THE HEART]. Influential works of political theory in this vein include: B.
BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE (1984); C.
PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1970); and M. SANDEL,
LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OFJUSTICE (1982). For historical works uncovering the
American republican tradition, see, for example,J. APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW
SOCIAL ORDER: THE REPUBLICAN VISION OF THE 1790S (1984); E. FONER, FREE SOIL,
FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL
WAR (1970); and G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787

(1969).
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A. Background: The Republican Revival
There are many possible ways to describe the republican
tradition. 30 For present purposes, a relatively simple picture will
do. Since this Article has the pragmatic goal of exploring the
possibilities for practicing and encouraging citizen self-government,
this picture will emphasize the political design features of republicanism rather than its foundations in ethical philosophy. Accordingly, the polar opposite of this version of republicanism is not
31
"liberalism" in the abstract, but interest group pluralism.
In contrast to liberalism's negative freedom, a "freedom to be
left alone ... that implies being alone,"3 2 republicanism offers the
hope that "freedom might encompass an ability to share a vision of
a good life or a good society with others." 33 We are thus empowered to engage in "collective, deliberate, active intervention in our
fate, in what would otherwise be the by-product of private decisions." 34 Where liberalism embraces or at least accepts the politics
of self-interest, republicanism expects citizens to place the general
30 As Professor Michelman observes, "Republicanism is not a well-defined
historical doctrine. As a 'tradition' in political thought, it figures less as canon than
ethos, less as blueprint than as conceptual grid, less as settled institutional fact than

as semantic field for normative debate and constructive imagination." Michelman,
supra note 19, at 17 (footnote omitted). Within the republican tradition, it is easy to
find strongly held views that few would find attractive today; for example, the ardent
militarism of Machiavelli and the profoundly elitist view of the human telos suggested
by Hannah Arendt. See H. ARENDT, supra note 16, at 121; N. MACHIAVELLI, The
Discoutwes, in THE PRINCE AND THE DISCOURSES 443-62 (1950).
31 For a description of interest group pluralism, see supra notes 5-8 and
accompanying text.
32 HABITS OF THE HEART, supra note 29, at 23. The authors give this example of
a person who lives by the principle of negative freedom:
Thus Margaret Oldham, for example, sets great store on becoming an
autonomous person, responsible for her own life, and she recognizes that
other people, like herself, are free to have their own values and to lead their
lives the way they choose. But then, by the same token, if she doesn't like
what they do or the way they live, her only right is the right to walk away.
In some sense, for her, freedom to be left alone is a freedom that implies
being alone.
Id.
3 Id. at 24.
34 Pitkin,Justice: On Relating Pivateand Public, 9 POL. THEORY 327, 344 (1981);
see also M. SANDEL, supra note 29, at 150-51. Thus, the carriers of the republican
tradition today are civic volunteers and social movement activists. See H1ABITS OF THE
HEART, supra note 29, at 51. In Rousseau's classic statement of positive freedom,
moral liberty "alone makes [man] truly master of himself; for the mere impulse of
appetite is slavery, while obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty."
J. RoussEAu, supra note 17, at 19 (emphasis added).
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good ahead of personal gratification. 35 To make possible this
"civic virtue," republicanism rejects liberalism's procedural vision of
justice, which tolerates wide disparities in wealth, and insists that if
citizens are in fact created equal, then they must enjoy a rough
36
measure of actual equality in the distribution of wealth.
The new republicans are not true republicans in the classical
sense. While emphasizing the importance of civic virtue and
political participation, they reject the ancient view that the political
life is the way of life: "Modern men and women know too well the
dangers of a unitary politics that lays claim to all the human soul
and affects to express man's 'higher nature.'"3 7 Their claim is the
more limited one that our society is out of balance; it privileges
autonomy (read isolation) over community, acquisitiveness over civic
virtue, and instrumental rationality (exemplified by bureaucracy and
market) over moral choice (exemplified by public moral discourse).
The new republicans would reverse these priorities, rather than root
38
out all traces of liberalism.
B. Direct PopularParticipationand the Problem of Size

Direct citizen participation plays a central role in the republican
vision. Without it, the benefits of positive freedom cannot be
realized:
3

5 See Michelman, supra note 19, at 19; Sunstein, Interest Groups,supra note 20, at
31. Rousseau warned that as "soon as public service ceases to be the chief business
of the citizens," the fall of the State is not far off. J. ROUSSEAU, supra note 17, at 93.
5
6 SeeJ. ROUSSEATU, A Discourseon PoliticalEconomy, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND
DISCOURSES, supra note 17, at 306-07; see also HABITS OF THE HEART, supra note 29,
at 25-26;
Michelman, supra note 19, at 19-20.
3
7 B. BARBER, supra note 29, at 118. Thus, Michelman holds that republicanism
loses its attractiveness as an alternative to pluralism if it depends on the assumption
of a human telos, the realization of which takes precedence over the individual's
freedom to choose her own good life. See Michelman, supra note 19, at 22.
38 The republican and liberal traditions have been intertwined since their
inceptions, and there is no reason other than abstract conceptual consistency for
insisting that they be surgically separated now. See, e.g., M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE,
AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 4 n.8 (1988) (noting that
although contemporary scholars have insisted that the framers world-view was either
one of liberalism or republicanism, in reality, the framers "almost certainly had not
sorted out the theories in the way that later authors have"); cf. Fallon, What is
Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1695, 1730-31 (1989)
(noting overlaps between liberalism and the new republicanism). This Article retains
the liberal concept of rights, and thus falls in the camp that C. Edwin Baker calls
"republican liberalism." Baker, Republican Liberalism: Liberal Rights and Republican
Politics, 41 U. FLA. L. REV. 491, 493 (1989).
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As long as politics is equated with government, and government
regarded as a means for achieving private purposes and reconciling conflicting private claims in a generally acceptable manner,
rightly designed representative institutions may serve its purposes
very well. But if its real function is to direct our shared, public
life, and its real value lies in the opportunity to share in power
over and responsibility for what we jointly, as a society, are doing,
then no one else can do my politics 'for' me, and representation
can mean only
the exclusion of most people from its benefits most
39
of the time.
Only through participation can individuals overcome selfish
parochialism to become virtuous citizens. In the course of political
deliberation, we are "forced to acknowledge the power of others
and appeal to their standards," to "find or create a common
language of purposes and aspirations," and thus "not merely to
clothe our private outlook in public disguise, but to become aware
ourselves of its public meaning."40

In a darker vein, only an active citizenry can defend itself against
corruption and tyranny. Rousseau warned that citizens who fail to
make public service their chief business will "end by having soldiers
to enslave their country and representatives to sell it."4 1 Benjamin
Barber has updated Rousseau's warning: "Only an active politics
and a democratic citizenry can prevent the transformation of
relativism into nihilism or of philosophical skepticism into political
42
impotence (the Weimar Republic comes to mind)."
Classical republicanism assumed a polity small enough for the
43
entire citizenry to engage in face-to-face political discussion.
Obviously, the United States is too large for a general assembly of
the whole people. The response of the new republicans to this
difficulty, which has haunted American republicans from the antifederalists on, will determine republicanism's relevance and
attractiveness as an alternative perspective on the Constitution.
If face-to-face debate is impossible on the national level, then
where can republican dialogue take place? In their initial efforts,
3

9 Pitkin, Representation, in POLITICAL INNOVATION AND CONCEPTUAL CHANGE 132,

150 (T. Ball, J. Farr & R. Hanson eds. 1989). Rousseau put the proposition more
starkly: "[T]he moment a people allows itself to be represented, it is no longer free:
it no longer exists." J. ROUSSEAU, supra note 17, at 96.
40 Pitkin, supra note 34, at 3,17; see also B. BARBER, supra note 29, at 235-37; C.
PATEMAN,
supra note 29, at 25.
411J. RoussEAU, supra note 17, at 93; see also infra text accompanying notes 173-76.
42 B. BARBER, supra note 29, at 108-09.

43 See supra note 17.

1990]

REPUBLICAN MOMENTS

Michelman and Sunstein found a home for republicanism in the
manageably sized congressional and judicial elites, most importantly
the Justices of the Supreme Court. 44 It will be useful to take a
briefjourney through Professor Michelman's two principal contributions, which graphically reveal the relationship between republican
elitism and the problem of size.
C. The Elitist Solution
In his Harvard Forewordon republicanism, Professor Michelman
straightforwardly confronts both the problem of size and the
problem of elitism. Direct citizen self-government might have been
possible in eighteenth century Geneva, but "for citizens of the
United States, national politics are not imaginably the arena of selfgovernment in its positive, freedom-giving sense." 45 With some
trepidation, Michelman finds a place where it does seem that
republican values can be realized: the ultimately small (nine strong)
and homogeneous (members of the legal elite) society of the
Supreme Court. 46 The Court takes on as one of its "ascribed
functions the modeling of active self-government that citizens find
practically beyond reach. Unable as a nation to practice our own
self-government (in the full, positive sense), we-or at any rate we of
'the reasoning class'-can at least identify with the judiciary's as we
47
idealistically construct it."
The difficulty with this approach is that self-government by any
given group (or class) presents a polycentric problem; the ability of
other groups to engage in self-government is inevitably affected.
Michelman is not insensitive to this difficulty. He acknowledges
that his approach may be "a pathology of court-fetishism," 48 but
offers an "optimistic" defense. Self-government is not, he points
out, a zero-sum game. 49 Freedom for one person or group does
not necessarily entail less freedom for another if freedom is
conceived of as "socially situated self-direction." 50 So far so good;
indeed, the self-governing activity of one group might well encour44 See Michelman, supra note 19, at 74-75; Sunstein, Interest Groups, supranote 20,
at 69-75.

45
Michelman, supra note 19, at 75.
46
Michelman acknowledges the anti-democratic difficulty and limits his claim to
revealing "optimistic possibilities." See id. at 74.
47 Id. (quotingJ. ELY, supra note 8, at 59 & n.**).
48 Id.
49 See id. at 74-75.
50
rd. at 75.
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age similar activity by others-both by example and by stimulating
intergroup dialogue.
The Supreme Court is not, however, just any group; it possesses
tremendous power to frustrate self-governing activity by others,
most notably by overturning the outcomes of the legislative process.
Here, Michelman points out-uncontroversially from a republican
point of view-that we, the people, are no more present in Congress
than we are in the Court, and "government fetishism is no better
than court-fetishism." 51 Any particular exercise of judicial review
may augment or constrict our freedom:
"As usual, it all de52
pends."
To establish that judicial review is not inherently anti-freedom
or anti-democratic is not, however, to establish that it should go so
far as to provide a vicarious substitute for direct democracy.
Numerous other roles are possible, for example the familiar ones of
enforcing conventional morality5 3 or tradition,5 4 or the one
proposed here: the republican process role of opening possibilities
55
for democratic discourse.
Michelman's proposal rests ultimately on the claim that the
Court can supply an acceptable representation of the kind of direct
self-government that we would practice were our polity small and
homogeneous enough to make it possible. If "we" is read to mean
We the People, however, then the claim collapses. To suggest that
judges, who are typically white, male, and rich, 6 can virtually
represent the rest of us is to forget the legacy of legal realism,
something that I doubt Michelman intends.
The possibility that the Court could represent self-government
among the "reasoning class" may be, depending upon the definition
of the class, more plausible. But the problem of definition requires
a straightforward trade-off of democracy for plausibility. If the
reasoning class includes only academically trained intellectuals, for
example, then the notion of Supreme Court representation is
51 Id.
52 Id.

53 See, e.g., Wellington, Common Law Rules and ConstitutionalDouble Standards:
Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 310-11 (1973) (suggesting that
conventional morality should dictate the proper bounds ofjudicial review).
54 See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28-32 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.) (relying
on the historical treatment of evidence in refusing to apply the federal exclusionary
rule to the states).
55 See infra notes 276-375 and accompanying text.
56
See A. BLAUSTEIN & R. MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED JUsTIcES 55-56, 60
(1978); Brest, Who Decides?, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 661, 667-69 (1985).
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plausible, but profoundly undemocratic. If, on the other hand, the
reasoning class extends to all members of society who are engaged
in serious moral choice and dialogue-including, for example,
religious fundamentalists, feminists, union militants, and black
activists-then Supreme Court representation would be more
fictional than virtual.
In the end, despite his aversion to elitism, Michelman chose an
elitist solution. One is left with the question of why, given that
Michelman drew the term "reasoning class" from John Ely's book,
did he not also address the problem to which Ely was referring:
"The danger that upper-middle-class judges and commentators will
57
find upper-middle-class values fundamental."
D. Back to Square One
In his more recent contribution, Law's Republic, Michelman
moves decisively away from the elitist implications of the Foreword
but only at the cost of abandoning his solution to the size dilemma.
In Law's Republic, the primary impetus for transformative republican
lawmaking comes not from empowered elites at the center of
society, but from hitherto subjugated groups at the margins. 58 For
example, the "emergent social presence and self-emancipatory
activity of Black Americans" played "the primary and crucial role"
in shaping the Warren Court's new approach toward the equal
protection clause. 59 Thus, the task for legal thinkers is to bring
"the hitherto absent voices of emergently self-conscious social
60
groups" to "legal-doctrinal presence."
How to do this is, of course, precisely the question made
difficult by the problem of size. One way to bring in marginal
voices is simply to have the Supreme Court listen to them, an
approach thoughtfully articulated by Professor Martha Minow
without any particular reliance on republican theory. 6' Michelman
adds a second, process-facilitating suggestion: the Court can seek
to preserve the conditions necessary to support self-governing
activity by the disempowered. Thus, for example, the dissenters'
position in Bowers v. Hardwick62 can be defended with a republican
57

j. ELY, supra note 8, at 59 n.**.

58 See Michelman, Law's Republic 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1529 (1988).
59 See id. at 1530.
60 Id. at 1529.
61 See Minow, supra note 19, at 88-89.
62 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Hardwick was charged with committing sodomy with a
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process argument that, "U]ust as property rights-rights of having
and holding material resources-become, in a republican perspective, a matter of constitutive political concern as underpinning the
independence and authenticity of the citizen's contribution to the
collective determinations of public life, so is it with the privacies of
personal refuge and intimacy."63 In this process-enhancing role,
the Court facilitates rather than displaces or represents popular
64
participation.
Unfortunately, this insight yields little in the way of prescription
that Michelman had not already taught us long before his journey
into Pocock, Pitkin, and Harrington, when he argued that the
Constitution compels government to provide a "social minimum" of
resources to every person so that he or she can function as a full
participant in the political life of the community. 65 Moreover,
Law's Republic leaves us back at square one on the problem of size.
E. A PopularRepublican Dilemma
With the publication of the Yale Symposium on the Civic
Republican Tradition, the development of a republican alternative
advanced to a new stage. Symposium participants, ranging from
Paul Brest to Richard Epstein, pointed out the elitism in the
Michelman and Sunstein articles. 66 Sunstein and-as we have

consenting adult in his bedroom. A five-member majority rejected Hardwick's claim
that his constitutional right of privacy had been infringed. See id. at 190. The
dissenters argued that the state had violated Hardwick's "right to be let alone." Id.
at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
63 Michelman, supra note 58, at 1535 (footnotes omitted).
64 For a more skeptical view of Michelman's attempt to give the Court a processenhancing role, see Abrams, Law's Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1591, 1597-98 (1988).
65 See Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 9-16 (1969).
6G See Abrams, supra note 64, at 1603 ("In their distinctive ways, both Michelnan
and Sunstein redirect our attention to the activities of a narrower citizenry: members
of the judiciary."); Bell & Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 97 YALE
L.J. 1609, 1620 (1988) ("[T]he current interest in civic republicanism maybe a passing
fashion for those with the luxury to revel in the life of the mind. .. ."); Brest, Further

Beyond the RepublicanRevival: Toward RadicalRepublicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1623, 1625
(1988) ("[Ilt is at least ironic that much of the legal scholarship of the republican
revival, rather than working to promote participation and discourse.., is as courtcentered as the pluralist scholarship from which it distinguishes itself."); Epstein,

Modern Republicanism: Or The Flight From Substance, 97 YALE L.J. 1633, 1642 (1988)
("The cynic might well say that bo th Michelman and Sunstein applaud republicanism
because it gives skilled academics a comparative advantage: this is the public choice
explanation as to why intellectuals prefer politics to markets."); Powell, Reviving
Republicanism, 97 YALE LJ. 1703, 1708 (1988) (suggesting that Sunstein's proposals
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seen-Michelman both moved beyond their earlier court-centered
suggestions, finding traces of republican self-government in, for
example, local communities, religious congregations, unions, and
other intermediate groups. 67 This new focus on direct participation by ordinary citizens moves the republican revival away from the
elitist tradition of republican thought, exemplified by The Federalist,
and toward the popular republican tradition, exemplified by
68
Rousseau and Thomas Jefferson.
In rejecting elitism, however, the new republicans have been
thrown back on the horns of the size dilemma. While small groups
undoubtedly provide a manageably sized forum for direct participation, the problem of self-government at the national level remains.
How are disempowered groups to engage in nationwide dialogue
and lawmaking?
One group of scholars, tagged by one of its number as "normative pluralists," has suggested an alternative: forget nationwide selfgovernment and rely on self-regulating interactions among autonomous self-governing groups.6 9 These thinkers have made an
undeniable contribution in disclosing and explaining the importance
of group self-government to strong democracy. 70 To the extent
that their emphasis on autonomous groups excludes nationwide selfgovernment, however, they fall prey to the centrifugal vices of

reflect assumptions that "contradict a belief in participatory or 'strong' democracy:
a distrust in at least the wisdom of the citizen body generally, and a corresponding
confidence that a select and autonomous body of representatives are more likely to
make intelligent and virtuous decisions for the public good than is the public itself."
(footnotes omitted)).
67 See Michelman, supra note 58, at 1531; Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival,
97 YALE LJ. 1539, 1578 (1988).
68 On the elitist republicanism of The Federalis4see Sunstein, InterestGroups,supra
note 20, at 38-45; see also infra text accompanying notes 252-55. For some characteristic Rousseauian statements on the necessity for popular participation, see supra notes
34-35; text accompanying note 41. For more on this aspect of Rousseau's thought,
see C. PATEMAN, supra note 29, at 22-27. A thorough and thought-provoking
summary of'Jefferson's views may be found in R. MATTHEWS, THE RADICAL POLITICS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: A REVISIONIST VIEW 77-95 (1984).
69 See Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,97 HARv. L. REV. 4, 46-53 (1983);
Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE LJ. 1713, 1716-21 (1988).
70 For essays that make this contribution while leaving the possibility of
nationwide self-government ambiguous, see, e.g., Baker, The Processof Changeand the
Liberty Theory oftheFirstAmnendment 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 293 (1981); Garet, Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001 (1983); Soifer, Toward
a Generalized Notion of the Right to Fonn or Join an Association: An Essay for Tom
Emerson, 38 CASE W.L. REV. 641 (1988).
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anarchism. 71 We cannot so easily escape the dilemma of strong
democracy at the national level.
II.

REPUBLICAN MOMENTS

The search for alternatives to interest group politics should
begin not in the realm of theory but in the political life of ordinary
citizens. 72 In his Storrs Lectures, Bruce Ackerman has provided an
73
excellent starting point.
A. Ackerman's ConstitutionalMoments
Professor Ackerman is painfully aware of the difficulties facing
citizens who seek to practice republican politics. An appeal to the
public interest is likely to be met "with bewilderment, or worse, by
friends and neighbors who fail to look beyond their parochial
interests." 74 Most of the citizenry most of the time is simply too
apathetic, ignorant of public issues, and selfish to engage in political
activity. 75 A serious attempt to eliminate these obstacles would
require a system of "coercive democracy," which would force
citizens to pay attention, for example, by compelling them to spend
an hour or two each day discussing public issues. Since the coercive
cure is worse than the liberal pluralist disease, the normal operation
of politics must be conceded to interest group representation-albeit
76
bounded by civic-minded judicial review.
But Ackerman extends his search for citizen self-government
beyond the bounds of representative government. There, he finds
a "higher lawmaking track," textually rooted in article V's provision
for constitutional conventions, theoretically elaborated in The
Federalist, and historically manifested in three constitutional
moments: (1) the founding of the republic; (2) the events culminat71See M. TUSHNET, supra note 38, at 155. Cover asserts optimistically that conflict
among groups with competing normative commitments will be muted spontaneously
by the competing norms themselves, which limit the situations in which open conflict

is justified. See Cover, supra note 69, at 50.

72 As Benjamin Barber has pointed out, institutions of self-government "should
be realistic and workable. For all practical purposes, this means that they ought to
be a7 product of actual political experience." B. BARBER, supra note 29, at 262.

3 See Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discoveing the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013

(1984).
74 Id. at 1034.
75 See id. at 1033-34.
76 See id. at 1028-30, 1034-35.
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ing in the adoption and acceptance of the Civil War amendments;
and (3) the constitutional vindication of the New Deal.77
In order to succeed on the higher track, a political movement
must refuse to be bought off by short-term selfish gains obtainable
on the lower track.78 This requires a high level of commitment
from the movement's adherents. For these citizens, the normal
priority of private over public life is reversed; they become private
citizens instead of private citizens. If they persevere, and if they
"strike a resonant chord" among the people, "their strong appeals
to the public good are no longer treated as if they were the ravings
of fringe elements." 79 At such moments, "millions of Americans
do manage, despite the countless diversions of liberal democratic
society, to engage in an act of self-government with a seriousness
that compares to the most outstanding constitutional achievements
80
of the past."
Inspiring talk. But at first glance, it seems that Professor
Ackerman has come to praise republicanism only to bury it. His
theory celebrates a system that has produced only three constitutional moments in two centuries, and two of those involved full-scale
warfare. Ackerman's three moments are not, however, intended as
a comprehensive list of popular republican periods. He set out to
develop a theory ofjudicial review, not of direct popular power. In
pursuit of that agenda, he sought only periods of citizen involvement so intense, widespread, and coherent that they could plausibly
be said to provide the Court with a mandate to overturn legislative
enactments.8 1 This Article, which seeks to explore the role of
direct popular power in general, requires a broader search.

71See id. at 1051-52, 1058.
78 See id. at 1040-41.
79 Id. at 1042.
80
Id.at 1043.
81 What distinguishes Ackerman's three constitutional moments from other
participatory periods is the relative coherence of their outcomes at the level of
constitutional lawmaking. The first two produced constitutional texts, and the third,
the New Deal, produced a focused showdown between the popular movement for
economic regulation and the Supreme Court's free market activism. Thus, it is not
true that-as Mark Tushnet has charged-there is no logic behind Ackerman's threc
moments other than that he approved of their results. See M. TUSHNET, supra note
38, at 25.

306

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 139:287

B. Public Purpose and CreedalPassion
Historians and political scientists have long recognized and
pondered over the fact that American politics seems to alternate
between periods characterized by public action, idealism, and
reform and periods of private interest, materialism, and retrenchment.8 2 Each period helps to generate its own demise. A prolonged private period spawns orgies of corruption and extremes of
wealth and poverty that, sooner or later, ignite passionate movements for reform. Public periods inevitably burn themselves out;
most people eventually become exhausted with politics and return
to family and private pursuits.8 3
Seven periods are often mentioned as public periods: the
Revolutionary era, the Jeffersonian upsurge, theJacksonian period,
the Civil War and Reconstruction, the Populist era, the New Deal,
and the 1960s.8 4 Most produced what V.0. Key labelled "Critical
Elections"-elections that reflect basic shifts in the nationwide
85
alignment of political forces.
Samuel P. Huntington has described the two modes of politics
in detail. He contrasts interest group pluralism, which "accounts for
most of American politics most of the time," with a distinct,
participatory mode-"creedal politics"-which supplements and at
times supplants interest group bargaining.8 6 In creedal politics,
the republican ideals of direct participation and socially-situated
moral discourse prevail over their liberal counterparts. Creedal
politics tends to be "idealistic rather than materialistic, reformminded rather than status-quo oriented, and formulated in terms of
82

See A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE CYCLES OF AMERICAN HISTORY 24-26 (1986); A.
(1949). Albert 0. Hirschman made

SCHLESINGER, SR., PATHS TO THE PRESENT 80-84

the point more generally for western capitalist countries.

See A. HIRSCHMAN,

SHIFTING INVOLVEMENTS: PRIVATE INTEREST AND PUBLIC ACTION 3-8 (1982). For a

recent statement, see K. PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF RICH AND POOR xx (1990).
83 See A. HIRSCHMAN, Supra note 82, at 92-102; A. SCHLESINGER,JR., supra note 82,
at 28.
84 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. embraces all seven, characterizing swings
between
private and public periods as generation-driven; others focus on varying subsets, with
different theories to explain the shifts between periods. See A. SCHLESINGER, JR.,
supra note 82, at 23-25, 31-34.
85 See Key, A Theory of CriticalElections, 17J. POL. 3, 16 (1955). Key's observations
served as the starting point for Walter Dean Burnham's influential theory of critical
elections. See W. BURNHAM, CRITI CAL ELECTIONS AND THE MAINSPRINGS OF AMERICAN
POLITICS (1970).
86 See S. HUNTINGTON, AMERICAN POLITICS: THE PROMISE OF DISHARMONY 105
(1981).
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right and wrong rather than more or less."8 7 Practitioners of
creedal politics appeal to deeply held American values, eschewing
the politics of self-interest. In contrast to liberal pluralism's
emphasis on party, electoral, and interest group politics, creedal
politics are characterized by protest, exposure, and reform propelled by "passionate drives to expose evil, to protest evil, and to
reform evil." 88
Huntington identifies four "creedal passion periods" when this
form of politics predominated: (1) the Revolutionary era of the
1760s and 1770s; (2) theJacksonian age of the 1820s and 1830s; (3)
the Populist-Progressive decades of the 1890s and 1900s; and (4) the
period of social upheaval sparked by the civil rights, anti-war, and
women's rights movements in the 1960s and early 1970s.8 9 During
such periods, political ideas and ideals are taken seriously throughout society. 90 Political participation is widespread and intense.
Public-spirited voluntary associations, "the peculiar American
contribution to achieving the common good," displace political
parties and representative government as the preferred organizational form for political action. 91 Although creedal movements
invariably fall far short of their goals, they have forced major
structural reforms, for example the introduction of universal white
male suffrage during the Jacksonian era, the first regulatory
commissions and antitrust laws during the Populist-Progressive era,
and the dismantling of legal segregation in the South during the
92
1960s.
Huntington claims that his construct captures the main
historical periods during which the American people practiced an
alternative form of politics to interest group pluralism. His pursuit
of a narrower agenda has, however, led him to omit highly significant periods of direct citizen participation. Of particular importance is his omission of the New Deal.93
8

7 Id.

88

Id. at 180.

89 See id. at 4, 85.
90 See id. at 93-97.
91
92
93

Id. at 97-99.
See id. at 116-17, 198.

Huntington also omits the era of Civil War and Reconstruction, unfortunately
without explanation. This omission is, however, less of a problem because the
occurrence of full-scale warfare mutes the significance of direct citizen participation.
Moreover, Huntington implies in an aside that he views the abolitionist movement as
a creedal movement. See id. at 98.
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Huntington' excludes the New Deal because, in his view, it
focused on economic rather than political problems, substituted
pragmatism for the "moralism and Puritanism" characteristic of
other creedal periods, expanded rather than cleansed or democratized government, and mobilized social movements along horizontal
class lines rather than the "more vertical cleavage characteristic of
94
creedal passion periods."
None of these distinctions are germane to our search for
experiences of citizen self-government. Huntington does not, and
could not, deny that the New Deal embodied all of the features of
his creedal periods that are important here: widespread and intense
political participation, political discourse centering on principles
rather than narrow self-interest, serious consideration of farreaching change, and the overshadowing of representative government by voluntary associations and social protest.
Indeed, a strong case can be made that Huntington was wrong
to exclude the New Deal even on his own terms. His characterization of the New Deal as economic, pragmatic, and lacking in
purifying or democratizing impulses fails to take account of the
period's climactic conflict. By the time of the New Deal, the labor
movement and its allies had been fighting for decades to implement
economic reform, scoring numerous legislative victories. Most of
these successes were nullified by courts. 95 The New Deal period
saw the elimination of the unelected judiciary as a barrier to
popular legislation, the transfer of enforcement power from what
were perceived to be anti-democratic judges to public-minded
administrators, 9 6 and the extension of democratic government to
the market realm.
Of course, in the depths of the Great Depression, the main
concern of policymakers was economic recovery. But the public
debate was heavily influenced by popular movements voicing the
language of equality, justice, and fundamental rights. In the period
leading up to the New Deal, "[e]veryone from Woodrow Wilson to
Big Bill Haywood acknowledged that the 'labor question' was not
merely the supreme economic question but the constitutive moral,
97
political, and social dilemma of the new industrial order."

9'Id. at 90-91.
95 See Forbath, The Shaping cf the American Labor Movement, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1109, 1132-48, 1237-48 (1989).
95
97

SeeJ. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 33-34 (1938).
Fraser, The Labor Question, in THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER 55,
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Consider the Wagner Act, a centerpiece of the New Deal order.
While the lawyers who drafted the law saw it as, a Keynesian
recovery measure, 98 its political supporters also viewed it as a
democratic reform, the replacement of industrial feudalism and
99
slavery by freedom of self-organization and God-given rights.
The law was enacted partly in response to a massive wave of protest
marches, strikes, job actions, and other protests. 1° ° In 1937,
Fortune Magazine provided what may be the best brief summary of
the relationship between economic pressures, popular upsurge, and
the Wagner Act:
A labor movement fighting merely for better wages might or might
not be a "movement" in the profound sense: it might be a kind
of guerrilla warfare, indicating unrest but without historical
direction. On the other hand, when men strike for union
recognition they are striking for collective bargaining ....

The

fact that half of the 1936 strikes were fought for [this] principle,
with the trend continuing into the stormy spring and summer of
1937, is of such significance that those who follow labor closely are
inclined to doubt the comfortable theory ... to the effect that the
current wave of strikes is just a normal post-depression phenomenon.... Washington has strengthened labor's position, not just
55 (S. Fraser & G. Gerstle eds. 1989).
98

See Casebeer, Holder of the Pen: An Interview with Leon Keyserling on Draftingthe

Wagner Act; 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 285, 295-96 (1987).
9 See 78 CONG. REc. 12,044 (1934) (Sen. Wagner). Representative William
Connery, who introduced the Wagner Act in the House, proclaimed that the right to
strike "is not a right that comes from Congress, but is a divine right which comes
from the Almighty God." 79 CONG. REC. 9730 (1935).
100 See F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS 129-33 (1977);
Goldfield, Worker Insurgency, Radical Organization,and New Deal LaborLegislation, 83
AM. POL. Sm. REV. 1257, 1270-73 (1989). As always, the attribution of social
causation is open to challenge. The main evidence offered to disprove a causal link
between worker protest and the Wagner Act is the decline in strike activity between
the 1934 strike wave, which included several successful general strikes, and the
enactment of the Wagner Act in 1935. See Skocpol, PoliticalResponse to Capitalist
Crisis: Neo-Marxist Theories of the State and the Case of the New Dea4 10 POL. & SOC'Y
155, 187-89 (1980). But as Professor Hyde points out,
it seems highly reductionist to suppose that month-by-month levels of unrest
would alone, or even importantly, determine the timing of the law-making
process. Legislation could still be said to respond to unrest, particularly if
some significant unrest in the near future appeared likely throughout the
period, as was true in 1935.
Hyde, A Theomy of Labor Legislation, 38 BUFFALO L. REV. 383, 437 (1990). Other
arguments are discussed and refuted in Goldfield, supra, at 1259-76.
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for the hell of it, but in response to forces that the depression
stimulated and revitalized. 10 1
Huntington's final distinction is puzzling. He contrasts the
class-based cleavages of the New Deal with the "vertical" (i.e., crossclass) cleavages of creedal passion periods. 10 2 It turns out, however, that the creedal movements were dominated by "middle-class"
reformers. 10 3 As with most successful reform movements, these
leaders found support outside their own class. It is hard to see why
this made Huntington's middle-class dominated creedal movements
qualitatively more "vertical" than the New Deal's working-class
movements, which found numerous allies among the middle classes
and, according to some, among the upper classes. 10 4 It seems
that Huntington either rejects the possibility of working class people
engaging in moral politics, or has chosen, for some reason, to
exclude such movements from his construct.
In short, Huntington's creedal construct is too narrow for
present purposes. We are concerned not with the "Puritan" content
of reform demands or with middle class leadership, but with the
popular republican character of political life among all moral
viewpoints and social classes. 10 5 Hence, instead of "public periods" or "creedal passion periods," the term "republican moments"
best identifies the phenomenon under study here.
C. Republican Moments
Republican moments are not, of course, republican in the strict
sense.
At no time did direct citizen self-government entirely
displace the interest group process. Nor was the classical ideal of
the deliberative republic implemented in any recognizable form.
These periods were, however, republican in the same sense that the
republican revival is republican. 10 6 The everyday liberal priorities

101 The Industrial War, FORTUNE, Nov. 1937, at 106, 156.
102 See S. HUNTINGTON, supra note 86, at 91.
103 See id. at 106, 181.
104 See, e.g., Ferguson, Indus'trial Conflict and the Coming of the New Deal: The
Triumph of MultinationalLiberalism in America, in THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW
DEAL ORDER, supra note 97, at 3, 19-24 (discussing Franklin Roosevelt's political
alliances with big business during the New Deal).
105 Although the focus here i:; on groups that are disempowered in interest group
bargaining, it seems that even business groups-the perennial winners in interest
group politics-practice a more republican form of politics during periods of
heightened struggle. See Martin, Constructed Interests and Elite Social Movements:
Tax Reform in 1986, at 4-17 (1990) (unpublished paper on file with the author).
106 On the divergence of the republican revival from classical republicanism, see
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of autonomy over community, acquisitiveness over civic virtue, and
instrumental rationality over moral choice were reversed, albeit only
partially and temporarily.
Republican moments have five defining features. The first three
track the republican-liberal distinction:
(1) large numbers of
Americans engage in serious political discourse; (2) their arguments
are couched primarily in moral rather than pecuniary terms and
appeal to the common good rather than private interest; and (3) the
subjects of debate include fundamental aspects of the social,
political, or economic order.
The last two track the distinction between direct popular power
and representative politics-as-normal: (4) representative politics are
overshadowed by extra-institutional forms of citizen participation
such as popular assemblies, militant protest, and civil disobedience;
and (5) social movements and voluntary associations displace
interest groups and political parties as the leading forms of political
1 7
organization. 0
supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
107 The historical distinction between republican moments and liberal politics-asnormal parallels the sociological distinction between social movements and interest
groups. Social movements typically employ extra-institutional direct action tactics,
while interest groups rely primarily on routinized lobbyini relationships with public
officials. See D. MCADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK
INSURGENCY 1930-1970, at 24-25 (1982); Eder, The "New Social Movements: Moral
Crusades, Political Pressure Groups, or Social Movements?, 52 Soc. RES. 869, 884-85

(1985).
Social movements tend to be informally organized and participatory; interest
groups are usually bureaucratized and hierarchical. See McCarthy & Zald, Resource
Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theoy, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN AN
ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY 15, 20-25 (M. Zald &J.McCarthy eds. 1987). While social
movements seek to implement moral principles, interest groups simply demand more
for their members. See Eder, supra,at 885. Social movements advocate basic change;
interest groups focus on incremental gains. See, e.g., R. HEBERLE, SOCIAL MOVEMENTs
9 (1951) ("A pressure group is distinguished from a genuine social movement partly
by the limitedness of its goal-it does not aim at a general change in the social
order"); C. KING, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 27 (1956) (stating that
a social movement is "a group venture extending beyond a local community or a
single event and involving a systematic effort to inaugurate changes in thought,
behavior, and social relationships"); K. LANG & G. LANG, COLLECTIVE DYNAMICS 490
(1961) (explaining that social movements pursue "an objective that affects and shapes
the social order in some fundamental aspect"); Blumer, Collective Belavio?; in
PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY 167, 169 (A. Lee ed. 1951) (describing social movements
as "collective enterprises to establish a new order of life").
The distinction is not, of course, rigid over time. Social movements are often
institutionalized into interest groups (for example, the late 19th century labor
movement produced the American Federation of Labor) and, conversely, new social
movements may arise within established interest groups (for example, the rise of the
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The construct of republican moments is, of course, an ideal
type-a distillation of characteristics that are rarely, if ever, observable in pure form in social practice. Three periods approach the
ideal type very closely: the Revolutionary era, the New Deal, and
the 1960s.1 0 8 Four others are close enough to warrant the label:

the Jeffersonian upsurge, the Age of Jackson, the period of Civil
10 9

War and Reconstruction, and the Populist era.
Thus far, I have focused exclusively on nationwide, multi-issue
republican moments. Even when national political life is dominated
by interest group bargaining, however, there is a constant simmering of popular agitation.
Out of this background of low-level
activity, democratic upsurges may bubble up and displace politics-asusual at the state or local level as happened, for example, in North
Dakota during the Non-Partisan League's reform campaigns of
1919-1920 or in Rhode Island during the Dorr Rebellion. Alternatively, the entire nation may experience popular republican politics
on a single issue, as in the struggle for women's suffrage, and the
current debate over abortion.
Full-scale republican moments
typically emerge out of such localized or single-issue mobiliza110
tions.
industrial union movement within the AFL).
108 On the Revolutionary era, see G. WOOD, supra note 29, at 3-7, 319-28
(describing the period as one of intense and widespread debate over fundamentals,
with organs of direct popular power often displacing representative institutions). On
the New Deal, see supra text accompanying notes 93-101. For a depiction of the
1960s as embodying all of the elements of republican moments, see S. HUNTINGTON,
supra note 86, at 167-220.
109 For depictions of these periods as times of intense public involvement, see L.
BANNING,

THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION

(1978);

E. FONER, RECONSTRUCTION:

AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877, at 60-68, 100-23,278-79,281-91,30733 (1988); L. GOODWYN, DEMOCRATIC PROMISE: THE POPULIST MOVEMENT IN
AMERICA 523-55

(1976);

R. REMINI, THE REVOLUTIONARY AGE OF ANDREW JACKSON

147-51 (1976). I consider theJeffersonian andJacksonian moments to be less clear
examples because party organization and electoral campaigning had not yet been
coopted as instruments of interest-group politics-as-normal, and thus were available
for use by reformers without the necessity of first building a movement through
extra-electoral means. The operation of popular republican politics during the era
of Civil War and Reconstruction was overshadowed by the politics of war and
occupation. The populist moment was, in a sense, a failed republican moment.
Although the labor and populist movements attempted to practice popular republican
politics, their efforts were truncated when the major strikes of the era were crushed
by military force.
1l0 For example, the Revolutionary movement grew out of single-issue campaigns
against British taxation schemes. The populist movement grew out of local farmers'
alliances. The civil rights movement built on boycotts and protests that were initiated
at the local level.
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The resulting picture shows the American political order not as
a delicately balanced machine or a harmonious body politic, but as
a competition between rival modes of politics, with republican
moments punctuating the operation of politics-as-normal at all
levels.
D. PopularRepublican Pathologies?
In response to earlier drafts of this Article, many readers
objected that I must have searched for instances of popular
participation through rose-colored glasses. Queried one: "I remain
uncertain about why the KKK, the Red Scare, McCarthyism,
Reaganism, etc. are not also 'moments'-and why exclude those
mobs who tarred and feathered Wobblies, lynched blacks, smashed
those opposed to World War I, and are blockading abortion clinics
today?""'
One of these examples-Reaganism-bears no relation to a
republican moment. The so-called "Reagan revolution" thrived on
political apathy. The principal form of citizen involvement was
voting, and even the rate of voter participation was down from the
1960s and 1970s, especially among groups that are relatively
disempowered in interest group bargaining." 2 None of the
defining characteristics of a republican moment.was present.
The remaining examples all exhibit at least some features of
republican moments. Most, however, depart decisively from the
model. Republican moments are defined by widespread participation in serious political discourse.
Many of the questioner's
examples are characterized by the systematic suppression of discourse. Thus, for example, the Reconstruction-era Klan rode to
expel Republican leaders and prevent African-Americans from
voting, goals which were achieved with spectacular success in many
areas of the South.1 1 3 The Red Scare of 1919-1920 involved an
attempt to silence radicals and the militant wing of the labor

I1am indebted to Aviam Soifer for asking this question so forcefully that I felt
compelled to attempt an answer.
112 See F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, WHY AMERICANs DON'T VOTE 160-62 (1988).

11 As described by David Chalmers, the main function of night riding was "to
destroy the basis of Negro political effectiveness by driving out its leaders, white and
black." D. CHALMERs, HOODED AMERICANIsM: THE HISTORY OF THE Ku KLux KLAN
14 (1987). In some areas, the Klan's tactics of torture, murder, and violent intimidation virtually eliminated the Republican vote. See id. at 15-16; see also E. FONER, supra
note 109, at 425-26 (observing that, in effect, "the klan was a military force serving
the interests of the Democratic party").
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movement, both by direct violence and by government repression. 114 McCarthyism was a similar, albeit less spectacular, phenomenon.
Repression and violence cannot, of course, be entirely avoided
when political passions run high, but these periods are distinguished
by the extent to which repression and intimidation dominated the
political atmosphere. Participatory politics were displaced by a
politics of fear.
Lynch-mobs, anti-Wobblie vigilantes, and patriotic enforcers are
specific phenomena, not "moments." Although such groups may be
active during republican moments, they are suppressing rather than
practicing popular republican politics.
What about the "Pro-life" movement? There is an obvious
factual distinction along right versus left political lines. 115 This
distinction is, however, radically inconsistent with the core notion
of republican moments. The focus here is on the democratic quality
of the political process, not its substantive outcomes. 1 16 The
current public debate over abortion meets all the criteria of a
114

When socialists attempted to hold a nationwide series of celebrations on May

Day in 1919, "[w]herever there were celebrations, there were also violent attacks on
the Socialists." AMERICAN VIOLENCE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 351 (R. Hofstadter
& M. Wallace eds. 1970). A mob in Weirton, West Virginia forced 118 striking
immigrants to kiss the American [lag. See M. LEVIN, POLITICAL HYSTERIA IN AMERICA
28(1971). These incidents were typical of a wide-ranging outburst of anti-striker and
anti-radical violence. See R. MURRAY, RED SCARE: A STUDY OF NATIONAL HYSTERIA,
1919-1920, at 30, 180-89 (1955). The most famous instance of government repression
occurred on the night ofJanuary 2, 1920, when federal officers rounded up more
than 4,000 alleged radicals in 23 states. A blue-ribbon group of twelve lawyers
including Roscoe Pound, Felix Frankfurter, and Zachariah Chaffee subsequently
issued a report condemning the raids for gross due process violations. See M. LEVIN,
supra, at 57-58.
115 1 am using the terms "right" and "left" as follows: right movements tend to
be protective of established groups and elites, while left movements tend to advance
the claims of hitherto excluded or disempowered groups.
11 6
By invoking the substance-process distinction, I do not mean to claim that the
construct is substantively neutral. There simply is no such thing as a substantively
neutral process. See L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 28 (1985); Parker, supranote
9, at 236. The idea of republican moments embodies a left bias because it emphasizes
widespread participation and extra-institutional forms of popular power. During
republican moments, the out-groups tend to be more effective politically than during
periods of politics-as-normal. Nevertheless, the defining characteristics are all
process-based. It is quite possible for a conservative to recognize that rights of
protest are likely to strengthen her political opponents, and yet to support those
rights as essential to democracy. Conversely (and perhaps more often in practice)
liberals may understand that their constituents benefit from rights of protest and yet
oppose such rights in practice because they would rather resolve issues in the more
peaceful and controllable context of elite bargaining.
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republican moment. Militant anti-abortion protesters have forced
the issue to the top of the legislative agenda in many states. Prochoice activists have responded with mass demonstrations and
lobbying campaigns. Politicians find themselves under intense
public scrutiny on the issue. Whatever the ultimate outcome, large
numbers of Americans have been drawn into a passionate, nationwide debate over fundamental moral principles.
III. REPUBLICAN MOMENTS AS A PARTIAL ANTIDOTE TO INTEREST

GROUP POLITICS

We have seen that social movements use direct power to bring
on republican moments, and that republican moments tilt the polity
toward the republican values of participation, virtue, and positive
freedom. But is a little republicanism necessarily a good thing?
After all, it was only a few decades ago that social movements were
widely regarded as divisive nuisances, and their leaders as "agitators,
117
rabble-rousers, or maladjusted personalities."
A thorough empirical analysis of the consequences of republican
moments is beyond the scope of this Article, but a canvass of the
literature supports a strong hypothesis that republican moments
provide correctives, albeit temporary and partial, to the main flaws
of interest group pluralism. Although these flaws have been
recognized and crititued from a wide range of theoretical perspectives, I have made a special effort to address the public choice
versions because of their enormous influence during the past
decade.
A. From Narrow Self-Interest to Public Virtue
According to public choice theory, it would be lunacy for
citizens to prefer public participation over private pursuits. Even
voting, the least demanding form of political participation, may be
irrational. Since the incremental benefit gained by a voter is likely
to be less than the cost of obtaining the information necessary to
R. HEBERLE,' supra note 107, at 417. Heberle criticizes this view as "partisan
abuse of psychopathological categories." Id. Perhaps the most famous depiction of
social movements as pathological phenomena is found in E. HOFFER, THE TRUE
BELIEVER (1951). More recently social scientists have tended to acknowledge that
social movements can perform salutary functions in promoting change and rectifying
117

power imbalances. See Walker & Mendlovitz, Peace, Politics and Contemporaty Social
Movements, in TOWARDS A JUST WORLD PEACE:

PERSPECTIVES

MOVEMENTS 3, 10-11 (S. Mendlovitz & R. Walker eds. 1987).

FROM SOCIAL
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make an intelligent choice, the typical citizen is "rationally ignorant"
about public affairs.1 18 She will make the effort to overcome
ignorance only if offered selective incentives to do so. This theory,
however, is accurate only when isolated individuals stand face-toface with the institutions of representative politics-as-usual.
Direct popular power alters the equation in two ways. First, it
gives ordinary citizens the experience of engaging in effective
collective action. In the early stages of a social movement, commitment and solidarity are forged in local struggles for limited
objectives. For example, colonial mobs forced royal tax officials to
resign; abolitionists helped slaves escape to Canada; industrial
workers struck for union recognition; and African-Americans
boycotted until white employers broke the color barrier. In local
settings, individuals learn to see themselves not as the anonymous,
isolated statistics of the public choice model, but as important
members of an effective and empowered group. They may thus
become what a recent empirical study described as "calculating
Kantians" who are "willing to do their duty if enough others are
119
doing the same."
As a social movement gains momentum, its adherents may cease
to see political action as a cost. Where the contrast between
individual despair and collective empowerment is especially sharp,
as during the Montgomery bus boycott of 1955-56, individuals
embrace collective action as a "liberating passion rather than a
distasteful chore." 120 The free-rider problem dissolves because
the experience of self-government itself becomes a source of
personal satisfaction. Thus, at some point, "the benefit of collective
action for an individual is not the difference between the hoped-for
118

See M. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF POLITICAL MARKETS

69-70 (1981); M. OLSON, supra note 15, at 26. Olson explains that the rational voter
will weigh the costs of obtaining information against the benefit she will receive from
a correct choice multiplied by the probability that her vote will be decisive to the
outcome. Since the likelihood that an election will be decided by one vote is
infinitesimal, voters have little incentive to inform themselves. See id. at 26.
119
Finkel, Muller & Opp, PersonalInfluence, CollectiveRationality,and Mass Political
Action, 83 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 885, 886, 900-01 (1989) (statistical study of protesters
in Germany concluding that they engage in collective action because they believe
either (1) that their individual participation makes a difference, or (2) that they are
part of a group of people who are willing to engage in protest if enough others are
willing to do the same).
120 Kennedy, Martin Luther King's Constitution: A Legal Histoty of the Montgomey
Bus Boycot4 98 YALE LJ. 999, 1022-23 (1989) (describing the sentiment among
African-Americans in Montgomery after African-Americans demonstrated surprisingly
strong solidarity in the bus boycott of 1955-56).

REPUBLICAN MOMENTS

result and the effort furnished by him or her, but the sum of these
12 1
two magnitudesl"
Second, the drama and disruption of direct popular power
mobilize the citizenry into political discourse. When individuals
must sit in a traffic jam caused by protesters, endure the glare of
picketers to shop at their favorite store, do without the services of
workers on strike, or see the calm of their neighborhoods disturbed
by residential picketers, it becomes more difficult for them to
remain focused on private pursuits. People who are not directly
affected see the protests on television or read about them in
newspapers. If the turmoil continues; citizens begin to pay more
attention.1 22 Although the initial reaction is usually anger against
the protesters, attention eventually shifts to the underlying
123
issues.
Opponents of direct popular power contend that it enables small
elites to force their views upon an apathetic populace. 124 They
point to the undeniable fact that only a small fraction of the
population actually participates in protest. But direct popular
power rarely serves as an effective weapon for imposing one group's
views on another. 125 Because it operates out in the open, it
usually contributes not only to the mobilization of supporters, but
also of opponents. Indeed, in the early stages of a movement,
protest often provokes a backlash from citizens who would prefer to
remain immersed in private pursuits.
In short, direct popular power is more useful in raising the pitch
of political struggle than in determining its outcome.
Once
distracted from private pursuits, the citizenry may selectively
embrace the protesters' demands, as occurred with the labor
121 A. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 82, at 86.
122
In Olson's view, there is one major exception to the rule of rational ignorance:

when information is fascinating or entertaining in itself, citizens may make the effort
to acquire it for those reasons. See M. OLSON, supra note 15, at 26. The prime

examples are sweeping statements, picturesque protests, and lively demonstrations-all
hallmarks of republican moments. See id. at 27.
123 On the role of protest in mobilizing popular constituencies, see Lipsky, Protest
as a PoliticalResource, in POWER AND CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES: EMPIRICAL
FINDINGS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 161 (K. Dolbeare ed. 1969).
124 See, e.g., Feuer, Participatory Demnocracy: Lenin Updated, in PARTICIPATORY
DEMOCRACY 57, 61 (T. Cook & P. Morgan eds. 1971) (describing civil rights protests
organized by the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee as "putschist" actions
of a "small student elite").,
125 There is one important exception to this generalization-when a group uses
direct popular power to suppress political activity by others. See supra text
accompanying notes 113-14.
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movement of the 1930s and the civil rights and anti-war movements
of the 1960s, or turn against them, as appears to be happening in
many states today in the struggle over abortion. The ultimate
outcome, whatever it is, reflects broader and more intense public
participation than interest group politics-as-usual.
B. Breaking the Interest Group Logjam
One of the most powerful critiques of interest group politics,
advanced from both the left and the right, points out the extreme
difficulty of getting anything done or-in republican terms-of
making conscious decisions about the basic direction of the country.
126
It is commonly said that America has become "ungovernable."
Policymakers, unwilling to consider or implement basic change,
"minimax" their way toward incremental reform. 127
Interest
groups form strong relationships with government agencies and
tenaciously resist any attempt to alter the balance of forces. 128 It
is especially difficult to change the "agenda of controversy, the list
of questions which are recognized by the active participants as
legitimate subjects of attention and concern." 29 Logrolling, it
seems, results in logjams.
While political life degenerates into stalemate, civil society
continues to change. Gradually, the state grows apart from society.
Government ceases to reflect either the needs or the preferences of
the people. 130 As depicted in Figure 1, republican moments are
126 M. OLSON, supra note 15, at 8.
127 See D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, STRATEGY OF DECISION:

POLICY

EVALUATION AS A SOCIAL PROCESS 83-86 (1963); T. LowI, THE END OF LIBERALISM:
IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE CRISIS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY 60-61 (1969); D. YATES,
BUREAUCRATIC DEMOCRACY: THE SEARCH FOR DEMOCRACY AND EFFICIENCY IN
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 103-05 (1982).
128 See D. TRUMAN, supra note 6, at 467-68. Many observers have noted the
existence of "iron triangles" composed of a government agency, an interest group
beneficiary of the agency, and the congressional committee charged with overseeing
the agency. Once an iron triangle gains control over an area of policy, it may be
virtually impossible to dislodge. See P. ARONSON, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: STRATEGY
AND CHOICE 491 (1981); D. YATES, supra note 127, at 165.
129 Walker, A Critiqueof the Elitist Theoty of Democracy, 60 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 285,
292 (1966).
130The classic statement of this disjuncture is the Marxist dichotomy between base
and superstructure, with the development at the base driven by advances in
productive forces. See K. MARX & F. ENGELS, THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY 68-69 (R.Pascal
ed. 1947). One need not, however, adopt a Marxist-or even a progressive-view of
history to recognize that a stalemated state is likely to grow apart from the society it
is attempting to govern.

1990]

REPUBLICAN MOMENTS

a sort of "surrogate for revolution" that reconnects the state to civil
society. 13 1 Using forms of direct popular power like mass demonstrations, strikes, and boycotts, social movements can force
Republican
fundamental change onto the public agenda. 1 32
moments, like the "critical elections" that tend to accompany them,
respond to the "incapacity of 'politics as usual' to integrate, much
less aggregate, emergent political demand."13 3 The major milestones on the road to the current political order-independence,
abolition, the rise of economic regulation, the integration of the
industrial proletariat into capitalist democracy, and the extension of
formal legal and political rights to racial minorities-were all
products of republican moments.
3
Figure 11 4
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Politics-As-Usual
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See Burnham, Revitalization and Decay: Looking Toward the Third Centuy of

American ElectoralPolitics, 38J. POL., Aug. 1976, at 146, 149. Thus, direct popular
involvement in agenda-setting maybe "more important to the Iongrun stability of the
R. COBB & C. ELDER, PARTICIPATION IN
system than electoral participation."
POLITICS: THE DYNAMICS OF AGENDA BUILDING 164 (1972).
AMERICAN
32

1 For illustrations of the agenda-setting function of popular protest, see R. COBB
& C. ELDER, supra note 131, at 64-71.
133 W. BURNHAM, supra note 85, at 10.
134 This diagram is a modification of one that appears in F. ALBERONI, MOVEMENT
AND INSTITUTION 9 (1984). In Alberoni's depiction, Revolution takes the place of
Republican Moment, and Forces of Production that of Civil Society.
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C. Equalizationfrom Below
It is widely agreed that the normal operation of interest group
pluralism systematically favors some groups over others. Not only
does this violate the principle of political equality, but it also leads
to a malfunction in the political marketplace. If all constituencies
were equally represented, then legislators would be pressured to
raise the total wealth of society. As long as the interest groups
active on an issue represent substantially less than the entire
population, they can agree on a solution that will benefit themselves
by transferring wealth from the underrepresented constituencies. 135 Typically, this means enriching small, formally organized
groups at the expense of larger, loosely organized groups. 36 In
economic terms, the costs of the interest group deal "spill over"
onto the underrepresented groups. 13 7 While corporations have
been rightly identified as the big winners in the process, 138 other
"entrenched oligarchies" such as labor unions and farm interests can
39
exercise disproportionate influence under certain conditions.
During republican moments, groups that are disadvantaged in
interest-group bargaining develop unorthodox forms of direct
popular power. The popular assemblies and boycott movements of
the Revolutionary era helped to compensate for malfunctions in the
representative process. 40
Reformers circumvented politics-asnormal during the Jacksonian era by calling state constitutional
conventions. 14 1
Conservative women invaded the "gendered
space" of taverns and saloons, while their radical counterparts
parlayed female control of household consumption into collective
power by boycotting such targets as British importers, slave
135 See K. SCHLOZMAN & J. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 312-13 (1986). For a useful summary of the literature, see Farber &
Frickey, supra note 11, at 906-07. 925.
136 See M. EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 35-36 (1964); M. OLSON,
supra note 15, at 41; K. SCHLOZMv.AN &J. TIERNEY, supra note 135, at 66-87.
137 See M. HAYES, supra note 118, at 57-58.
138 See C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS 172 (1977). The critics of this view
have been reduced to arguing, in effect, that it is impossible to prove who is a winner
in interest group politics. See Wilson, Democracy and the Coiporation,Wall St. J., Jan.
11, 1978, at 14, col. 4.
139 See H. KARIEL, THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN PLURALISM 68-69 (1961); G.
MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 355-57 (1966).
140 See D. HOERDER, CROWD ACTION IN REVOLUTIONARY MASSACHUSETTS 17651780, at 378-80 (1977); see also infra text accompanying notes 189-92 & 222-23.
141 For a portrayal of these constitutional conventions as organs of popular
sovereignty, see D. RODGERS, supra note 6, at 92-101.
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industries, and discriminatory employers. 142 Industrial workers
occupied factories and engaged in general strikes; African-Americans boycotted, sat in, and marched; and the list goes on.
Even groups that appear to be politically effective may in fact be
poorly represented in politics-as-normal. The notion that leaders
and paid lobbyists accurately represent their constituents' interests
4
depends upon an idealized conception of group. organization. 3
Leaders and paid staff develop distinct interests which do not
necessarily coincide with those of the members. 14 4 Internal
democracy-often the main channel for expressing views to
leadership-rarely functions well at the national level.145 Subgroups compete within large interest groups, replicating pluralist
malfunctions on a smaller scale. 146 As a result, the policies purfrom the
sued by group leaders and staffers often diverge widely1 47
interests of many or even most of the group's members.
During republican moments, however, rank-and-file members
are prone to rise up and reshape their organizations. In the 1930s,
for example, a mass movement of industrial workers arose within
the American Federation of Labor, which had been systematically
ignoring their concerns, and drastically altered the balance of power
between the craft and industrial unions and between industrial
workers and their employers. 148 Similarly, in 1959, the NAACP
142

For an analysis of the temperance movement's saloon invasions as highly

effective exercises of direct popular power, see Chused, Gendered Space, 42 FLA. L.
REV. 125, 130-35 (1990). On the role of women in boycotts, see S. EVANS, BORN FOR
LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF WOMEN IN AMERICA 48-50, 259 (1989) andJ.JONES, LABOR
OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW: BLACK WOMEN, WORK AND THE FAMILY, FROM SLAVERY
TO THE PRESENT 215-16, 279-80 (1985).
145 See H. KARIEL, supra note 139, at 241-46.
144For classic, if somewhat extreme, statements of this problem, see R. MICHELS,
POLITICAL PARTIES 136-63 (1915); M. WEBER, The Social Psychology of the World

Religions, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 267, 297-301 (H. Gerth & C.
Mills trans. & eds. 1946). For a more recent treatment, see F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD,
POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED, How THEY FAIL (1977).
45
' The standard study is S. LPSET, M. TROW &J. COLEMAN, UNION DEMOCRACY
(1956).
146 Thus, for example, Grant McConnell has shown that the Farm Bureau came
to act for only a small, highly organized segment of its membership. See G.
MCCONNELL, THE DECLINE OF AGRARIAN DEMOCRACY 173-81 (1953). Similarly,
relatively compact and economically powerful subgroups within unions, like the
skilled trades in the United Auto Workers and the over-the-road truckers in the
Teamsters Union, exercise disproportionate influence over their unions.
147 See supra note 144.
14' The classic account is found in I. BERNSTEIN, THE LEAN YEARS: A HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN WORKER 1920-1933 (1960).
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was forced by the bold sit-in tactics of young activists to endorse a
campaign strategy that was not of its own choosing. 1 49 During
such periods of upheaval, established interest group leaders must
either embrace the rank-and-file initiative, as did the NAACP, or
risk severe damage to their leadership positions, as occurred when
the CIO split from the intransigent AFL. In either case, the
constituency ends up with more responsive representatives.
D. Republican Moments and the Threat of Totalitarianism
In response to earlier versions of this Article, several readers
argued that in celebrating direct popular power there is a risk of
strengthening totalitarian movements. Although interest group
pluralism's affirmative claims to fairness and efficiency may have
been debunked, what about its defensive function as a bulwark
against totalitarian dictatorship? This argument brings us full circle,
back to the early days of modern liberal pluralism.
* Interest-group pluralism originated as a defensive reaction to
the totalitarian threat of the mid-twentieth century. To the liberal
intellectuals of that period, the central problem of political science
was preserving formal democratic institutions against the brutal
menaces of Nazism and Stalinism.15 0 Many located the social
basis of totalitarianism in the lower classes, and its political
151
expression in ideological politics.
Their solution embodied the two main principles of Madisonian
democracy. First, the people-especially the lower classes-should be
discouraged from uniting in an ideological movement. 152 As long
as politics consisted of narrowly self-interested deals, no broadbased ideological movement would emerge. Second, effective
power should be concentrated in elites that could-at least relatively
speaking-rise above popular passions and prejudices.
From this perspective, republican moments are nightmares.
Social movements mobilize broad sectors of the population into
149 See A. MORRIS, THE' ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT:

BLACK

COMMUNITIES
ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE 192, 216 (1984).
150
See E. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM
AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 197-217 (1973); D. RODGERS, supra note 6, at 209.
151 See S. LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN 87-126 (1981); D. TRUMAN, supra note 6, at 522.

152 The pluralist intellectuals tried to discourage ideological politics by declaring
them impossible. America had, they proclaimed, moved beyond ideology to a
pragmatic consensus. See D. BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY 393-407 (revised ed. 1962);
S. LIpsET, supra note 151, at 439-56. For a more critical view of the consequences of
consensus, see L. HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA 302-09 (1955).
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passionate, ideological action. Interest group leaders are shoved
aside. Representative institutions are bypassed or pressured with
extra-institutional forms of power.
As the pre-eminent pluralist Robert Dahl has observed, however,
defensive pluralism makes a "sort of fetish" out of stability and
consensus, ignoring the "astonishing" amount of conflict and
change that democracies have absorbed.1 5 3 The democratic rights
that we celebrate today were all won by unruly and ideological
movements. Defensive pluralists would have us believe that these
origins are irrelevant to preserving democracy. As Huntington has
shown, however, democratic ideals cannot survive without periodic
rejuvenation by popular movements-a belief shared, as we shall see,
by many Americans of the founding generation. Totalitarian
movements find their most fertile soil in the political anomie that
results from stalemated politics and popular disempowerment.
The democratic impact of republican moments should not be
overstated. Historians have argued that many of the Progressive Era
and New Deal reforms reflected efforts by corporate elites to finetune the market and head off radical change. 54 Moreover,
during the 1960s-the only republican moment since the rise of the
administrative state-the civil rights movement was co-opted into
many incrementalist projects. 55 But the failure of republican
moments to displace interest group politics completely should not
blind us to the fact that they encompass the most vigorous exercises
of democracy yet undertaken by the American people. As such,
they provide the natural starting point for efforts to involve the
citizenry in strengthening democracy.

15 3

See R. DAHL, PLURALIsT DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: CONFLICT AND
CONSENT 261 (1967).
154 Some contend that this was the central significance of the reforms. See, e.g.,
G. KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM 285-87 (1963) (concerning the PopulistProgressive Era); Ferguson, supra note 104, at 3. A more accurate view holds,
however, that corporate elements exercised considerable but by no means controlling
influence over the ultimate direction of reform. On the New Deal, see Hawley, The
Discovery and Study of a "CorporateLiberalism," 52 Bus. HIsT. REv. 309, 314, 318
(1978); see also supra note 100 and accompanying text. On the Populist-Progressive
era, see, e.g., Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the
Railroad Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 1017, 1027 (1988) (observing that although federal
railroad regulation may have been enacted to promote railroad interests, state statutes
were5 intended
"to improve the economic welfare of resident farmers").
1 5 See T. LOWI, supra note 127, at 226-49; F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, REGULATING
THE POOR 198, 272-76 (1971).
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REPUBLICAN MOMENTS AND THE CONSTITUTION

The Constitution and Bill of Rights were themselves products of
a republican moment, a time when "every order and degree among
the people" had begun "to dispute on politics and positively to
determine upon our liberties." 156 Given this genesis, it would be
surprising if these founding documents did not express some
position on the status of popular republican politics in our
constitutional order.
In the traditional view, the Constitution was a reaction to the
"democratic excesses" of he Confederation period-an attempt, in
effect, to terminate the republican moment and reestablish politics157
as-normal within a framework of representative government.
This view is accurate as far as it goes. 58 Any attempt to find a
constitutional home for popular republican politics must confront
the fact that the body of the Constitution was intended to repudiate
direct democracy and to establish representative government.
But liberal pluralist theory has attempted to go further,
interpreting subsequent amendments in light of the traditional view.
The first amendment is said to be primarily concerned with
activities that are integral to representative politics-as-normal, for
example, speech that seeks to influence elections or comment upon
public officials. 159 John Ely and Jesse Choper built this view into
a comprehensive theory, arguing that the entire Constitution,
including the Bill of Rights and the Reconstruction Amendments,
should be interpreted so as to facilitate the functioning of represen160
tative government.
At first glance, the liberal pluralist view has the advantage of
structural consistency. Given that the body of the Constitution
clearly sets up the machinery for representative government, why
not treat the relatively vague commands of the first amendment as
if they were accessories?
156 G. WOOD, supra note 29, at 6 (quoting contemporary observers).
157 See infra text accompanying notes 248-56.
158 See infra text accompanying notes 253-56.

15 9 See A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 22-

27 (1948). For more recent arguments along these lines, see Bevier, The First
Amendment and PoliticalSpeech: An Inquiiy Into the Substance and Limnits of Pinciple,30
STAN. L. REv. 299, 304-22 (1978); Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some FirstAmendment
Problems, 47 IND. LJ. 1, 17-20 (1971).
160 SeeJ. CHOPER, supra note 8, at 1-12;J. ELY, supra note 8, at 88-101.
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The history of republican moments suggests another possibility.
From a functional point of view, the constitutional order might best
be served not by reducing the first amendment to a guarantee of
politics-as-normal, but by permitting and even encouraging the
practice of popular republican politics outside the framework of
representative government. In this view, the first amendment would
encompass direct exercises of group power, thus providing a
61
popular supplement to representative government.
The following sections assess the textual and historical support
for the possibility of a popular republican supplement, focusing on
the right of the people peaceably to assemble. Although the history
presented here is in the service of the broader project on republican
moments, I hope that it will not do too much violence to the
historian's concern with "[n]uance and change." 162 The account
takes as its starting point the centrality of the relation between the
legal theory and political practice of the Revolutionary and
63
Confederation periods.
A. Republican Moments in the Political Thought and Practiceof
the Founding Generation
Most of the American founders and their English Radical Whig
mentors believed strongly in the need for popular action outside
regularly established government. James Burgh advised that in
"planning a government by representation, the people ought to
provide against their own annihilation"by establishing "a regular
and constitutional method of acting by and from themselves, without,
161 The theory of republican moments thus adds support to constitutional theories
that maintain a role for popular power. See, e.g., C.E. BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 108-24 (1989) (contending that the liberty theory of the first
amendment provides the possibility for nonhierarchical noninstrumental means for
radical democratic change); Blasi, The Checking Value in FirstAmendment Theory, 1977
AM. B. FOUND. RES.J. 521 (suggesting that by protecting the flow of information, the
first amendment enables the people to check government abuses); see also S. SHIFFRIN,
THE FIRsT AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 96-100 (1990); Ackerman, supra
note16273.

See Soifer, ProtectingCivil Rights: A CritiqueofRaoul Berger'sHistory, 54 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 651, 654 (1979).
163 See Rabban, The AhistoricalHistorian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in
Early American History (Book Review), 37 STAN. L. REV. 795, 799-801 (1985). AsJohn

Phillip Reid observed, even legally untrained Whigs considered themselves fully

capable of making legal judgments, which they frequently did in political discourse.
See Reid, In a Defensive Rage: The Uses of the Mob, The Justification in Law, And the
Coming of the American Revolution, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1043, 1044 n.9 (1974).
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or even in opposition to their representatives, if necessary." 1 64 In
Cato'sLetters, John Trenchard asserted the people's right of petition
(which, in his view, included not only the right to be heard, but also
to obtain relief), and argued that the distinctive feature of free
countries "lies principally here, that ... their Magistrates must

consult the Voice and Interest of the People." 165 Joseph Priestly
observed that the "sense of the people" though "no nominal part of the
constitution.., and though it is only expressed by talking, writing,
and petitioning," nevertheless operates as a "real check" on
government because "tumults and insurrections so often arise when
that the most arbitrary governments
the voice of the people is loud,
166
them."
of
effects
dread the
Since rulers inevitably tended toward corruption and tyranny,
the people had the right and the duty to defend their liberties-by
armed force if necessary.-6 7 Rebellion and tumult served notice
that, as Samuel Adams put it, the "wheels of good government"
were clogged. 168 Even cautious Whigs like John Adams, not to
mention Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, could endorse
"Popular Commotions" when "Fundamentals are invaded" by
government. 169 Thus, insurrections could be interpreted as "Symp164 1 J. BURGH, POLITICAL DISQUISITIONS 6 (1774).
165 2J. TRENCHARD, CATO'S LETTERS 42-43 (1733) [hereinafter CATO'S LETTERS];
see also 3 CATO'S LETTERS, supra, at 21. Trenchard, however, took a dimmer view of

crowd action than some of his 'Whig colleagues when he warned against "public
Disturbances" because the consequences could not be foreseen. See 1 CATO'S
LETTERS,
supra, at 193.
166
j. PRIESTLY, LECTURES ON HISTORY AND GENERAL POLICY 340 (1788) (J. Rutt
ed. 1826).
67
1

See P. GiLJE, THE ROAD TO MOBOCRACY 8 (1987); P. MAIER, FROM RESISTANCE
COLONIAL RADICALS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN

TO REVOLUTION:

OPPOSITION TO BRITAIN, 1765-1776, at 42-43; Reid, supra note 163, at 1050-53.
168 1 THE WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS 237 (H. Cushing ed. 1904).
169 Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (July 7, 1774), in 1 ADAMS FAMILY
CORRESPONDENCE 130-31 (L. Butterfield ed. 1963), quoted in G. WOOD, supranote 29,
at 321. Hamilton and Madison acknowledged the existence and legitimacy of the
right of resistance in the FederalistPapers,with Hamilton going so far as to argue-in
an odd departure from his usual distrust of popular tumult-that power should be
centered in national rather than state government because popular resistance would
have "infinitely better prospect of success" against national rulers than against those
of an individual state. THE FEDERALIST No. 28, supra note 5, at 180 (A. Hamilton);
see also THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 5, at 298 (J. Madison) (stating that
"ambitious encroachments of the federal government" would be met by organized
resistance); THE FEDERALIST No. 60, supra note 5, at 369 (A. Hamilton) (stating that
an attempt by the federal government to make improper use of its power to regulate
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170
toms of a strong and healthy Constitution."
Thomas Jefferson developed this theme in a way that closely
presaged the subsequent experience with republican moments.
Political turbulence was "as necessary in the political world as
storms in the physical." 17 1 It helped to sustain a politically aware
citizenry by nourishing "a general attention to the public affairs." 172 Periodic rebellions would hold governors to "the true
principles of their institution,"173 thus narrowing the gap between
republican ideals and institutional practice. Without popular
tumults, governors would become "wolves," and there would be a
"general prey of the rich on the poor."174 "God forbid," wrote
Jefferson, "that we should ever be" without a rebellion for 20
years175 -a fair anticipation of the average interval between nationwide republican moments.
The American founders saw popular resistance not as a means
of pressing for change, but as a defense against tyrannical government. Republican moments, on the other hand, have brought
wrenching transformations in political, social, and economic life.
Both constructs are, however, concerned with the same underlying
problem: the natural tendency of government to become estranged
from the people and to diverge from the pursuit of the public

elections would cause "an immediate revolt of the great body of the people"). Violent
remedies would not, however, bejustified for mere "partial or occasional distempers
of the State," for which the remedy was "a change of men." THE FEDERALIST No. 21,
supra note 5, at 140 (A. Hamilton). Indeed, one of the principal reasons for forming
a strong national government was its utility in suppressing "partial commotions and
insurrections.., from the intrigues of an inconsiderable faction." THE FEDERALIST
No. 16, supra note 5, at 117 (A. Hamilton); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 27, supra
note 5, at 175 (A. Hamilton) (arguing that a strong national government would be
more likely to discourage sedition than the state governments); THE FEDERALIST No.
43, supra note 5, at 276-80 (J. Madison) (arguing that a national government will
provide protection against domestic insurrections).
170 p. MAIER, supra note 167, at 23 (quoting Josiah Quincy). For additional
contemporary statements, see id. at 22-24; P. GILJE, supra note 167, at 7-9.
171 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Jan. 30, 1787), in 11
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 2, at 92, 93.
172 Id. Thus, rebellion was "a medicine necessary for the sound health of
government." Id.
173 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Carrington (Jan. 16, 1787), in 11
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 2, at 48, 49. Tumult thus served as "the only safeguard
of the public liberty." Id.
174

Id.

175 Letter from ThomasJefferson to William Stephens Smith (Nov. 13, 1787), in
12 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 2, at 355-56.
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massive and
interest. And both prescribe the same remedy:
176
forceful political intervention by the citizenry.
A strong case might be made that the right of resistance was
incorporated into the Constitution via the second amendment right
to bear arms, 177 or that it is among those rights that were retained by the people in the ninth amendment. 178 But the right of
resistance does not provide an adequate home for popular republican politics. In its traditional formulation, the right was narrowly
circumscribed. Resistance would be justified only if government
abuses were so widespread, notorious, and unlawful as to amount
to tyranny.' 79 It could not be exercised by a few individuals or a
small faction; participation by the whole "Body of the People" was,
To limit republican politics to
at least in theory, essential.' 8 0
they
could
be
justified
under the right of resistance
situations where

178 See infra notes 117-55 and accompanying text.
177 See, e.g., Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second
Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 221-22 (1983) (noting that support for the right
of resistance was one of the impulses behind the second amendment); Levinson, The
Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE LJ. 637, 648-50 (1989) (observing that
commentators from 1787 into the twentieth century have argued that an armed
populace is necessary to prevent tyrannical acts by the government).
178 Cf. Paust, The Human Right to Participatein Arned Revolution and RelatedForms
of Social Violence: Testing the Limits of Permissibility,32 EMORY LJ. 545, 545-47, 550-55
(1983) (arguing that the founders regarded the right of revolution as arising from
natural law, and noting that the Declaration of Independence, the Declaration of the
Causes and Necessity of Taking up Arms, and several state constitutions assert the
right).
179 See P. MAIER, supra note 167, at 35, 40-41. The requirement of unlawfulness
was not a technical, legal judgment. The Whigs recognized that the law was so
.ambiguous, perplexed, and intricate" that the real question was whether the ruler
had acted against the public good. A. SIDNEY, DIscouRsEs CONCERNING GOVERNMENT
418 (London 3d ed. 1751), quoted in P. MAIER, supra note 167, at 37. For example,
although the proposed constitution empowered Congress to regulate the "Times,
Places and Manner" of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, U.S.
CONST. art. I § 4, Hamilton argued that a congressional attempt to confine "the
places of election to particular districts" thus "rendering it impracticable to the
citizens at large to partake in the choice" would properly result in an "immediate
revolt of the great body of the people, headed and directed by the State governments." THE FEDERALIST No. 60, supra note 5, at 367 (A. Hamilton).
180
See P. MAIER, supra note 167, at 35-36; Paust, supra note 178, at 553-55; Reid,
supra note 163, at 1050. In practice, this requirement meant something substantially
less than unanimous support. It is estimated that up to 20 percent of the white
population retained its loyalty to Britain throughout the revolution. See Smith, The
American Loyalists: Notes on Their Organizationand Numerical Strength, 25 WM.& MARY
Q. 259, 269 (3d Ser. 1968). To this number must be added a substantial group that
remained undecided.
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would thus be to relegate them to the fringes of our constitutional
order.
Armed resistance was not, however, the only form of extra-legal
popular action during the Revolutionary era. There was an
intermediate level of popular involvement more forceful than polite
petitioning but less so than violent resistance. Activities in this
category included peaceful demonstrations, boycotts, and social
ostracism.18 1 These activities performed some of the same functions as rebellion, for example arousing the people and holding
governors to the "true principles of their institution," but at less
cost in life and property. They were precisely the kinds of participation that, as we have seen, typically displace politics-as-normal
during republican moments.1 82 Their unifying feature was the
nonviolent exercise of popular power outside the established
institutions of government.
The legal justifications for this type of political action were
intimately bound up with the development of the right of the
people peaceably to assemble. The remainder of this Part suggests
that a home for republican moments may be found in the first
amendment's guarantee of that right. In making this claim, I do not
mean to imply that courts deciding first amendment cases should
stress the distinctions among the rights of assembly, petition, and
free speech. Courts quite properly downplay these formal distinctions and instead assess political activities in light of the broad
purposes of all three clauses.18 3 My claim is that the assembly
clause, read in historical context, adds the protection of popular
republican political action to those broad purposes.
181 See Conser, McCarthy & Toscano, The American IndependenceMovenen4 1765-

1775: A Decade of Nonviolent Struggles, in RESISTANCE, POLITICS, AND THE AMERICAN
STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE, 1765-1775, at 3 (W. Conser, R. McCarthy, D. Toscano

& G. Sharp eds. 1986); see also infra notes 189-92 and accompanying text.
182 See supra text accompanying notes 140-42. Republican moments are usually
accompanied by violence as well. Typically, however, the impetus for serious violence
comes from forces opposed to transformative social movements. As Gordon Wood
has observed, for example, the contrast between the purportedly.restrained American
revolutionary mobs and the violent French ones was due not to any violent propensity
of French mobs, but to the violence of the French government's reaction as compared
to the relatively peaceful response of British and colonial authorities to American
mobs. See Wood, A Note on Mobs in the American Revolution, 23 WM. & MARY Q. 635,
639-42 (3d Ser. 1966). See generally AMERICAN VIOLENCE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
(R. Hofstadter & M. Wallace eds. 1970) (collecting contemporary accounts of
American uprisings from 1634 to 1968).
183 See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429-30 (1963);J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA,
&J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.53, at 1004 (3d ed. 1986).
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B. Revolutionary Origins of the Right of Assembly
In 1774, the Continental Congress declared the right of the
people "peaceably to assemble, consider of their grievances, and
petition the king."184 This right, which was not expressly recognized in British law, 185 was asserted in response to its attempted
suppression by Parliament earlier that year.18 6 The Massachusetts
Government Act of 1774, one of the "Intolerable Acts," had
prohibited citizens from calling meetings "without the leave of the
governor," except for specified purposes.18 7 In explanation,
Parliament chastised the people for abusing their authorization "to
assemble together" by treating "upon matters of the most general
concern" (meaning telling Parliament how to run the Empire) and
88
passing "many dangerous and unwarrantable resolves."
These "abuses" dated back to the Stamp Act of 1765. After an
initial outbreak of violence, American leaders had turned to the
relatively peaceful strategy of boycotting British goods and refusing
to comply with oppressive laws.' 8 9 Nonimportation associations
184 Declaration of Rights, 14 October 1774,Journalof the Proceedingsof the First

Congress Held at PhiladelphiaSept. 5, 1774, at 62 (1774 & reprint 1974), reprinted in
SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES: DOCUMENTARY ORIGINS OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES IN THE

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND BILL OF RIGHTS 286, 288 (R. Perry ed. 1959)
[hereinafter SOURCES] (emphasis added) ("Resolved ... That they have a right
peaceably to assemble, consider of their grievances, and petition the king; and that
all prosecutions, prohibitory proclamations, and commitments for the same, are
illegal.").
185 According to Bernard Schwartz, the Declaration of the Continental Congress
was the first authoritative document to assert the right of assembly. See B. SCHWARTZ,
THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BILL OF RIGHTs 198

(1977). The English Bill of Rights guaranteed the right to petition but did not
mention assembly. See Bill of Rights, 1688, 1 W. & M. ch. 2, § 5, reprinted in
SOURCES, supra note 184, at 246 (stating "[t]hat it is the right of the subjects to
petition the King, and all commitments and prosecutions for such petitioning are
illegal.").
Those who argue that the right was recognized in English law rely not on any
explicit declarations, but on the pattern of common law holdings and statutory
restrictions. SeeJarrett & Mund, The Right of Assenbly 9 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 1, 5-10
(1931). This is not, however, a legal right in the strong sense. What existed in
England might be better described as the potentialfor an affirmative right of assembly
to be implied from existing law. In 1781, the King's Bench declined an opportunity
to imply such a right from the right of petition. See infra note 202.
18 See 1 J. REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 24-25
(1986).
187 Massachusetts Government Act, 14 Geo. 3, ch. 45, § 7 (1774).
188 Id.
189 See D. HOERDER, CROWD ACTION IN REVOLUTIONARY MASSACHUSETTS 1765-

1780, at 115 (1977); P. MAIER, supra note 167, at 73-74; Conser, The Stamp Act
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openly engaged in nonviolent coercion against importers. Meetings
1 90
voted to "Expose to shame and Contempt" all offenders.
Boycott violators were themselves boycotted, often with devastating
effect. 191 Crowds of nonimportation supporters visited offenders
to demand compliance. 192 In short, the resistance movement employed the kind of intense and impolite protest tactics that are
characteristic of republican moments.
These tactics were consciously chosen as "legal & peaceable"
alternatives to rioting.1 93 While "riots and tumults" might be
illegal, it could "be no breach of the laws of nature nor of our
country for people to assemble together peaceably." 194 If respectful petitions were ignored, John Dickinson argued, "then that kind
of opposition becomes justifiable, which can be made without
breaking the laws, or disturbing the public peace," namely "withholding from Great-Britain, all the advantages she has been used to
receive from us." 195 When Lieutenant Governor Thomas HutchResistance,in RESISTANCE, POLITICS, AND THE AMERICAN STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE,
1765-1775, supra note 181, at 22, 31-37. I say "relatively" because nonimportation
and nonconsumption were never entirely severed from violence in practice, and
during some periods, violent enforcement of the boycott was common. See D.
HOERDER, supra, at 204-15.
190 See D. HOERDER, supra note 189, at 206; P. MAIER, supra note 167, at 122.
191 See P. MAIER, supra note 167, at 122-23. The boycott also had serious
consequences for many citizens who did not import themselves, but who were
connected to industries related to the British trade. Tailors suffered because of the
boycott of British cloth, and shipyard workers were hurt by the decline in ship-borne
trade. See C. BRIDENBAUGH, CITIES IN REVOLT: URBAN LIFE IN AMERICA, 1743-1776,
at 283 (1955).
192 See P. MAIER, supra note 167, at 126-27; Reid, supra note 163, at 1081.
193 As George Mason put it, the colonists had no alternative but to prevent "by all
legal & peaceable Means in our Power (for we must avoid even the Appearance of
Violence) the Importation of the enumerated goods." Letter from George Mason to
Richard Henry Lee (June 7, 1770), in 1 PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON 1725-1792, at 116
(R. Rutland ed. 1970) [hereinafter MASON PAPERS]; see also D. HOERDER, supra note
189, at 115; P. MAIER, supra note 167, at 114. Nonimportation associations typically
declared themselves to be lawful. See, e.g., NonimportationAgreement ofJune 28, 1769,
in THE LETTERS OF FREEMAN, ETC.: ESSAYS ON THE NONIMPORTATION MOVEMENT IN
SOUTH CAROLINA 5,5 (W. Drayton ed. 1771) (R. Weir ed. 1977) [hereinafter LETTERS
OF FREEMAN] (describing nonimportation as a "loyal and vigorous" method); Virginia
NonimportationAssociation, in MASON PAPERS, supra, at 120, 121 (declaring it to be the
duty of every citizen to prevent the ruin of his country "by every lawful means").
19'Pa.J., Supplenen4 Feb. 6, 1766, quoted in P. MAIER, supra note 167, at 72; see
also, G. WOOD, supra note 29, at 312 (observing that it was the "right of assembly that
justified the numerous associations and congresses that sprang up during the Stamp
Act crisis").
195 j. DICKINSON, LETTERS FROM A FARMER IN PENNSYLVANIA TO THE INHABITANTS
OF THE BRITISH COLONIES 31-35 (1903). Dickinson's writings were highly influential
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inson of Massachusetts complained that Boston's nonimportation
assembly was unlawful and should be immediately disbanded, local
justices of the peace responded that there had been insufficient
disorder to justify suppression. 196 To Hutchinson, the justices'
response missed the point. A few months earlier, he had written
that he had found "by experience, that associations and assemblies,

pretending to be legal and constitutional and assuming powers
which belong only to the Established authority prove more fatal to
this authority, than mobs, riots, and the mass tumultuous disor19 7

ders."
Some conservatives contended that the nonimportation
associations were unlawful conspiracies even when their activities
were entirely peaceable.
They argued that a combination or
"confederacy" to coerce citizens into boycotting was criminal and
seditious. 198 But the nonimportation activists countered that they
could not be prosecuted for combining to commit legal acts; no law

compelled them to purchase British goods or to patronize or
associate with people who did. 199 It is unclear which side had the

and, according to Benjamin Franklin, spoke the "general sentiments" of the American
people at that time. See D. JACOBSON, JOHN DICKINSON AND THE REVOLUTION IN
PENNSYLVANIA 1764-1776, at 57 (1965).

196 See Letter from Thomas Hutchinson to Hillsborough (Jan. 24, 1770), in 1
SPARKS MANUSCRIPTS, BRITISH PAPERS RELATING TO THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 116

(handcopied papers located at the Houghton Library at Harvard University).
197 Letter from Thomas Hutchinson to Hillsborough (Oct. 20, 1769), in 3 SPARKS
MANUSCRIPTS, PAPERS RELATING TO NEW ENGLAND 41.

198 According to Thomas Hutchinson, for "particular persons to forbear importing
cannot be deemed criminal, but it is quite another thing for numbers to confederate
together and compel others to join them, and all with an avowed design to force the
legislature to repeal their acts." B. BAILYN, THE ORDEAL OF THOMAS HUTCHINSON

133 (1974) (quoting Hutchinson). William Henry Drayton likewise acknowledged that
individuals might refrain from importing, but a "confederacy" for that purpose would
unlawfully "oblige a man to act contrary to his inclination." Letter from Freeman
(William Henry Drayton) to Libertas et Natali Solum (Oct. 12, 1769), in LETTERS OF
FREEMAN, supra note 193, at 42, 47-48.
199 According to John Mackenzie, the "association assumes no other right" than
the individual right to withhold patronage, and as for social ostracism, that was "a
mere matter of opinion, which men will ever exercise, without entering into
associations." Not satisfied with this formalistic argument, Mackenzie acknowledged
that,
[t]o be sure, the greater the numbers, the greater the weight. That it is an
hardship, men should be constrained to enter into such measures, no body
will deny: but let us put the saddle upon the right horse; Those who have
rendered such measures necessary, are answerable for the uncommon roads
they force mankind to take.
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better of the argument under English law, 20 0 but there is no
doubt which prevailed among the American leaders. As one
nonimportation leader put it, "every body of English freemen"
possessed an "undeniable constitutional right" to boycott "if they
20 1
think it necessary for their preservation."
The colonists' identification of nonviolence as the touchstone of
legality was reflected in colonial law. No colonial legislature passed
any law resembling the English Tumultuous Petitioning Act of 1661,
which criminalized assemblies engaged in nothing more than
nonviolent petitioning. 20 2 A number of colonies did, however,
respond to outbreaks of armed rioting and vigilantism by passing
riot acts. Like the English Riot Act of 1714,203 these laws prohibited some number of people (usually twelve, but sometimes as few
as three) from remaining unlawfully assembled for more than one

Letter by A Member of the General Committee (John Mackenzie) (Sept. 28, 1769),
in LETTERS OF FREEMAN, supra note 193, at 33, 38. See generally P. MAIER, supra note
167, at 130-31 (discussing the attempts of the movement's leaders to avoid the taint
of illegality).
At times, the justification of nonimportation activities shaded into invocations
of the right of resistance. The Americans had been, according to Christopher
Gadsden, "reduced to a necessity of associating together, in order to discover, and
unite in, some common means, for the recovery and preservation of their rights and
liberties." Letter from Christopher Gadsden to Peter Timothy 7 (Oct. 26, 1769), in
LETTERS OF FREEMAN, supra note 193, at 52, 67.
200 In arguing that a confederacy was unlawful, see supra note 198, Drayton was
relying on language in the Poulterers' Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 813, 815 (K.B. 1611). This
was, however, vague dictum; the case involved a conspiracy to obtain the arrest and
conviction of an innocent person. Maier found no case decided prior to or
contemporaneously with the American Revolution in which a peaceful boycott was
held to be an unlawful conspiracy. See P. MAIER, supra note 167, at 132.
201 Letter from Christopher Gadsden to Peter Timothy (Oct. 26, 1769), in LETTERS
OF FREEMAN, supra note 193, at 57, 67 (emphasis omitted); see also supra notes 193-97
and accompanying text.
202 See An Act Against Tumults and Disorders Upon Pretence of Preparing or
Presenting Public Petitions or Other Addresses to His Majesty or the Parliament, 13
Car. 2, st. 1, ch. 5. The Act limited to 20 the number of people who could sign a
petition to the King, and to 10 the number who could approach the King or
Parliament "upon pretence of presenting or delivering any petition." Id. In the case
of Lord George Gordon, Lord Mansfield ruled that the English Bill of Rights, which
guaranteed the "right of the subjects to petition the King," had not repealed this law.
The20King v. Lord George Gordon, 99 Eng. Rep. 372, 374 (K.B. 1781).
3See An Act for Preventing Tumults and Riotous Assemblies, and for the More
Speedy and Effectual-Punishing the Rioters, 1 Geo. 2, ch. 5 [hereinafter English Riot
Act of 1714]. This law authorized the violent suppression of any group of 12 or more
people who remained "unlawfully, riotously, and tumultuously assembled together,
to the disturbance of the publick peace" for more than one hour after being read the
riot act. Id.
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hour after having been "read the riot act." 20 4 The unlawfulness
derived either from the commission of a violent act or the intent to
20 5
commit one.
Although the colonial riot acts contained language vague
enough, 20 6 and punishments severe enough 207 to make a modern first amendment scholar cringe, it appears that in practice they
were directed against specific instances of open, armed rebellion.
The New York legislature acted after the Green Mountain Boys had
carried out numerous armed attacks on New Yorkers. 20 In New
Jersey, groups of citizens had repeatedly broken into jails to rescue
prisoners. 20 9 North Carolina's law was passed after adherents of
the Regulator movement attacked and beat court officials. 210 By
the time the Pennsylvania legislature acted, the Paxton Boys were
already marching toward Philadelphia with the avowed purpose of
capturing and killing Indians who were there under military
protection. 211 Only Connecticut moved before a major outbreak
of popular violence. Its legislature was responding to a single jail
rescue. 2 12 In an important departure from the English act, all but
204

See, e.g., An Act for preventing and suppressing of Riots, Routs, and unlawful

Assemblies, Acts 1750, ch. 12 [hereinafter Massachusetts Riot Act of 1750]; An Act
for Preventing Tumults and Riotous Assemblies and for the More Speedy and
Effectual Punishing the Rioters, Acts 1764, reprinted in 6 STATUTES AT LARGE OF
PENNsYLvANIA 325-28 (1899) [hereinafter Pennsylvania Riot Act of 1764]. The other
colonies to pass riot acts were Connecticut (1722), New Jersey (1747), New York
(1774), and North Carolina (1771). See P. MAIER, supra note 167, at 24-25.
205 See, e.g., Massachusetts Riot Act of 1750, supra note 204 (participants must be
"unlawfully, riotously or tumultuously assembled"); Pennsylvania Riot Act of 1764,
supra note 204, at 325 (participants must be "unlawfully, riotously, and tumultuously
assembled together to the disturbance of the public peace"). This general language
was drawn from the English Riot Act of 1714, supra note 203, at 1 Geo. 2, ch. 5, § 1.
The offense of unlawful assembly required only a purpose "to do an unlawful act, as
to pull down enclosures, to destroy a warren or the game therein." 4 W. BLAcKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *146.
206 See supra note 205.
207 Pennsylvania imposed the death penalty. See Pennsylvania Riot Act of 1764,
supra note 204, at 326. More typically, Massachusetts called for 39 or 40 stripes
across the naked back in addition to imprisonment and fines or property forfeitures.
See Massachusetts Riot Act of 1750, supra note 204. These penalties were considered
brutal even at the time. See C. BRIDENBAUGH, supra note 191, at 117.
208 See D. Fox, YANKEES AND YORKERS 169 (1940).
2 09

See 7 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW

JERSEY
2 10 117-304 (1883).
See H. LEFLER & W. POWELL, COLONIAL NORTH CAROLINA: A HISTORY 234-37

(1973).

211 See J. KELLEY, PENNSYLVANIA:

(1980).

THE COLONIAL YEARS 1681-1776, at 494-95

212 See R. TAYLOR, COLONIAL CONNECTICUT:

A HISTORY 175 (1979).
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Connecticut's expired by their own terms after periods of one to
2 13
three years.
Despite their limited practical reach, the riot acts were heartily
opposed by many colonials as unwarranted intrusions on liberty. 214 By the 1770s, only one of the temporary laws-New York'sremained in effect, and in 1778 it was repudiated by the state
legislature as "unjust" and "founded in ill policy." 215 When
Thomas Hutchinson sought the passage of a riot act in 1770, the
Massachusetts House of Representatives replied that it would not
legislate "without an apparent and very urgent Necessity" because
a riot act would give magistrates "a Power that would be dangerous
216
to the Rights and Liberties of the People."
Eventually, Hutchinson and other loyalists concluded that it
would require legislation by Parliament to outlaw collective
action. 217 The end result was, as we have seen, the Massachusetts
Government Act of 1774, in response to which the First Continental
Congress declared the right "peaceably to assemble"-language now
found in the first amendment. 2 18 One month later, when Hutchinson charged that a Boston meeting called to organize resistance
to the tea duty was unlawful, Samuel Adams had a ready reply-that
2 19
a free people had a right to meet and consult.

213 See, e.g., Massachusetts Riot Act of 1750, supranote 204 (3 years); Pennsylvania

Riot Act of 1764, supra note 204 (1 year from publication and then to the end of the
next sitting assembly). The one exception was the oldest of the lot, the Connecticut
Riot Act of 1722. See infra note 215.
214 See C. BRIDENBAUGH, supra note 191, at 117 (noting that the Massachusetts
Riot Act "did not go down well with the bulk of Bostonians").
215 Although the law had expired several years before, the legislature acted to
remove any doubt as to whether prosecutions could be brought based on incidents
prior to its expiration. See Acts 1778, ch. 11, reprinted in I LAWs OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK 20 (1886). Connecticut, on the other hand, continued its uniquely
conservative course by reaffirming its law in 1776. See 15 THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF
THE21COLONY OF CONNECTICUT 283 (C. Hoadly ed. 1890).
6JOURNALS OFTHE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF MASSACHUSETTS 1770, at 178
(1977). Instead of suppressing the rioters, the House recommended redressing their
grievances, claiming that it "may justly be said of the People of this Province, that
they seldom if ever have assembled in a tumultuous Manner, unless they have been
oppressed." Id.
217 See B. BAILYN, supra note 198, at 133; P. MAIER, supra note 167, at 133.
218 See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
2 19
See Upton, Proceedingsofye Body respectingthe Tea, 22 WM. & MARY Q. 287, 292-

93 (1965).
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C. Peaceable Assembly as a Form of PopularSovereignty
We have seen how the right of assembly was initially asserted to
justify exercises of popular power. Through modern eyes, it is easy
to see how marches, rallies, and nonimportation campaigns could
be defended as forms of nonviolent political action. Like the
boycotters in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 2 20 the American
founders sought to change what they perceived to be an unjust and
unresponsive political system.
But there was a more radical
dimension to the colonials' exercise of the right. Not only did they
develop the notion of actual popular sovereignty-perhaps their
greatest innovation in political theory 22 1-but at least initially they
took it literally.
Many, if not most, of the meetings called to organize opposition
to British policies claimed to speak not only for those present, but
also for the entire people of the town or district. Town meetings,
the basic units of local government, provided the main organizational form for the movement in New England. To ensure that the
whole people was represented, the normal property qualifications
for attendance were often suspended. Towns outside New England,
which were not formally organized on the town meeting model,
emulated the New England example by calling meetings of the
whole people. 222 When it was necessary to coordinate action at
the county level, local meetings selected and sent delegates to
223
extralegal county and province "conventions."
220 458 U.S. 886 (1982). This and other boycott cases are discussed infra notes
289-335 and accompanying text.
221 On the radical significance of this advance, see G. WOOD, supra note 29, at
382-84; Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1432-37 (1987).
222 See B. LABAREE, THE BOSTON TEA PARTY 98-99 (1964); P. MAIER, supra note
167, at 118.
223 The term "convention" already had a long and diverse history, but in all
contexts it referred to a body which met "to exercise or influence power outside the
established structure of government." THE POPULAR SOURCES OF POLITICAL
AUTHORITY: DOCUMENTS ON THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION OF 1780, at 5 (0.
Handlin & M. Handlin eds. 1966) [hereinafter POPULAR SOURCES]; G. WOOD, supra
note 29, at 306-10. Despite their use of delegates, these conventions qualify as
exercises of "direct" popular power because they operated outside the structure of
representative government in close contact with the popular movements that spawned
them. Delegates were selected at a popular assembly, charged with specified missions,
and dispatched to a single convention after which they were expected to report back
to their constituents. For an analysis of the democratic advantages of the convention
form, see Amar, supra note 221, at 1459 n.147; see also G. WOOD, supra note 29, at
323-24; infra notes 234-35 and accompanying text.
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To the British and their supporters, these assemblies were
patently illegal. While the people had a right to participate in
government, once they had "chosen their representatives, that right
[centered] in their Representatives alone."224 It was true that the
people of Massachusetts had been authorized to hold town
meetings, but that had been "an absurdity" that had the effect of
empowering "the lowest and most violent of the mob." 225 Parliament, in the Massachusetts Government Act, banned town meetings
precisely to eliminate this exercise of direct democracy. By forcing
the citizenry to cede power to town officials, Pownall sought to
ensure that "the wise and prudent may act and govern." 226 Lord
Germain expected to "see some subordination, some authority and
22 7
order."
At first, the Americans were careful to explain that their extralegal assemblies were "loyal and dutiful" supplements to established
government. 228 But as British authority crumbled and the revolutionary movement gained momentum, popular assemblies gradually
displaced the colonial administration, performing such traditional
government functions as regulating the economy, levying taxes, and
disposing of the militia. 229 When North Carolina's provincial
assembly openly took up the reins of government, it explained that
the people had a right to assemble and petition the King. 230 Even
after state power had shifted to Congress and the Revolutionary
state legislatures, informal popular assemblies continued to be
justified, as Samuel Adams asserted in 1777, by the people's right
"to assemble upon all occasions to consult measures for promoting
23 1
liberty and happiness."
D. PeaceableAssembly During the ConfederationPeriod
The defeat of Britain did not bring an end to popular assemblies. On the contrary, so many associations, conventions, and
224 G. WOOD, supra note 29, at 314 (quoting a Tory tract).
225 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE BRITISH PARLIAMENTS RESPECTING NORTH
AMERICA 1754-1783, at 149 (R. Simmons & P. Thomas eds. 1985) (Pownall); see also
id. at 151-52 (Lord North); id. at 279-80 (statement of Mr. R. Rigby).

226 Id. at 149 (Pownall).
227 Id. at 151 (Lord Germain).
22 8

SeeJournal of Stamp Act Congress, reprintedin C. WESLAGER, THE STAMP ACT

CONGRESS 181, 202 (1976); see also G. WOOD, supra note 29, at 312.

229 See G. WOOD, supra note 29, at 321-22.
230 See W. POWELL, NORTH CAROLINA THROUGH FOUR CENTURIES 173 (1989).
231 G. WOOD, supra note 29, at 324.
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assemblies sprang up that it seemed to some observers that the

country would "shortly be overrun by committees. "232
The most significant turmoil occurred in New England, where
farmers, caught in the transition from subsistence to commercial
farming, sought debt relief from their state governments. When
none was forthcoming, they organized county conventions throughout the region. 233 Remote towns that could not afford to send a
representative to the state capital "to wait six weeks or more on the
Governor's pleasure" had no trouble sending delegates to the
county convention. 234
:In addition, conventions, unlike state
legislatures, imposed no property qualifications for serving-a matter
of great concern to towns that, as a result of the economic troubles,

had not a single citizen who could meet the qualification for
election to the legislature. 23 5 Like their revolutionary predecessors, these conventions passed resolutions, petitioned the legisla23 6
ture, and sometimes claimed sovereign powers.
There was a lively debate over the conventions' legality. As an
opening formality, the typical convention voted itself "constitutional" and renounced the use of violence. 23 7 This did not stop
opponents from arguing that although conventions had been
appropriate to challenge British power a decade earlier, they could
not be justified now that "we have a constitution of our own
chusing" that provided for the annual election of representatives. 23 8 To some, conventions could be lawful only if they met
232 Id. at 326 (quoting a contemporary observer); see also id. at 323-28.
233 See D. SZATMARY, SHAYS' REBELLION:
THE MAKING OF AN AGRARIAN
INSURRECTION 38-40 (1980).
234 M. STARKEY, A LIrrLE REBELLION 11 (1955); see also Pole, Shays's Rebellion: A
Political Inteipretation, in THE REINTERPRETATION OF TEE AMERICA N REVOLUTION

1763-1789, at 419-20, 424-25 (J. Greene ed. 1968).
235 See POPULAR SOURCES, supra note 223, at 35-39; M. STARKEY, supra note 234,
at 11.
2 6
3 See V. HALL, POLITICs WITHOUT PARTIES 204, 209 (1972); D. SZATMARY, Supra
note 233, at 39-40. For a contemporary account, see G. MINOT, THE HISTORY OFTHE
INSURRECTIONS IN MASSACHUSETTS 24-42 (1788) (2d ed. 1810).
237 See R. Feer, Shays' Rebellion 177 (Ph.D. thesis, Harvard Univ. 1958); see also
G. MINOT, supra note 236, at 33-37 (describing the proceeding of a convention); M.
STARKEY, supranote 234, at 13 (same). In this, the conventions followed the practice
of the earlier nonimportation associations. Seesupranote 194 and accompanying text.
238 See R. Feer, supra note 237, at 91 (quoting a statement of the Boston Town
Meeting, Apr. 5, 1784); see also R. TAYLOR, WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS IN THE
REVOLUTION 63, 141 (1954); G. WOOD, supra note 29, at 327. Similar arguments had
been made during the convention movement leading up to the enactment of the
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780. See Response of the Worcester Committee of
Correspondence, Oct. 8, 1778, in POPULAR SOURCES, supra note 223, at 369, 372.
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the test for the right of resistance, that government power had
"been evidently and notoriously applied to unconstitutional
239
purposes, and no constitutional means of redress" remained.
The farmers turned to the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780,
which guaranteed the right of the people "in an orderly and
peaceable manner, to assemble to consult upon the common good"
and to petition the legislature for redress of grievances. 240 Since
the constitution did not prohibit conventions, it was argued, they
must be encompassed under the right of assembly. 241 Convention
supporters recalled the Revolutionary conventions of the 1770s and
argued that the need for the people to assemble outside of the
formal government remained as urgent under the new republic as
242
it had been under British rule.
In the end, no attempt was made to prohibit the conventions.
Beginning in August 1786, the farmers rendered the issue moot by
employing tactics that could be justified only under the right of
resistance. In what became known as "Shays' Rebellion," armed
crowds surrounded and occupied courthouses in numerous rural
towns. 243 Nearly one thousand insurgents marched through
Springfield behind fifes and drums, threatening warfare if the court
did not adjourn.2 44 In late fall, the Massachusetts legislature
passed a riot act2 45 and suspended habeas corpus. 246 Virginia
247
and Vermont, which had also suffered turbulence, followed suit.
2

39 R. Feer, supra note 237, at 91-92 (quoting a statement of the Cambridge Town
Meeting,
July 24, 1786).
240
MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. 19, reprinted in POPULAR SOURCES, supra note 223,
at 441.
241 See D. SZATMARY, supra note 233, at 39-40; R. Feer, supra note 237, at 90
(citing contemporary periodicals). In his contemporary account, George Richards
Minot stated simply that the conventions were founded on the Massachusetts
Constitution's guarantee of the right of assembly. See G. MINOT, supra note 236, at
24.
242 See G. WOOD, supra note 29, at 326; R. Feer, supra note 237, at 90.
243 The most detailed account is in R. Feer, supra note 237, at 180-210, 236-37.
244 See id. at 229-32.
245 See An Act to prevent Routs, Riots, and tumultuous Assemblies, and the evil
Consequences thereof, Acts 1786, ch. 8. This law prohibited "any persons to the
number of twelve, or more, being armed with clubs, or other weapons; or... any
number of persons, consisting of thirty or more" from remaining "unlawfully,
routously, riotously or tumultuously assembled" more than one hour after the reading
of the riot act. Id. Unlike most of its colonial predecessors, this law had no
termination
date.
246
See 1786 Acts, ch. 41, Nov. 10, 1786. This law expired by its own terms on July
1, 1787.
247 See Vermont Riot Act of 1787, reprinted in 14 STATE PAPERS OF VERMONT:
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E. The Constitution and the Reestablishment of Politics-as-Normal
The popular assemblies and the disorders of the Confederation
period exerted a profound influence on the movement for a
constitution. Far from celebrating direct democracy, many erstwhile
revolutionaries feared that the people had become "the ready
instruments of their own ruin."248 Even Samuel Adams decided
that "popular Committees and County Conventions are not only
useless but dangerous." 249
Shays' Rebellion convinced many
people that the Confederation had failed and it was time for strong
national government. 250 George Washington credited the rebellion with shocking the states into sending delegates to the constitu25 1
tional convention at Philadelphia.
The Constitutionalists' solution was to erect a strong structure
for politics-as-normal. While taking a bow to the right of resistance, 252 The Federalist portrayed popular assemblies as "frequently subject to the impulses of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and
of other irregular and violent propensities." 25 3 The distinctive
feature of American government was to be "the total exclusion of
254
the people, in their collective capacity" from the government.
Instead of directly participating, the people would delegate power
to "a chosen body of citizens" who possessed more wisdom and less
255
inclination toward passion and interest than ordinary citizens.
All that remained of the popular republican politics which had
brought about the Constitution was an echo in article V authorizing

LAWS OF VERMONT 265-66, 281-84 (J. Williams ed. 1966); Virginia Riot Act of 1786,
reprinted in 2 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 2, at 517-19.
248 G. WOOD, supra note 29, at 397.
249 Id. at 327.
250 See D. SZATMARY, supra note 233, at 123-28.
251 See id. at 127.

252 See supra note 169.
253 THE FEDERALIST No. 6, supra note 5, at 56 (A. Hamilton). Similarly, in

response to Jefferson's suggestion that the people should be consulted directly in the
event of a conflict between the branches of government, Madison warned against
"disturbing the public tranquillity by interesting too strongly the public passions."
THE FEDERALIST No. 49, supra note 5, at 315 (J. Madison).
254 THE FEDERALIST No. 63, supra note 5, at 387 (A. Hamilton or J. Madison)

(emphasis omitted).
255 See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 5, at 82 (J. Madison). For a welldocumented portrayal of the debate between federalists and anti-federalists as a clash
between aristocracy and democracy, see G. WOOD, supra note 29, at 512-16. On the
purportedly superior civic virtue of representatives as opposed to ordinary citizens,
see Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 20, at 43-45.
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Congress to call constitutional conventions,256but only upon application by two thirds of the state legislatures.
F. Republican Moments and the Bill of Rights
Given that the Bill of Rights was, in a sense, the "legacy of the
anti-federalists," it would be odd to interpret the first amendment
as a mere extension of the political theoi-y embodied in The Federalist.257 Yet this is precisely what liberal pluralist theory proposes

to do. 258 The more natural view-that the amendment reflects the
outlook of the anti-federalists and other strong proponents of a bill
of rights-corresponds better to the legislative history.
During the ratification debates, the anti-federalists repeatedly
urged the virtues of a small republic. 259 Backcountry antifederalists feared a powerful national government that could not be
260
controlled by town meetings or extra-legal county conventions.
But direct democracy was not a viable alternative. Given that even
256

See U.S. CONST. art. V. Bruce Ackerman's use of article V to build a theory of
periodic constitutional revision through popular republican politics is discussed supra
notes
257 73-80 and accompanying text.
See H. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 65 (1981); see also L.
LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESs 221-22 (1985) (arguing that the anti-federalists
merely used the Bill of Rights as a tactical pawn in their struggle to preserve state
autonomy). While it is true that the Bill of Rights played a distinctly secondary role
in anti-federalist thought, see infra notes 260-62 and accompanying text, it does not
follow that anti-federalist thinking is unhelpful in determining the original meaning
of the right of assembly. As Akhil Amar has shown, the Bill of Rights was
"significantly more influenced by AntiFederalist thought than was 'Madison's original
constitution.'" Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution (forthcoming 100 YALE L.J.
(1991)).
In particular, when it was necessary, the anti-federalists were willing to fight for
rights of popular control over representative government. Although they spoke up
in support of the right of assembly, the lack of any serious challenge obviated the
need for passionate debate. On the question of a right to instruct representatives, on
the other hand, the anti-federalists forced one of the most hotly contested debates on
any proposed provision of the Bill of Rights. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 761-76 (J. Gales
ed. 1834) [hereinafter ANNALS (J. Gales ed, 1834)]; see also infra text accompanying
notes 267-70.
258John Ely, for example, finds liberal pluralist political theory in The Federalis4
and then goes on to apply the theory to the Bill of Rights. SeeJ. ELY, supra note 8,
at 80, 89-104. His conclusion is that the appropriate role for constitutional
jurisprudence is "policing the process of representation." Id. at 73-88.
259 See H. STORING, supra note 257, at 15-23.
260 See V. HALL, supra note 236, at 281-82. In the view of some anti-federalists,
the federalist fear of popular assemblies was a symptom of aristocratic pretensions.
See 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 94-97 (H. Storing ed. 1981) (An Officer of the
Late Continental Army).
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the states were too large for a committee of the whole people,
representative government was inevitable. Hence, the anti-federalists reluctantly conceded the inadequacy of direct popular government and focused their efforts on trying to keep power centered in
the states, where representatives would be relatively responsive to
the people, 26 1 and secondarily on constraining the national
government with a Bill of lRights.
Although they failed to incorporate direct democracy into the
institutional structure of politics-as-normal, the anti-federalists did
join with others to preserve the right that had been invoked to
justify extra-legal forms of popular power during the Revolutionary
era. A number of states sent proposed amendments to the first
Congress along with their ratifications of the Constitution. Four
262
included the right peaceably to assemble.
In the congressional debates, two views of the clause may be
distinguished: one weak and one strong. Theodore Sedgwick, a
conservative federalist from Massachusetts, put forth the weak view
in support of his motion to delete the clause. "If people freely
converse together," he argued, "they must assemble for that
purpose." Hence, the assembly clause was nothing more than a
redundant appendage to the free speech guarantee; indeed, it would
be "derogatory to the dignity of the House to descend to such
minutiae." 2 63 John Vining of Delaware embraced the weak conception, but turned it against Sedgwick, pointing out that "if the
thing was harmless" and some states strongly desired it, then he
264:
might as well support it.
Four congressmen rejected Sedgwick's "trivial" view of the
clause, but failed to articulate a clear alternative.26 5
Only El-

261 See H. STORING, supra note 257, at 17. To the anti-federalists, national
representatives would be "too far removed from the people, in general, to sympathize
with them, and too few to communicate with them." 2 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 260, at 268 (The Federal Farmer). As a result, the representatives would circulate among and sympathize with only the "natural aristocracy" and
the "popular demagogues," but not with the "substantial and respectable part of the
democracy." Id. at 269, 275-76; see also id. at 369 (Brutus) (observing that "in a large
extended country, it is impossible to have a representation, possessing the sentiments,
and of integrity, to declare the minds of the people...").
262 These states were Virginia, North Carolina, New York, and Rhode Island. See
Jarrett & Mund, The Right of Assembly, 9 N.Y.U. L.Q. REv. 1, 11 (1931). In addition,
the right was included in a minority report from the Maryland convention. See B.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 185, at 157.

263 1 ANNALS (J. Gales ed. 1834), supra note 257, at 759.
264 Id. at 732.

265 In John Page's view, the right was essential to the preservation of the other

19901

REPUBLICAN MOMENTS

bridge Gerry, a Massachusetts anti-federalist, attempted to provide
a context. Although this "essential" right had been abused during
Shays' Rebellion, he argued, the "people ought to be secure in the
266
peaceable enjoyment of this privilege."
The most illuminating statement, however, came in the debate
over a proposed clause that would have given the people the right
"to instruct their representatives." 267 Like the right of assembly,
instruction was favored by the anti-federalists, who viewed both as
means of increasing the people's role in government. Although
successful on the assembly clause by a considerable majority, the
anti-federalists were defeated on instruction by a vote of 41-10.268
James Jackson of Georgia, one of the swing votes, explained that he
was in favor of the right to assemble because "it had been used in
this country as one of the best checks on the British Legislature in
their unjustifiable attempts to tax the colonies." 2 69 The right to
instruct, on the other hand, would bind the representatives, thus
promoting factionalism and preventing the representatives from
270
exercising their individual consciences.
Jackson's statement suggests that the right of assembly should
be viewed as incorporating a direct, popular supplement to strong
representative government. The Constitution had shifted power
from the local and state levels, where the people had been directly
and passionately involved, to the national level, where cool-headed
and public-minded representatives would practice sound government.2 71 Jackson embraced this design, but only as a plan for
first amendment rights; "[i]f the people could be deprived of the power of
assembling," then they "might be deprived of every other privilege contained in the

clause." Id. at 760. Thomas Tucker and Thomas Hartley added vaguely that the
clause was "of importance" and "as necessary to be inserted ... as most in the
clause." Id. at 760-61.
266 Id. at 760. This statement corresponded to Gerry's views on the rebellion.
While most Massachusetts leaders reacted to the convention movement with alarm,
he remained cool and opposed repression until long after the Shaysites had turned
from peaceful county conventions to armed attacks on the courts. See G. BILLIAS,
ELBRIDGE GERRY, FOUNDING FATHER AND REPUBLICAN STATESMAN 150-51 (1976).
267 1 ANNALS (J. Gales ed. 1834), supra note 257, at 761. Instruction was

a
common practice during the Revolutionary and Confederation periods. Town
meetings or county conventions would instruct their representatives how to vote in
the state legislature. For the representatives to vote otherwise was considered
defiance of popular sovereignty. See G. WOOD, supra note 29, at 189-90.
268 See 1 ANNALS (J. Gales ed. 1834), supra note 257, at 776.
269 Id. at 764.
270 See id.
271 See supra text accompanying notes 252-56. See generally Sunstein, Constilutionalism, supra note 20, at 430-37 (discussing Madison's belief that representatives
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politics-as-normal. With Madison, he opposed the right to instruct
because direct popular control over representatives would negate
their individual judgment and remove any possibility of deliberating
toward a unified view.27 2 But Jackson could not agree to "the
total exclusion of the people, in their. collective capacity" from the
government. 273 As the reference to the tax resistance makes
clear, he saw the right of assembly as a protection for forceful,
collectively organized, and direct popular pressure.
This strong reading appears to be the natural one. Sedgwick's
weak reading is implausible given the historical proximity of strong
274
usage by the American resistance movement and the Shaysites.
Indeed, the right had been invoked almost exclusively to justify
exercises of popular power; there was no need to defend meetings
called merely to discuss issues or advocate viewpoints. 275 As
Jackson's and Gerry's remarks indicate, these events were on the
minds of the framers. Their apparent conclusion was that the value
of the people assembled as a check on representative government
justified a degree of political instability and the risk of violent
abuses.

could independently achieve the public good).
272Jackson argued that the right of instruction "would necessarily drive the house
into a number of factions. There might be different instructions from every State,
and the representation from each State would be a faction to support its own
measures." 1 ANNALS (J. Gales ed. 1834), supra note 257, at 764. Madison
emphasized the importance of the congressman's individualjudgment: "Suppose he
is instructed to patronize certain measures, and from circumstances known to him,
but not to his constituents, he is convinced that they will endanger the public good;
is he obliged to sacrifice his own judgment to them?" Id. at 767.
273 See THE FEDERALIsT No. 63, supra note 5, at 387 (A. Hamilton orJ. Madison)

(emphasis omitted).
274 One wonders whether Sedgwick's insistence on a narrow reading might have
masked a concern that the clause would in fact be read more broadly. Only a few
years before, he had been a leader of the movement to suppress Shays' Rebellion.
In the course of the conflict, his home was looted on one occasion and on another
he was briefly captured. See It. WELCH, THEODORE SEDGWICK, FEDERALIST: A
POLITICAL PORTRAIT 48-52 (1965). Unlike most of the counterinsurgency leaders, he

was a resident of western Massachusetts and thoroughly immersed in local politics.
It seems improbable that he was unaware of the Shaysites' reliance on the right of
peaceable assembly to justify their county conventions.
275 No one was prosecuted or imprisoned merely for meeting or petitioning. The
right to assemble was called upon tojustify provincial and continental congresses,
unauthorized assemblies of colonial legislators, nonimportation assemblies, and extralegal county conventions. SeeJ. REID, supra note 186, at 17-18.
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V. DIRECT POPULAR POWER AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
In Parts III and IV of this Article, I argued that republican
moments provide a vital supplement to representative politics-asnormal. If this is true, then the vague guarantees of the first
amendment should be purposively construed to protect exercises of
direct popular power that carry out this supplementary role.
A. The First Amendment Value of Direct PopularPower
It is certainly possible to argue for rights of forceful protest
without drawing on popular republican theory or referring to
republican moments. From a liberal pluralist perspective, it can be
argued that protest is essential for groups effectively to advance
their interests, or that protest enables less wealthy groups to offset
the financial power of wealthier groups.
By themselves, however, these arguments have limited appeal.
Why should judges force citizens to bear the costs and endure the
disruptions of protest merely to give special interest graups fair and
equal access to the public trough?276 If fairness is the problem,
then why not mandate judges to overturn unfairly enacted legislation or, less drastically, construe statutes in favor of disadvantaged
groups?

277

The answer-and it comes as no surprise at this point in the
essay-is that the American constitutional order both requires and
embodies a popular republican supplement to remedy the corruption and political degeneration of interest group bargaining. In
order to break through the apathy and selfishness of politics-asnormal, social movements often find it necessary to employ forms
of protest that are experienced by their targets as coercive. It is not
easy to divert citizens from private pursuits or politicians and
administrators from the cozy routine of interest group bargaining.
When disempowered groups try to "enter the conversation," as
Once an issue has been reduced to a clash of private interests,judges are not
likely to impose costs on "innocent" third parties to assist one side or the other. For
a brilliant treatment of this problem in the context of affirmative action, see Ansley,
Stirringthe Ashes: Race, Classand the Future of Civil Rights Scholarship, 74 CORNELL L.
276

REV. 993 (1989).

277 In asking this rhetorical question, I do not mean to suggest that these
proposals would be unwise if implemented in addition to rather than as a substitute
for protection for forceful protest. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 20, at 1032 (arguing
that statutes "affecting certain discrete and insular minorities" should be interpreted,
"where possible, for the benefit of those minorities").
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Michelman points out, "we" may sometimes feel that they "seek to
disrupt it." 278 Higher track lawmaking necessarily involves "passion, debate and conflict." 279 If the public life is to present a
viable alternative to private pursuits, it must encompass "not only
communication, but the development and exercise of power, the
power to create new forms as well as the strength to resist existing
28 0
structures."
The republican value of direct popular power adds a factor to
be weighed in first amendment balancing. Consider, for example,
the recent residential picketing case, Frisby v. Schultz. 28 l In Frisby,
antiabortion activists peacefully picketed the home of a doctor who
performed abortions at nearby medical clinics. The Court upheld
an ordinance that, as judicially narrowed, barred "focused picketing
28 2
taking place solely in front of a particular residence."
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the majority simply
identified with the homeowner's desire for privacy, while showing
no interest in the function of the picketing as a form of moral
discourse.
According to the majority opinion, the picketing
"inherently and offensively" intruded on residential privacy with
"devastating" consequences. Even a lone picketer could "invade"
privacy, as few of "us" would feel comfortable with a stranger who
283
"lurks" outside.
Meanwhile, the Court had little to say about the value or
function of residential picketing, other than to characterize it as
"narrowly directed at the household," and thus not implicating the
constitutional value of public communication. 2 84 Justice Stevens
in his dissent went further, suggesting that repeated picketing would
285
serve no purpose except "to harm the doctor and his family."
These statements betray a lack of sensitivity to the role of
picketing in the activists' effort. Even if the protesters aimed solely
to stop the doctor from performing abortions, they undoubtedly
expected that unwanted notoriety among his neighbors would help
278 Michelman, supra note 58, at 1529.
279 Ackerman, supra note 73, at 1072.
280 C.E. BAKER, supra note 161, at 117-18; see also supra text accompanying notes
39-42.
281 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
282 Id. at 483.
28

3 Id. at 486-87 (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,478-79 (1980) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting)).
284 See id. at 486.

285 Id. at 498 (Stevens, J., dis:senting).
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accomplish their end. By removing the shield of anonymity, they
transformed what might otherwise have been a private career
decision into a public moral issue. Ever since colonial tax resisters
of British sympathizers, residential protest
held rallies at the homes 286
function.
this
served
has
While it is true that the picketers were exhibiting hostility
toward the doctor, it is also true that they were treating him as a
member of a moral community. Instead of writing him off, they
evidently felt that an hour or two of picketing every week might be
enough to induce him to cease performing aboritions. 28 7 This
hope would not, of course, be fulfilled if the doctor was strongly
committed to keeping abortion available. Whatever the outcome,
the picketers were, by their act of moral commitment, testing his.
Although the test might be devastating to the Supreme Court's "us,"
it was also an entirely nonviolent means of injecting moral passion
into public political discourse, an essential step on the road to a
republican moment.

28 8

B. The Value of DirectPopularPower Embodied in CurrentDoctrine:
The ConstitutionalRight to Boycott
While ignoring the republican function of direct popular power
in Frisby, the Supreme Court has nevertheless placed it at the core
of the first amendment doctrine governing boycotts. The resulting
case law provides the most fully developed example of the Court's
approach toward direct popular power.
1. Background: ClaiborneHardware and SCTLA
Eight years ago, in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,289 _the
Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a state tort
judgment against black citizens who had conducted a boycott of
286 See, e.g., P. MAIER, supra note 167, at 127-28 (describing the practice of mass
meetings outside the homes of merchants t6 dissuade them from importing British
goods).
287 The doctor's home was picketed "on at least six occasions between April 20,
1985, and May 20, 1985, for periods ranging from one to one and a half hours."
Ftisby, 487 U.S. at 476.
288 It should be remembered that the Court was upholding a flat ban on
residential picketing. Limits on the number or intrusiveness of pickets would pose

a more difficult case even considering the picketing's functions in higher lawmaking.
289 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
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white businesses in Port Gibson, Mississippi. The boycott was a
classic instance of popular republican politics.
The local branch of the NAACP had petitioned the county
government and private businesses, urging them to provide equal
treatment for blacks. 290 When the response proved unsatisfactory, several hundred black citizens met at a church and voted unanimously to boycott white merchants. 29 1 Boycott supporters picketed white-owned stores and organized a group known as the
"Deacons," or "Black Hats" to enforce the boycott. 292 Violators
were publicly identified as "traitors" to the black community,
socially ostracized, occasionally threatened with violence, and very
2 93
occasionally physically attacked.
The Supreme Court held that the first amendment protects
peaceful civil rights boycott activities and overturned the tort
judgment against the boycotters. 294 "Speech," said the Court,
should "not lose its protected character.., simply because it may
embarrass others or coerce them into action." 295 Furthermore,
although violence was "beyond the pale" of the Constitution, violent
acts would not render a boycott unprotected unless the plaintiffs
could meet the "heavy" burden of establishing that "fear rather than
296
protected conduct was the dominant force in the movement."
Last term, in FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association
("SCTLA"), 29 7 the Court unanimously rejected a claim that Claiborne Hardware protected a concerted refusal by lawyers to serve as
court-appointed defense counsel until their hourly fees were
raised. 298 The Court distinguished Claiborne Hardware on grounds
that closely parallel the definition of republican moments. While
the civil rights boycotters "sought no special advantage for them290

See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 393 So. 2d 1290, 1295-97 (Miss. 1980),
rev'd, 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
291 See ClaiborneHardware,458 U.S. at 900.
292 See id. at 903-04.

293 At least four incidents of violence were connected to the boycott, including
two involving shots fired into the homes of non-boycotters. See id. at 904. At a
boycott rally, Charles Evers, the Field Secretary of the NAACP, reportedly threatened
to break the neck of anyone caught violating the boycott. See id. at 902.
294 See id. at 912-15, 934.

215 Id. at 910; cf. Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419-20
(1971) (stating that "peaceful picketeering" is protected by the first amendment even
where the pamphlet's message is "intended to exercise a coercive impact" on others).
296 ClaiborneHardware, 458 U.S. at 933-34.
297 110 S. Ct. 768 (1990).
29

See id. at 776-78; id. at 791-92 (Blackmun,J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); id. at 782 n.1 (Brennari,J., dissenting in part).
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selves," the lawyers' "immediate objective was to increase the price
that they would be paid for their services." 299 Unlike the lawyers,
the NAACP was fighting to implement the constitutional ideal of
equality, to obtain the "equal respect and equal treatment to which
they were constitutionally entitled."30 0 Their struggle transcended the day-to-day conduct of business as usual: "Equality and
freedom are preconditions of the free market, and not commodities
to be haggled over within it."301
2. The Right to Boycott as a Popular Republican
Supplement to Representative Politics
From a liberal pluralist viewpoint, these distinctions make little
sense. As we have seen, liberal pluralist theory is comfortable with
the notion that politics consists of manipulating state power for
private gain. Indeed, judicial discrimination between selfish and
virtuous political activities conflicts with the liberal commitment to
30 2
neutrality among speakers and viewpoints.
Where politics-as-usual is concerned, the Court has not hesitated
to carry this neutrality principle through to its logical conclusions.
303
In Eastern Rail Road Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
for example, an association of railroads engaged in an anti-trucking
publicity campaign aimed at securing the passage of legislation
restricting the trucking industry, the railroads' major competition.
The railroads were thus more obviously self-interested than the
SCTLA lawyers, who could plausibly claim to be concerned about
the quality of representation for criminal defendants as well as their
own pocketbooks. But the Court dismissed the railroads' motive as
irrelevant 3 0 4 In order to avoid "important constitutional ques299 Id. at 777.

300 Id.
301 Id.
302 On this commitment, see J. ELY, supra note 8, at 105-34; Kalven, The
Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 19; Karst, Equality as a
Central Piinciplein the Fist Amendment 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 20, 29-35 (1975).
303 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
304 See id. at 138-40 (noting that "[i]t is neither unusual nor illegal for people to
seek action on laws in the hope that they may bring about an advantage to themselves
and a disadvantage to their competitors").
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tions,"305 it held that the Sherman Act did not prohibit the
campaign.
The SCTLA Court distinguished Noerr exactly on the line
between representative politics and direct popular power. While
the alleged restraint of trade in Noerr "was the intended consequence
of public action," the SCTLA boycott "would have had precisely the
same anticompetitive consequences .

.

. even if no legislation had

30 6

been enacted."
In other words, the railroads in Noerr were
using the normal processes of representative government to obtain
a legislative restraint on trade, while the SCTLA lawyers were
directly exercising their collective economic' power to fix prices.

307

One might ask why this should make a difference. The answer
depends on one's political viewpoint. From an elitist republican
perspective, the vice of the SCTLA boycott was that it circumvented
the Madisonian check on popular passions and interests. While the
process of deliberation among purportedly virtuous representatives
normally ensures that legislation serves public ends, the SCTLA
lawyers bypassed this safeguard when they exerted direct economic
pressure on the city.
From a liberal plurallist perspective, on the other hand, the
outputs as well as the inputs of government may properly serve

private purposes. Since judges cannot distinguish between private
and public interests without improperly drawing on their own
controversial value preferences, the best they can do is ensure that

305 Id. at 137-38.
Noerr was subsequently extended to protect access to
administrative agencies and courts. See California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking
Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-11 (1972); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381

U.S. 657, 669-70 (1965). For an illuminating analysis of Noe?" as an embodiment of
interest group pluralism, see Minda, supra note 7, at 931-35.
306 SCTLA, 110 S. Ct. at 776. At first glance, this reasoning would seem to
overturn Missouri v. National Org. for Women, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 842 (1980) (extending Noerr to protect a boycott of Missouri convention
facilities in protest of the state legislature's failure to ratify the Equal Rights
Amendment). More likely, however, the NOW decision-having served as part of the
support for Claiboine Hardwan; 458 U.S. at 914 n.48-will now be saved by that
decision.
307 For readers who have an integrated conception of political and economic life,
it maybe difficult to understand the Court's approach. The SCTLA lawyers were, like
the Noerrrailroads, seeking action from government. And the railroads were, like the
lawyers, exerting economic power (by paying for a publicity barrage). But the
railroads' publicity campaign would produce economic results only if the elected
representatives were persuaded to legislate, while the lawyers could and did produce
immediate economic results by collectively withholding their services.
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conflict among interest groups is played out according to the rules
of the game. In this view, the SOTLA abandoned its constitutional
shield when it chose to exercise power outside the constitutionallyestablished process of representative government.
While both elitist republicanism and liberal pluralism can thus
distinguish Noerr from SCTLA, neither can distinguish SCTLA from
Claiborne Hardware. Like the lawyers in SCTLA, the civil rights
boycotters in Claiborne Hardware exercised power directly, thus
bypassing the filter of representative politics (be it an elitist
republican filter of virtue operating on outcomes, or a liberal
pluralist filter of fairness operating on process).
Claiborne Hardware thus appears to be a popular republican
exception to the normal judicial preference for representative
governmentA-0 8 Taken together, SCTLA and Claiborne Hardware
hold that popular republican tactics are constitutionally protected,
but only if they exhibit the virtues of popular republicanism:
namely, the pursuit of interests broader than immediate pecuniary
3 09
gain, and an appeal to fundamental ideals.
This reconciliation aids in explaining the contrasting results in
Claiborne Hardware and International Longshoremen's Association v.
308

ClaiborneHardware could also be viewed as an extension of suspect classifica-

tion analysis into the first amendment area. Since black Americans are unable
effectively to participate in interest group bargaining, it follows that they should be
permitted to use extraordinary, extra-institutional forms of political action. See H.
KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 123-72 (1966); Cover, The Origins
ofJudicialActivism in the Protectionof Minorities, 91 YALE LJ. 1287, 1311-12 (1982).
In its broad outline, this theory is not opposed to the vision of a popular
republican supplement advocated here. It suggests that the first amendment protects
the exercise of direct group power when necessary to remedy a malfunction in
politics-as-normal. If limited to groups that are singled out for special protection
under suspect classification analysis, however, it would provide inadequate protection.
Republican moments are notjust for discrete and insular minorities; indeed, virtually
the entire people may participate, as in the struggle for independence. The theory
would exclude the democratic reformers of theJacksonian era, the populists of the
late nineteenth century, and the trade unionists and unemployed activists of the
1930s.
The SCTLA Court may have had something like this theory in mind when it
observed that the ClaiborneHardwareboycotters were struggling "to change a social
order that had consistently treated them as second class citizens." SCTLA, 110 S. Ct.
at 777 (quoting ClaiborneHardware,458 U.S. at 912). However, the Court's emphasis
on the SCTLA boycotters' objective to benefit themselves economically, suggests that
the Justices may not be anxious to adopt a theory that would require them to
discriminate among social groups in the first amendment area. See SCTLA, 110 S. Ct.
at 777-78.
30' See supra text accompanying notes 33-38.
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Allied International ("ILA"), 310 a problem that has attracted wide
attention from commentators. 3 1
ILA involved a refusal by
longshoremen to unload Soviet goods as a protest against the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan. As in Claiborne Hardware, the boycotters
were pursuing a broad social goal rather than narrow self-interest. 31 2 But the ILA's boycott was not an exercise of popular
republican politics. ILA president Thomas Gleason had "ordered
ILA members to stop handling cargoes." 13 Far from engaging in
an exercise of positive freedom, the longshoremen acted "[i]n
obedience to" Gleason's order. 314
Given the long history of
autocracy in the ILA, the coercive power Gleason held over
individual workers, and the workers' inability to leave the union's

jurisdiction without sacrificing their jobs,3

15

the boycott could

hardly be viewed as an exercise in democracy.
3. An Expansive Reading of the Right

That the theory of republican moments helps to explain the
boycott decisions does not mean that it supports them. By attempting to tailor first amendment protection to virtuous protests, the

310 456 U.S. 212 (1982).
311 See L. TRIBE, supra note 116, at 200-03; Getman, Labor Law and Free Speech:
The Curious Policy of Limited Expression, 43 MD. L. REv. 4, 16-19 (1984); Harper, The
Consumer's Emerging Right to Boycott: NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware and its
Implicationsfor American Labor Law, 93 YALE LJ. 409 (1984); Kupferberg, Political
Strikes, Labor Law, and DemooraticRights, 71 VA. L. REV. 685 (1985); Pope, The ThreeSystems Ladder of FirstAmendmen Values: Two Rungs and a Black Hole, 11 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 189, 224-28 (1984); Note, Peaceful Labor Picketing and the First
Amendmen 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1469, 1489 n.132 (1982); Note, Labor Picketing and
CommercialSpeech: Free Enteiprise Values in the Doctrineof FreeSpeech, 91 YALE LJ. 938
(1982).
312 The ClaiborneHardwaredecision distinguished ILA by making an apples-andoranges contrast between the economic restrictions involved in that case with the
political activity involved in Claiborne. See ClaiborneHardware,458 U.S. at 912-13.
However, Claiborne Hardware also involved economic restrictions, and ILA also
involved political activity. See Pope, supra note 311, at 226-27.
313 ILA, 456 U.S. at 214.
314 See id. This factor figured in the decision of the First Circuit Court of Appeals
denying first amendment protection to the boycott. See Allied Int'l, Inc. v.
International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 640 F.2d 1368, 1379 n.11 (1st Cir. 1981), affd,
456 U.S. 212 (1982). For a penetrating constitutional analysis of the significance of
Gleason's order, see Kupferberg, supra note 311, at 738-39.
315 See generally PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, THE EDGE:
ORGANIZED CRIME, BUSINESS AND LABOR UNIONS 33-70 (1986) (recounting control of
racketeers over ILA and efforts to expose mob involvement); D. GODDARD, ALL FALL
DOWN: ONE MAN AGAINST THE WATERFRONT MOB (1980) (same).
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Court may have unduly constricted the space for popular republican
politics. Even campaigns for the lofty goals of equality and freedom
often focus on immediate economic gains, especially when the
participants are economically disadvantaged. The "Don't Buy
Where You Can't Work" boycotts of the 1930s and 1940s prefigured
the more political boycotts of the 1950s and 1960s. 3 16
The
Claiborne Hardware boycotters themselves were demanding more
jobs for themselves and their families. 3 17 Even the colonial Whig
nonimporters were seeking to reduce taxes and, in some cases, to
destroy competitors who were dependent on British imports. 1 8
There is also a suggestion in SCTLA that boycotters may be
protected only when they are seeking to enforce rights that are
already recognized by courts as constitutionally guaranteed. 1 9
Rights-creation, however, is one of the hallmarks of republican
moments. 320 Whatever one may think about the concept of rights
at the level of philosophy, there is no doubt that rights discourse
has historically served as the primary point of connection between
popular movements and constitutional jurisprudence. 32 1 In mass
meetings as well as court proceedings, the labor movement
advanced "labor's constitution," a vision of labor rights grounded in
the first and thirteenth amendments, as an alternative to the
jurisprudence of Lochner era judges. 3 22 The civil rights move316 Boycotts conducted by "Housewives Leagues" have been credited with winning
75,000 jobs for blacks during the depression. SeeJ.JoNES, supra note 142, at 215.
317 The boycotters demanded that all of the targeted businesses hire black clerks
and cashiers and that the county government hire black policemen, welfare workers,
school staff, and hospital staff. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 393 So. 2d
1290, 1296 (Miss. 1980), rev'd, 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
318 See C. BRIDENBAUGH, supra note 191, at 281-82.
319 Seesupra note 300 and accompanying text; see also ClaiborneHardware,458 U.S.

at 914 (stating that "[t]he right of the States to regulate economic activity could not
justify a complete prohibition against a nonviolent, politically motivated boycott
designed to force governmental and economic change and to effectuate rightsguaranteed
by the Constitution itself" (emphasis added)).
320 In addition to the Bill of Rights, the right of otherwise qualified nonpropertied
citizens to vote, the right to be free from chattel slavery and involuntary servitude, the
right of workers to self-organization, and the right to be free from private race and
sex discrimination are all among the rights that gained legal recognition during
republican
moments.
32 1
See Hartog, The Constitution ofAspirationand "The Rights That Belong To Us AIl,"
74J. AM. HisT. 1013, 1024 (1987) (noting that "[g]roups have been able to draw from
constitutional language ways of demonstrating that those who exercised power over
them did so illegitimately, immorally, and wrongly, and therefore had nothing worthy
of recognition as vested rights").
522 See Forbath, supra note 95, at 1208-14.
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ment-through its leading spokesman, Martin Luther King, Jr.likewise asserted its constitutional vision in opposition to the
prevailing positive law.3 23 If disempowered groups are to be
heard in constitutional discourse, the courts must protect their
struggles to create new rights as well as to enforce old ones.
The Court's use of noneconomic objectives and constitutional
concerns as criteria for protection will involve judges in highly
problematic judgments about the value of protests. Suppose the
Claiborne Hardware boycotters had been demanding only that
segregated employers hire blacks.
Would their "economic"
objective have rendered their protest unprotected?3 24 What if a
group with economic objectives, having read SCTLA, adds political
demands to its economic demands? If a group claims, as unions
and workers did in the 1930s, that it is fighting for its constitutional
rights, should protection hinge on whether the group's view of the
Constitution coincides with that of thejudges? Should environmentalists be denied constitutional protection because their demands do
325
not refer to any recognized constitutional right?
If popular republican politics are to be given adequate space,
judges will have to abandon the effort to limit protection to virtuous
protests over fundamental issues. While popular republican theory
provides the reasons for protecting such protests, it cannot provide
criteria determinate enough to enable judges to distinguish them
from other, less noble protests.3 26 Judges
cannot be expected to anticipate which social movements and which issues will
eventually trigger full-scale repub.lican moments. Demands that will
later be recognized as political and fundamental may initially be
323 See Kennedy, supra note '[20, at 1000-02.
324 Compare Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950) (holding that an

injunction against picketers who were demanding that blacks be hired in proportion
to their population in the area was justified by the state's policy against picketing to
force discriminatory hiring on a racial basis) with Kirkland v. Wallace, 403 F.2d 413
(5th Cir. 1968) (treating picketing in support of demands for black hiring as constitutionally
protected and striking clown an anti-boycott statute as facially invalid).
25
Cf.Environmental Planning & Information Council v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.
3d 188, 197, 680 P.2d 1086, 1092, 203 Cal. Rptr. 127, 133 (1984) (holding that a
secondary boycott by environmentalists against private businesses was entitled to first
amendment protection).
326 Thus, in this case, the liberal principle of neutrality is best suited to protect
republican values. As we have seen, there is no reason other than abstract
consistency to be disturbed over convergences between liberal and republican theory.
See supra note 38. For a thoughtful argument that judges can and should make
content-based distinctions between communicative activities that do and those that
do not contribute to republican deliberation, see Minda, supra note 7, at 1001-08.
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seen as narrow, self-interested, and factional. Like most citizens,
judges may feel skeptical about protesters' motivations and irritated
at the disruptions they cause.3 27 It can take a prolonged period
of mass political action and education to change their minds. The
Supreme Court, for example, was able to recognize the constitutional value of labor organizing and picketing only after the republican
moment of the 1930s had been. underway for years. 328 By that
time, the Wagner Act had been passed and the decisive organizing
victories won.3 29 Although the Court did a better job of protecting civil rights protests, the most important decisions did not come
33 0
until the republican moment of the 1960s was in full swing,
and the Court did not get around to protecting boycotts until
ClaiborneHardwarein 1982. During the crucial, early stages of both
movements, when they were politically isolated and in desperate
need of constitutional protection, courts1 not only denied protection
33
but actively suppressed their protests.
Although the SCTLA language on noneconomic and constitutional objectives suggests that these failings are likely to be
repeated, the Court did supply a narrow interpretation of its
holding. In response to the dissent, which emphasized the value of
See supra text accompanying notes 122-23.
The constitutional breakthroughs came in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939);
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) and Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
On the shift in the judicial view of labor picketing from commercial to political
and back again, see Pope, Labor and the Constitution: FromAbolition to Deindustrialization,
65 TEx. L. REV. 1071, 1076-78, 1089-96 (1987).
329
The Wagner Act was passed in 1935. The key union organizing victories were
won against General Motors and "Big Steel" in 1936 and 1937. See generally I.
327
328

BERNSTEIN, TURBULENT YEARS, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER: 1933-1941
(1969).
330 Cases involving the kind of militant protest tactics chara teristic of republican
moments included: Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961) (reversing the
convictions of sit-in protestors for disturbing the peace); Edwards v. South Carolina,
372 U.S. 229 (1963) (reversing the convictions of black demonstrators since there was
no violence or threat of violence on their part or on the part of any member of the
crowd watching them); and Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (reversing the
convictions of black protestors because the breach of peace statute was unconstitutionally vague and because the obstructing public passage statute was discriminatorily

applied).
331 Earlier decisions issuing or upholding injunctions against civil rights protesters
include Hughes v. Superior Court, 339. U.S. 460 (1950) (described supra note 324);
Green v. Samuelson, 168 Md. 421, 178 A. 109 (1935) (concerning an injunction
against picketing to compel white merchants to hire blacks); and A.S. Beck Shoe
Corp. v.Johnson, 153 Misc. 363, 274 N.Y.S. 946 (Sup. Ct. 1934) (same).
On thejudicial suppression of labor protest, see Forbath, supranote 95, at 1148-
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boycotting as a form of political communication, 332 the majority
noted that "this case involves not only a boycott but also a horizontal price-fixing arrangement-a type of conspiracy that has been
consistently analyzed as a per se violation [of the anti-trust laws] for
many decades."33 3 As the Court pointed out, this price-fixing
element distinguishes the SCTLA boycott from those listed by the
dissent, which included the colonial boycotts against the British, the
Montgomery bus boycott, NOW's boycott in support of the ERA,
334
the United Farm Workers' grape boycott, and a host of others.
If limited to price-fixing conspiracies, the holding of SCTLA would
33 5
thus leave most popular republican boycotts protected.
VI. REPUBLICAN STATUTES

Republican moments invariably yield many laws. Some of these
laws take the form of constitutional amendments or pathbreaking
judicial opinions, a theme pursued by Bruce Ackerman in his recent
contribution, Constitutional Politics/ConstitutionalLaw. 336 Most,
however, are statutes. The two most recent republican moments,
the New Deal period and the 1960s, produced mainly statutes.
How should courts treat these legislative products of republican
moments? Here, Ackerman's initial suggestions are disturbing. The
332 See SCTLA, 110 S. Ct. at '788-90 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

333 Id. at 782 n.19.
334 See id. at 776-78, 782 n.19; id. at 788 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
35 At least one important form of boycott would, however, be excluded. Strikes
for higher wages played an important role in the republican moment of the 1930s.
Wage demands often reflect concerns ofjustice and self-respect rather than a simple
desire for "more." See, e.g., P. DRUCKER, THE NEW SOCIETY: THE ANATOMY OF THE
INDUSTRIAL ORDER 76 (1950) (noting that conflict over wages is really a "mock
conflict" designed to hide deeper concerns over issues of "power" and "citizenship").
33r Ackerman, ConstitutionalPolitics/ConstitutionalLaw, 99 YALE L.J. 453 (1989).
In that article, Ackerman takes a retrospective view of the three constitutional
moments, asking how their outcomes should be implemented. He imagines the
Justices in the caboose of a train, looking backward. Theirjob is to reflect upon the
deeper meaning of the direction chosen by the people. As the train changes
direction, new vistas are revealed, and familiar ones are seen in a fresh light. In this
wonderfully graphic metaphor, Ackerman notes that the "distinctive thing about the
judges.., is that they remain in the caboose, looking backward-not in the locomotive
arguing over the direction the train should be taking at the next crossroads." Id. at
546. From this backward-looking perspective, Ackerman develops a fascinating and,
I think, true picture of constitutional jurisprudence as an effort to interpret and
reconcile the conflicting results of constitutional moments.
For an analysis of the intellectual structure of constitutional transformations, see
Lipkin, TheAnatomy of ConstitutionalRevolutions,68 NEB. L. REV. 701 (1989) (applying
Thomas Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions to "constitutional revolutions").
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Storrs Lectures endorse an active role for the Supreme Court in
overturning the legislative victories won by transformative social
movements.33 7 By sitting on the legislative steam valve, the
Supreme Court alerts the people that a major change is in the
offing, giving the opposition an opportunity to mobilize and forcing
the transformative movement to raise the level of political struggle
to a "fever pitch." 33 8 Lochner and, perhaps, Dred Scott 3thus
emerge
3 9
as examples of the proper exercise of judicial review.
This view bears an unmistakable resemblance to the tongue-incheek revolutionary slogan: "The worse the better!" In order to
maintain a sharp distinction between the two tracks of lawmaking,
Ackerman would have courts nullify the legislative outcomes of
popular republican politics, thus forcing a constitutional showdown.
As we have seen, this approach writes off all but three popular
upsurges, about one every seventy years, and seemingly approves of
intensifying the level of struggle to the point that armed combat
may be necessary to decide the issue-as occurred in two of
Ackerman's three periods.
Although judicial hostility may at times intensify republican
moments by pushing social movements to greater efforts, the more
straightforward and likely result is the spreading of cynicism and
political apathy. Thus, for example, the judicial nullification of the
early civil rights statutes and the populist-inspired economic
regulation thwarted and demoralized instead of inspiring the radical
republican and populist movements. And, as William Forbath has
suggested, a combination of labor injunctions and judicial nullification of labor's legislative victories during the late 19th and early
20th centuries may have been decisive in transforming the American
labor movement from a broad social movement into a narrow,
3 40
commercially-oriented interest group.
337 See Ackerman, supra note 73, at 1050-55. As Professor Michelman put it,

the
Court is thus "cast as the agent of our constitutional past." Michelman, supra note
58, at 1521.
338 See Ackerman, supra note 73, at 1050, 1053.
339 See id. at 1053-57. Although Ackerman refers to Dred Scott as a "judicial
failure," id. at 1051, it seems to have performed the same vital "higher lawmaking"
functions that he attributes to the economic due process cases, namely focusing
popular
attention and escalating the level of struggle.
540
See Forbath, supra note 95, at 1116, 1148-49. Similarly, Karl Klare has argued
that the Supreme Court's narrow construction of labor's rights under the Wagner Act
contributed to the decline of rank and file participation and the rise of bureaucracy
in the industrial unions. See KlareJudicialDeradicalizationof the WagnerAct and the
Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REv. 265, 336 (1978).
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This part suggests that statutes resulting from a process of
heightened political participation and public awareness should be
broadly construed, both by courts and administrative agencies. In
making this proposal, my aim is not to develop a comprehensive
theory of statutory interpretation, but to suggest that one important
consideration should be reaping the maximum gain from our
occasional and costly republican moments.
A. Statutory Construction
Courts employ two basic methods in dealing with ambiguities,
broad and narrow
gaps, and conflicts in statutory language:
construction. A judge applying broad construction abstracts the
question of legislative intent to the level of purpose. She identifies
the primary purpose of the statute and construes ambiguities, fills
gaps, and resolves conflict; so as to effectuate that purpose. Instead
of asking whether Congress intended, for example, to prohibit some
activity which is not explicitly mentioned in the statute, she asks
whether the prohibition of that activity is necessary to carry out
Congress's purpose in enacting the statute. This approach is
embodied in the principle that remedial statutes are to be broadly
construed.
A judge applying narrow construction, on the other hand,
interprets the legislation as she would a contract. To borrow
Professor Easterbrook's description, a judge
first identifies the contracting parties and then seeks to discover
what they resolved and what they left unresolved. For example,
[s]he may conclude that a statute regulating the price of fluid milk
is a pact between milk producers and milk handlers designed to
cut back output and raise price, to the benefit of both at the
expense of consumers. [She] then implements the bargain as a
faithful agent but without enthusiasm; asked to extend the scope
of a back-room deal, [s]he refuses unless the proof of the deal's
34
scope is compelling. '
This method corresponds to the traditional maxim that statutes in
derogation of the common law are to be narrowly construed.
The Supreme Court regularly employs both methods. 3 42 The
341 Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARv. L. REV. 4,

15 (1984).
Although the canon calling for narrow construction of statutes in derogation
common law is rarely cied, see W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 657 (1988), the method is often
342

of the
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Court is rarely clear, however, on why it has selected one rather
than the other. 343 Professor Easterbrook has suggested that
broad construction should be applied to "general-interest" statutes,
narrow to "private-interest" statutes. 44 A law prohibiting murder
is a clear example of the former, a tobacco subsidy of the latter.
In borderline cases-which constitute the great majorityEasterbrook suggests that the courts should search for evidence that
the statute resulted from a deal among private interests. Specifically, they should look at three factors: (1) the statutory language (the
more detailed it is, the more likely there was interest-group giveand-take); (2) indicators of rent-seeking (e.g., statutory barriers on
new entry to the regulated industry, subsidies extracted from one
group and granted to another, and prohibitions against buying and
selling statutory entitlements); and (3) the legislative process (e.g.,
who lobbied for the legislation, and what deals were struck). A
statute enacted without a serious contest among interest groups is,
345
in Easterbrook's view, more likely to be in the general interest.
Were all statutes to be found on the spectrum from general to
private interests, Easterbrook's proposal would amount to nothing
more than economic due process writ small. The second factor
would ensure that redistributional statutes were construed narrowly.
The third factor, with its emphasis on consensus, would relegate the
applied. Perhaps the most striking examples are decisions construing the right to
engage in "concerted activities for... mutual aid or protection" under tile National
Labor Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988). The Court has often construed this
broad language narrowly in order to avoid infringing employers' common law rights.
See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 1229, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 346 U.S. 464, 475 (1953)
(construing § 7 to exclude certain conduct because the "legal principle that
insubordination, disobedience or disloyalty is adequate cause for discharge is plain
enough"); NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938) (holding that
the NLRA did not deprive the employer of "the right to protect and continue his
business" by permanently replacing employees who were exercising their § 7 right to
strike). For discussion of these aid other cases narrowly construing workers'
statutory rights in order to preserve employer common law rights, seeJ. ATLESON,
VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW (1983); Klare, supra note 340.
The method of broad construction is used regularly, often with citation to the
canon calling for broad construction of remedial statutes. See, e.g., Gomez v. Toledo,
446 U.S. 635, 639 (1980) (describing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as "remedial legislation.., to
be construed generously to further its primary purpose" (citation omitted)).
343 See 3 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 60.02 (N.

Singer 4th ed. 1986) ("Every statute that makes any change in the existing body of
law, excluding only those enactments which merely restate or codify prior law, can be
said to 'remedy' some flaw in the prior law or some social evil.").
344 See Easterbrook, supra note 341, at 16.
315 See id. at 16-17.

360

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 139:287

legislative victories of controversial social movements to similar
treatment.
Easterbrook recognizes, however, that some statutes "are
designed to implement principles of morality" and thus "cannot
easily be analyzed on a continuum between public interest and
private interest." 346 This point raises new questions: how are
morality-implementing statutes to be recognized, and what method
of construction is appropriate? Easterbrook does not address these
questions other than suggesting that morality-implementing statutes
are to be distinguished from statutes designed "to influence
economic conduct." 347
Thus depicted, morality-implementing
statutes are beyond the scope of Easterbrook's project, which is to
assess the Supreme Court's performance vis-4-vis the economic
system.
The dichotomy between statutes designed to implement morality
and statutes designed to influence economic conduct is transparently false. Many statutes are intended, at least in. part, to impose
moral strictures on economic activity. By its terms, the Federal
Trade Commission Act prohibits "unfair," not inefficient, methods
of competition.3 48 There is no inherent contradiction between
moral and economic conduct.
Ackerman's notion of higher-track lawmaking, supplemented by
the theory of republican moments, suggests a more appropriate axis
of comparison. Statutes that result from higher track lawmakingcall them "republican" statutes349-should receive a broad construction; products of interest group bargaining should, as Easterbrook suggests, be narrowly construed. The many statutes that fall
in the nether zone between these two categories should be con46
3

Id. at 17. Similarly, Judge Posner identifies a category of statutes which are
"based on public sentiment rather than on either an objective weighing of demonstrable pros and cons or on cartel-like pressures for redistributing wealth." Posner,
Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution,49 U. CHi. L. REV.
263, 271 (1982). Posner suggests that these statutes "cannot readily be defended on
economic grounds given our existing and deficient knowledge of their effects." Id.
Although Posner suggests that they are too important to be ignored, the existence of
these statutes has no discernable impact on his proposals for proper statutory
construction.
347 Easterbrook, supra note 841, at 17.
348 See Federal Trade Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717, § 5 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C.

§ 45(a)(1) (1988)).
M9 As used here, the term "republican statutes" serves a similar function to that
of"reform statutes" as used in a 1977 article by Professor Blumrosen. See Blumrosen,
TowardEffectiveAdministration of IewRegulatoy Statutes, 29 ADMIN. L. REV. 87 (1977).
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strued according to whatever background rule is in effect-broad
construction according to some,3 5 0 narrow according to oth3 51

ers.

Republican statutes may be identified by examining their history
for the factors associated with republican moments: (1) widespread
and serious public discussion; (2) debate framed in terms of
principle and public good; (3) an intention to bring about major
changes in the legal order; (4) direct citizen action, such as social
protest; and (5) extensive activity by voluntary associations and
social movements. These factors precisely negate the picture of the
legislative process that shapes Easterbrook's (and other public
choice theorists') view of interest group bargaining: back-room
deals among self-interested power brokers dividing the spoils of
government.
Consider, for example, the contrast between the process leading
to enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and that giving rise to
the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930.352

The Civil Rights Act was

preceded by a period of public discussion triggered by militant
protests.3 53

3 54
Religious groups led the push for legislation.

3 55
The legislative history is full of fundamental rights rhetoric.
In contrast, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff was enacted almost entirely
through the efforts of interest groups pursuing protection for their
own product markets. 56 Public participation and arguments of
principle were conspicuous by their absence.
For a more difficult test of the distinction, consider the National
Labor Relations Act of 1935 ("NLRA") and the 1959 LandrumGriffin amendments to the NLRA. Both involved restrictions on

See H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 7, at 1409-10.
351 See Macey, supra note 12, at 264-66.

350
3

12 Eskridge and Frickey use this pair of polar opposites to illustrate the difference
between an instance of successful Madisonian deliberation and a special interest
statute. See W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 342, at 40.
353 See T. BROOKS, WALLS COME TUMBLING DOWN: A HISTORY OF THE CML
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1940-1970 214-35 (1974); A. MORRIS, supra note 149, at 274.
35 See J. SUNDQUIST, POLrics AND PoLicy: THE EISENHOWER, KENNEDY, AND
JOHNSON YEARS 268-69 (1968); Findlay, Religion andPoliticsin the Sixties: The Churches
and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 77J. AM. HIsT. 66 (1990).
-55 See W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 342, at 3, 13, 15. Throughout the
lengthy congressional maneuvers and debates, civil rights protesters kept up the
pressure. See T. BROOKS, supra note 353, at 228-35.
356 See W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 342, at 40-46 (condensing and

commenting upon E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, POLITICS, PRESSURES AND THE TARIFF: A
STUDY OF FREE PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN PRESSURE PoLIIcs, AS SHOWN IN THE 19291930 REVISION OF THE TARIFF (1935)).
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economic activity and both were contested by a similar cast of
interest group representatives.
The NLRA was, however, the
product of a broad-based. social movement seeking fundamental
reform in the system of labor relations. During the period leading
up to its enactment, civil libertarians and religious leaders joined
with workers in an escalating campaign for the right to organize. 3 57 They broke through politics-as-normal with demonstrations, strikes, and acts of civil disobedience. "In 1934," as Irving
Bernstein succinctly put it, "labor erupted" in countless strikes,
including successful general strikes in San Francisco and Minneapolis. 358 Although many special interest statutes have come into
being with a sugarcoating of reformist rhetoric, the legislative
history of the NLRA leaves no doubt that its proponents contemplated a dramatic shift in the system of industrial relations toward
collective bargaining and away from unilateral employer con3 60
trol. 3 59 By all accounts, the Act wrought profound changes.
The 1959 amendments to the NLRA present an interesting
contrast. In addition to the amendments, the Landrum-Griffin Act
enacted a new law designed to combat internal union corruption
and autocracy. This law, the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act, began as a response to widespread public concern
over intra-union corruption, which the McClellan Committee had
36
spotlighted vividly in a highly-publicized series of hearings. 1
357 SeeJ. AUERBACH, LABOR AND LIBERTY 26-32 (1966).
358 See I. BERNSTEIN, supra note 148, at 217, 236; see also supra notes 100-01 and
accompanying text.
359 As originally introduced, the bill proclaimed:

The tendency of modern economic life toward integration and centralized
control has long since destroyed the balance of bargaining power between
the individual employer and the individual employee, and has rendered the
individual, unorganized worker helpless to exercise actual liberty of
contract, to secure ajust reward for his services, and to preserve a decent
standard of living, with consequent detriment to the general welfare and the
free flow of commerce.
S. 2926, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 2, 78 CONG. REc. 3444 (1934). The ultimate statement
of purpose mentioned the "inequality of bargaining power between employees who
do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and

employers," 49 Stat. 449 (1935), but emphasized the harm to commerce as part of a
strategy to have the Act upheld under the commerce clause. See I. BERNSTEIN, supra
note 148, at 344-45.
360 See, e.g., W. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOsEvELT AND THE NEW DEAL

1932-1940, at 151 (1963) (describing the Act as "radical"); Klare, TraditionalLabor
Law Scholarshipand the Crisis of Collective BargainingLaw: A Reply to ProfessorFinkin,
44 MD. L. REV. 731, 756 (1985) (collecting additional quotations to the same effect).
361 See A. MCADAMs, POWER AND POLITICS IN LABOR LEGISLATION 11 (1964).
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The NLRA amendments were added later during a series of
maneuvers by interest group lobbyists.3 6 2- While the NLRA
amendments sparked the main controversy in Congress, public
participation was limited to letter writing, and then only in reaction
to campaigning by interest group staffers and speeches by political
figures, most prominently President Eisenhower.3 6 3
Neither
management nor labor was able to attract active support from other
constituencies. Throughout the process, the amendments were
thought of as incremental adjustments, not as fundamental reforms.
In short, none of the indicators of higher-track lawmaking were
present.
Of course, the distinction will not always be easy for judges to

make. As Jonathan Macey has pointed out, judges "interpret
statutes; they are not investigative reporters."3 6 4 It is much
easier, however, to identify republican statutes than to single out
interest group statutes, the problem that concerned Macey. While
interest group politics thrive in smoke-filled rooms, citizen selfgovernment is out in the open for all to see. A judge need not be
an investigative reporter to recognize that, for example, the Civil
Rights Act and the NLRA were products of exceptional citizen
involvement.
The identification of republican statutes is not as "value-laden
and political"3 6 5 as is Easterbrook's distinction between public
interest and special interest statutes. Although Easterbrook's
distinction requires a substantive conception of the public interest
(which, in his view, should be defined according to the highly
controversial theory of neoclassical economics), republican statutes
can be singled out by a relatively procedural test. The criteria listed
above do not, for example, distinguish between a "pro-choice" and
a "pro-life" law, or between neoclassical and critical economic
philosophy, or even between social Darwinism and socialism. They

362

The principal amendments,

those restricting secondary boycotts and

organizational picketing, were added at the behest of management lobbyists after
unions had succeeded in attaching their own NLRA "sweeteners" to the anticorruption provisions of the Senate version. See id. at 49-54.
363 See id. at 193-96, 210-12.
364 Macey, supra note 12, at 239.
165 See Farber & Frickey, supra note 11, at 908-10 (arguing against mandating
judges to distinguish between public interest and special interest statutes because of

the danger that the purported public interest would "simply correspond with the
judge's favored political program").
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embody only the admittedly value-laden, but imminently defensible,
preference for active citizen democracy over special interest politics.
Whatever the difficulties of identifying republican statutes, they
pale in comparison to the drawbacks of not making the attempt.
Macey, for example, would jettison broad construction altogether
because many purportedly remedial statutes are merely a "guise for
the transfer of wealth to some favored group." 366 Judge Posner
proposes the same result out of concern that a broad construction
would "upset the compromise that the statute was intended to
embody." 367 While Macey and Posner would relieve judges of the
necessity for determining which statutes are remedial, they would
also condemn the products of higher-track lawmaking to the same
cramped construction accorded interest group statutes, thus
insulating special interest politics against republican legislation.
The obstacles to movements for higher lawmaking are formidable
enough without forcing them to run a final gauntlet of narrow
construction.
In response to an earlier draft of this proposal, a number of
readers expressed the fear that the legislative victories of reactionary social movements would be entitled to a broad construction.
The right-to-life movement has, for example, been known to engage
in higher-track lawmaking as defined here. The obvious answer is
that any serious supporter of democracy must be prepared to accept
the possibility that the people may disagree with her personal views.
As long as the popular republican process is not sabotaged by
repression, 368 its legislative products warrant broad construction
regardless of their conseriative or liberal content.
B. Administrative Implementation
We have seen how difficult it is for social movements to
overcome politics-as-normal and win reform legislation.
The
difficulties do not end with the signing of a bill into law. After the
legislative victory, administrators must enforce the new law in an
environment that is conducive to interest-group politics. Professor
Blumrosen's description of the problem warrants extended quotation:

366 Macey, supra note 12, at 265-66.
3 67

Posner, Statutoiy Interpretation-inthe Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI.

L. REV. 800, 809 (1983).
868 See supra text accompanying notes 112-14.
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We can safely begin our analysis with the proposition that
achieving reform is difficult under any conditions. Implementing
reforms may be costly to the regulated community; may require
changes in individual and institutional behavior which has been
traditional and appears legitimate to the individuals involved; may
imply guilt or immorality where none is felt by the individuals
involved and may appear wrong or unnecessary to respondent
personnel. And reform almost always introduces uncertainty
which tends to immobilize respondents rather than lead them
toward compliance. Faced with resistance based on these factors,
the administrator's task is virtually impossible unless it can be
demonstrated that substantial compliance with the reform
legislation will actually be required. The basis for such an
assertion finally-and initially-must be an interpretation of the law
itself.... Yet 'administrative discretion' permits the agency to
avoid this fundamental point by a variety of devices including
'to' the courts,' or a narrow
endless study, leaving the matter
3 69
interpretation of the statute.
Blumrosen suggests that courts should stiffen agency resolve by
requiring broad construction of reform statutes.Y70 Although the
3 71
Supreme Court does require broad construction on occasion,
it has failed to articulate any principle explaining when it will and
37 2
when it will not.

869

Blumrosen, supra note 349, at 94.

See id. at 97.
A famous example is Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
(1971). There, the Secretary of Transportation was directed by statute not to supply
federal funds for highways routed through public parks unless there was no "feasible
and prudent" alternative route. Id. at 405. The Court rejected the Secretary's
contention that this provision entitled him to consider the economic and social costs
870

71

3

of alternative routes, reasoning that Congress intended "that protection of parkland
was to be given paramount importance." Id. at 412-13.
s72 Instead, deferential and critical standards co-exist, with no stated criteria for
choosing between them. The basic rule calls for the courts to defer to an agency's
statutory construction unless Congress has "directly addressed the precise questions
at issue" and clearly expressed its intent. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). This standard carves out a wide
zone for agency discretion; it precludes courts from overturning agency constructions
on the basis of purposive reasoning, broad inferences from statutory structure, or

legislative history not directed to the particular point at issue. Chevron, however, also
set forth a nondeferential counterprinciple. Recognizing that courts have the final
say on matters of law, the Chevron Court announced that if "a court, employing
traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention
on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect."
Id. at 843 n.9. Of course, purposive reasoning, inferences from statutory structure,
and general legislative history are all among the "traditional tools of statutory
construction." If courts were to apply the full kit of traditional tools, Chevron's
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Professor Blumrosen's proposal would resolve a large number
of the most important cases. Unfortunately, he does not tell us how
to distinguish a reform statute from other kinds of legislation. This
gap can be filled with the criteria proposed here for identifying
republican statutes.3 7 3
When the process leading to the enactment of a statute transcends politics-as-normal, the agency enforcing
it should be protected against the onslaught of interest group
politics afterward.
Thus elaborated, Blumrosen's rule has clear advantages over
other proposals for reducing the impact of special interest politics
on agency decisions. Instead of giving the courts a broad mandate
to trump agency statutory construiction374-a power that has often
been used to shackle aggressive agency construction of republican
statutes 3 75 -it enlists the courts in an effort to maximize the
results of higher lawmaking.
CONCLUSION
Strong democracy comes in pulses. During republican moments, large numbers of normally quiescent citizens enter the public
arena to struggle for their visions of the common good. Passion
and moral commitment set the tone for public discourse. Groups
that are underrepresented in special interest bargaining use mass

deferential principle would be swallowed up by its critical counterprinciple, as
happened three years later in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,449 (1987) (using
Chevron'scritical counterprinciple and overturning an agency's statutory construction
based on purposive reasoning and overarching legislative history as well as specific
statutory language). Chevron and Cardoza-Fonsecaare only the latest manifestations
of a split that goes back four decades, to the time before the enactment of the
Administrative Procedure Act. See S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AND REGULATORY POLICY 272-73 (2d ed. 1985); id. at 288 n.1 (Supp. 1988).

For a

persuasive explanation of the Court's non-deferential approach in Cardoza-Fonseca,see
Eskridge, supra note 20, at 1032 (suggesting that the Court was unwilling to defer to
the agency interpretation in part because it disadvantaged a discrete and insular
minority).
373 See supra text accompanying notes 351-52.
374 See, e.g., Macey, supra note 12, at 263-64; Sunstein, Constitutionalisn,supra note
20, at 469.
375 See, e.g., NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939) (overturning the NLRB's determination hat a sit-down strike in protest of employer unfair
labor practices is protected concerted activity); NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332
(1939) (overturning the NLRB's holding that an employer violated the NLRA by
discharging employees for threatening a strike during the term of a collective
bargaining agreement that lacked a no-strike clause). See generally Klare, supra note
340, at 265 (discussing how the Court's narrow conception of legitimate union activity
barred labor from participating in social change).
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protest and other forms of direct power to place their concerns on
the public agenda. Aroused citizens disrupt cozy relationships
among politicians, administrators, and interest group lobbyists.
Republican moments are the times when the basic direction of
the country (or state or municipality) is at issue, and our core ideals
of liberty and equality become matters of urgent concern to broad
sections of the populace. Most of the great rights we celebrate
today were products of the unruly and passionate politics of
republican moments.
Talk of strong democracy and direct popular power sounds
romantic in these times of hard-nosed economism. Paradoxically,
however, direct popular power provides an effective, if partial and
temporary, antidote to three of the most serious political evils
identified by the economic theory of collective action. First, social
movements use direct power to overcome the "free-rider" problem
and other barriers to political participation, in the process replacing
public choice theory's "logic" of collective action with an alternative
logic of collective empowerment and moral choice. Second, direct
popular power can dislodge or bypass the logjam created by interest
group bargaining, thus redirecting the public agenda away from
private deals and toward basic issues of public policy. Finally, direct
popular power enables groups that are underrepresented in interest
group bargaining to offset-if only for a moment-the disproportionate influence enjoyed by compact, wealthy interest groups during
politics-as-normal.
The Constitution, of course, erects a system of representativenot direct-democracy. Its most effective proponents sought to
temper special interest politics with deliberations among an elite of
virtuous representatives, not with pulses of direct popular power.
The Bill of Rights, however, added a potentially subversive supplement to the representative scheme.
Read in context, the first amendment carves out the constitutional space for direct popular power. In the political theory and
practice of the founding generation, the right of the people
peaceably to assemble encompassed not only the right to meet, but
also to exercise extra-institutional forms of power, ranging from
nonviolent rallies and boycotts to the displacement of representative
government by popular assemblies. Direct power was seen as a
necessary corrective to the natural tendency of government to
degenerate into corruption and tyranny. Here, as elsewhere, the
framers deliberately built a conflict into the constitutional scheme,

368

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 139:287

this one between representative government and direct popular
3 76

power.

The theory of republican moments has two major implications
for legal doctrine. First, it provides arguments for expanding the
protection of direct popular power under the first amendment.
Understanding the long-ruh functions of direct power may help to
forge the kind of civic courage that can sustain a commitment to
377
free speech and assembly in the midst of popular tumult.
Second, the theory suggests that courts and administrative
agencies should give a broad construction to the statutory and
constitutional products of republican moments. For brief periods
of time, at a considerable cost to business-as-normal, direct popular
power offsets the worst flaws of interest group bargaining. These
times should be seen as precious-albeit unsettling-moments of
strong democracy. The resulting statutes, which I have called
"republican statutes," embody unusually accurate expressions of the
popular will. When the level of participation subsides, courts and
administrative agencies should serve as agents of the republican
moment, preserving the thrust of republican statutes against the
inevitable lethargy and corruption of interest group bargaining.
Failure to do so can only reflect, as Frederick Douglass lamented
when the Supreme Court invalidated the Civil Rights Act of 1875,
3 78
a failure of historical memory.

376 Far from erecting a unitary structure of government, our Constitution
'constitutes a system of conflicts." Leubsdorf, DeconstructingtheConstitution,40 STAN.
L. REV. 181, 192 (1987).
377 See Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis
Opinion in Whitney v. California, 20 WM. & MARY L. REv. 653, 679-80, 682-83 (1988)
(summarizing Brandeis's ideal of civic courage and commenting on its role in first
amendment jurisprudence).
378 See Blight, "ForSomething beyond the Battlefield": Frederick Douglass and the
Strugglefor the Memoiy of the Civil War, 75J. AM. HIST. 1156, 1159 (1989).

POLITICS, BUREAUCRACIES, AND FINANCIAL MARKETS:
BANK ENTRY INTO COMMERCIAL PAPER
UNDERWRITING IN THE UNITED
STATES AND JAPAN
DAVID G. LITT, JONATHAN R. MACEY, GEOFFREY P. MILLER
AND EDWARD L. RUBIN t

'Americans writing about Japan seem to fall into two camps:
those who think the Japanese act according to very different rules
than Americans, so that the apparent similarities between the two
peoples actually mask deep cultural differences;1 and those who
think that the Japanese and the Americans are really rather similar,
so that the obvious cultural differences cover more deep-rooted
2
continuities.
t Litt is a graduate of the University of Chicago Law School (J.D., 1988); Macey
is Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School; Miller is Kirkland & Ellis
Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School; Rubin is Professor of Law
and Associate Dean at the University of California Law School at Berkeley. We would
like to thank Valita Fredland, Karyn Ordower, Erika Samuels, and Robert Tassinari
for valuable research assistance and Anne-Marie Burley, J. Mark Ramseyer, and
Frances Rosenbluth for helpful suggestions. The authors also wish to acknowledge
our deep gratitude and appreciation to Professor Hideki Kanda of the University of
Tokyo Law School, whose insight into "ex post" and "ex ante" enforcement of legal
norms has influenced our thinking on the subject of the present paper in many ways.
Research for this article was supported by the Sho Sato Institute (Litt, Macey, Miller,
and Rubin), and the John M. Olin Foundation (Macey and Miller). The authors
would like to'thank the many individuals in Japan and the United States who
generously agreed to be interviewed in connection with this project.

1The classic cultural account ofJapanese society is R. BENEDICT, THE CHRYSANTHEMUM AND THE SWORD: PATTERNS OFJAPANESE CULTURE (1946). See also T. Doi,
THE ANATOMY OF DEPENDENCE (1973); C. NAKANE,JAPANESE SOCIETY (1970). Recent
accounts by Western observers includeJ. MORLEY, PICTURES FROM THE WATERTRADE
(1985), and P. TAsKER, THE JAPANESE: A MAJOR EXPLORATION OF MODERN JAPAN
(1987). A superb general treatment of modern Japanese history and society is E.
R:EISCHAUER, THE JAPANESE (1977).
2 The leadinglegal scholar who argues for deep-seated similarities betweenjapan
and the United States is J. Mark Ramseyer. See e.g., Ramseyer & Nakazato, The
RationalLitigant: Settlement Amounts and Verdict Rates injapan, 18J. LEGAL STUD. 263,
290 (1989) (arguing that although culture is important, "the current emphasis on
culture in comparative studies ofJapanese law deflects attention from.., mundane
incentive structures"); see also Ramseyer, The Costs of the ConsensualMyth: Antitirst
Enforcement and InstitutionalBarriers to Litigation in Japan, 94 YALE L.J. 604, 604-05
(1985) (explaining the behavior of litigants as it pertains to cultural characteristics);
Ramseyer, Legal Rules in Repeated Deals: Banking in the Shadow of Cheats in Japan,
(forthcomingJ. LEGAL STUD. (Jan. 1991)) (discussing the system of "main banks" in
Japan, andjapanese banks' treatment of troubled borrowers); Ramseyer, Takeoves in
Japan: Opportunisn, Ideology and Corporate Contro, 35 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4-6 (1987)
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There may be no authoritative way to resolve this debate, since
what is important in terms of cultural differences lies largely in the
eye of the beholder. Yet it is also possible that detailed investigation of a specific subject area might yield at least some insights into
the question.
The present study is such a detailed investigation of a particularly intriguing-and economically significant-parallel development
in Japan and the United States. In 1987, regulators in both Japan
and the United States allowed commercial banks to enter the
business of underwriting commercial paper (short-term, unsecured
corporate promissory notes).
That this important development occurred in both countries at
roughly the same time suggests support for the arguments of the
continuity theorists. They believe that the Japanese and American
systems are quite similar in their actual functioning, despite
apparent cultural differences.
At the same time, however, the similarity in the actions taken by
the two governments is matched by an equally striking dissimilarity
in the methods by which those actions were brought about. In the
United States, bank entry into the commercial paper market was
initiated by a private institution, Bankers Trust New York Corporation. Federal regulators did not design or implement the marketplace changes and were largely cast in the role of reacting to
changes that were already occurring. Some of the major government decisions allowing the market to go forward, moreover, were
made by courts of law rather than the regulatory administrative
agencies.
In Japan, by way of contrast, the development of a commercial
paper market with bank involvement was carefully controlled at
every step by a government agency, the Ministry of Finance (MOF).
No private entity took the initiative to move the process forward by
entering the commercial paper business without prior MOF
approval. Moreover, in Japan, litigation was not only absent, but
was never seriously considered as a step towards resolution of the

(discussing the phenomenon of takeovers injapan and considering these implications
as they pertain to the American experience); Ramseyer, WaterLaw in ImperialJapan:
Public Goods, Private Claims, and Legal Convergence 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 53 (1989)
(discussing the "similarities between [the Japanese] legal regime and the priorappropriation regime in the American West"). Although the theory set forth in the
present study differs in some respects from Ramseyer's general views on the subject,
the authors are greatly in his debt for defining the debate and for many insightful
observations.
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controversy. The views of those interests affected were made known
to the government through an elaborate series of ex parte contacts
at all levels of seniority. This is something that would have been
unthinkable, and probably illegal, at many stages of the proceedings
in the United States. 3 These differences in method lend some
support to proponents of the difference hypothesis, who would
suggest that, despite the apparent similarity of result, the whole
process was radically different due to cultural influences.
Our view, based on an examination of this one limited, albeit
important, development in the commercial life. of Japan and the
United States, is that neither the similarity nor the difference
hypothesis fully explains the evidence under review. In both
countries the question of bank involvement in commercial paper
distribution was a fundamental bone of contention between two
powerful industries, banks and securities firms, because commercial
paper represents a deep threat to the core banking business of
providing short term credit to business enterprises. In each case,
the political battle over commercial paper was fought by powerful
and well-organized special interest groups, and resolved in part by
4
bureaucratic agencies anxious to preserve their regulatory "turf."
Although to a casual observer the Japanese events may have
appeared more cordial and less nakedly self-interested than the
American experience, they actually involved an interest-group battle
of ferocious intensity raging within the relatively private confines of
the MOF. The nature of the events in Japan was revealed to us
3 The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1988),
prohibits communications between any "member of the body comprising the agency,
administrative law judge, or other employee who is or may reasonably be involved"
and anyone involved in the decision-making process or an interested party outside the
agency, if such communications are relevant to the merits of the proceeding. Id.
§ 557(d).
4A recent and perhaps notorious example of this sort of behavior in the United
States took place when officials of the Securities and Exchange Commission sought
to divest the Commodities and Futures Trading Commission of its jurisdiction over
the regulation of stock-index futures. See, e.g., Egan, Cofingwith Stock-Market Tremors,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 13, 1990, at 66 (noting that "[e]fforts by Treasury
Secretary Nicholas Brady to give the Securities and Exchange Commission authority
to regulate stock-index futures as well as stocks have bogged down in ajurisdictional
wrangle between the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the
current overlord"); Hinden, Brady Loses in Fightfor Futures Bill; Senate Panels Scuttle
Provision on Control Wash. Post, July 28, 1990, at D10, col. 6 (noting that Treasury
Secretary Nicholas Brady had "lobbied hard for passage" of legislation that would
have reassignedjurisdiction over the regulation of stock-index futures from the CFTC
to the SEC but had faced "the implacable opposition of the CFTC, the Chicago
futures market and members of Congress with close ties to the agricultural industry").
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through our research which included interviews with many of the
key participants in both government and the private sector and
5
which focused on the actual mechanics of the Japanese decision.
There is no evidence that the Japanese motives were any more noble
or less self-interested than those of the American participants.
At the same time, there are undeniable and important differences between the Japanese and American approaches to the
conflict. In part, we find that these differences stem from variations
in institutional structure. Because the Japanese MOF has overarching responsibility for both securities firms and banks, the
conflict between these industries was channeled inside the walls of
that agency rather than spilling out into the public arena. The latter
was the case in the United States where banks, but not securities
firms, are represented and influential within the relevant agency
(the Federal Reserve Board 6).
In part, the differences also appear to reflect the influence of
factors that could be labeled "cultural." Japanese society-at least
the Japanese commercial society that we studied-is marked by the
extensive use of "preclearance": 7 conflicts are addressed and
resolved in a variety of settings by informal and private means
before any party is forced to take a public stand on an issue. It is
this feature of preclearance that generates the popular clich6 of

5 In researching this Article, we conducted detailed discussions with over 30
individuals in Japan, including high-ranking officials at the Ministry of Finance, the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry, and the Bank of Japan, important
professors from law faculties, including the University of Tokyo, officials from leading
securities houses and banks, and representatives of the Japan Securities Research
Institute and the Japan Bankers Association. We found all our informants to be both
knowledgeable and extraordinarily forthcoming about the inner workings of the
decision process in Japan. We also interviewed leading securities traders and bank
officials in the United States.
The present study is outside the tradition ofAmerican law review articles in that
it is based largely on the results of detailed interviews with actual participants in the
process. Our goal has been to look behind the formal documentation of decisions
to determine more precisely the actual forces which shaped the outcome. In
addition, as we discuss below, se.? infra text accompanying note 10, our focus is not
simply on the development of legal doctrine, but rather on the complex and subtle
interplay among four great social systems: politics, markets, technology, and law. We
believe that our interviewing technique is a useful supplement to the written record
as a means for bringing into clearer focus the influence of each of these four systems
and the complex interplay among them.
6 We use the term "Federal Reserve Board" interchangeably with other popular
locutions, including Federal Reserve and the Fed.
7 For a fuller discussion on the "preclearance-postclearance" distinction, see infra
text accompanying notes 205-27.
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Japanese society as based on "consensus." The appearance of
consensus does not indicate any lack of conflict within Japanese
society; rather, it reflects the fact that conflicts are typically
addressed and resolved in advance of any overt public confrontation. In contrast, decisions in the United States are often reached
by "postclearance" mechanisms, in which parties are free-indeed,
encouraged-to take public stands that generate confrontation for
the relevant decision-maker's formal, on-the-record resolution. The
history of the commercial paper struggle in the two countries amply
illustrates the difference between preclearance and postclearance
methods of dispute resolution.
It is not at all evident that one method is better than another in
any a priori sense. A naive view might see the Japanese system as
intrinsically better because fewer social resources are devoted to
conflict resolution. This view is notoriously present in Derek Bok's
famous jeremiad on the American legal profession,8 which he
portrays as draining the best talent away from more fruitful
occupations such as business, medicine, or educatioh. Bok suggests
that the United States would benefit by becoming more like the
Japanese, with their minuscule lawyer-to-population ratio and
mighty productive capacities. Yet, aside from the factual shortcomings in Bok's critique, 9 it is grossly shortsighted because it fails to
recognize the presence in Japan of a pervasive, and extremely
resource-intensive, system of dispute resolution through preclearance.
An approach more sophisticated than Bok's might attempt to
determine whether the Japanese preference for preclearance and
the American preference for postclearance represent intrinsic
differences between the two cultures, or simply different choices by
the relevant decision-makers. By studying one set of analogous
decisions in the two nations, we can gain insight into the relationship between behavior and culture in the United States and Japan.
In examining the developments in Japan and the United States,
we consider the interplay of four factors: politics, markets,
8 See Bok, A Flawed Systen of Law Practice and Training, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 570

(1983).
9 For example, Bok fails to observe that although the ratio ofbengoshi (people who
have passed the bar) to population is much lower than the American lawyer-topopulation ratio, the ratio of law school graduates to population in Japan is much
higher than in the United States. Many of these law graduates go on to careers that
in the United States would require a license to practice law. See Tsubota, Myth and
Truth on Non-Litigiousness inJapan, 30 U. CHI. L. ScH. REC. 8, 9 (1984).
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technology, and law. Rather than viewing the law relating to
commercial paper in isolation from the other three, we see that
each factor profoundly shapes the law. As we demonstrate below,
the evolution of the law in the commercial paper area had an
important political dimension; indeed, in both the United States and
Japan, the legal developments were largely, although not wholly,
driven by the influence of powerful political interest groups.
Technology also influenced the events recounted here: as world
markets have become linked through modern computer and
communications facilities, markets in both the United States and
Japan have increasingly been able to "securitize" assets. 10 The role
of the financial intermediary has accordingly become less crucial to
developed economic systems over the past decade than it was
previously. And market developments such as the growth of money
market mutual funds, the increasing globalization of financial
markets, and the dramatic weakness shown in parts of the American
banking and securities industries over the past few years have all
contributed to'the unfolding of the events recounted in this study.
At the same time, we do not view the legal environment simply
as a passive product of these other systemic developments.
Although changes in the law may be influenced or even caused by
developments in politics, markets, and technology, legal changes
also influence the other systems by altering political alignments,
restructuring markets, and stimulating the development of new
technologies. Thus, the relationships of all four systems are deeply
reciprocal. Economic history is the result of the dynamic interplay
among them.
This politics-markets-technology-law perspective on economic
history is inherently complex in structure. No one variable can be
identified to "explain" any particular development, although lines
of proximate causality often can be traced with some degree of
confidence. All developments depend on the influence of a variety
of different variables, operating within an overall system that is
moving constantly towards equilibrium but, at the same time, is
disturbed repeatedly by new and often unexpected developments.
Thus, the discussion that follows does not identify any single factor
that uniquely explains the developments in Japan or in the United
States. It does identify, at least tentatively, the concatenation of

1oSee generally Comment, CollateralizedMortgage Obligations: Probingthe Limits of
National Bank Powers Under the Glass-SteagallAct, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 1025 (1987)
(discussing legal limitations on national banks to securitize mortgage assets).
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causes that together influenced these developments, and it offers
some thoughts as to why these particular constellations of forces
may have arisen, and why the mix of factors differed between Japan
and the United States.
This Article is structured as follows. Part I provides a brief
introduction to commercial paper, and to the structure of the
American and Japanese financial services industries.
Part II
examines the American experience with bank entry into the
commercial paper market. Part III treats the parallel Japanese
experience. Finally, Part IV ties the two histories together and
draws conclusions about their similarities and differences.
I. BACKGROUND
Commercial paper is one of the various devices which corporations use to raise funds. It is a short-term, unsecured obligation of
the corporation, issued for a fixed amount and bearing a fixed rate
of interest. Commercial paper occupies a middle ground between
stocks and bonds, on the one hand, and commercial loans on the
other; it is sold in a market like stocks and bonds, rather than being
individually negotiated like commercial loans, but the sales generally
occur by private placement, rather than through public offerings.
For the issuers, commercial paper is an attractive financing
vehicle because it provides ready access to capital markets without
requiring extensive negotiations or creating long-term obligations.
For investors, it is attractive because it pays higher interest than
most bonds or treasury bills, and yet is relatively safe; while the
paper is not backed by any specified assets, its short-term character
means that any major issuer is unlikely to decline to the point of
insolvency during the brief period before the paper matures. In
addition, commercial paper may be backed by a letter of credit from
a bank or other financial institution.
From this description, one might assume that the amount of
commercial paper that a corporation issues, relative to other
financing instruments, is a matter of interest primarily to students
of economics or business administration. In certain European
countries, such as West Germany, where there are virtually no
restrictions on a bank's range of activities, this is in'fact the case.
In the United States and Japan, however, commercial paper has
become a major political, regulatory, and legal issue because of the
separation of financial institutions into banks and securities firms.
In both nations, deposit-taking institutions-that is, banks-have

376

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 139:369

been allowed to make commercial loans but have been prohibited
from underwriting securities. This excludes banks from being the
primary manager, or underwriter, of corporate securities issues,
since the underwriter's role is typically to buy the entire issue and
take the risk that some of it cannot be sold at the original price.
Instead, underwriting is performed by investment banks, which are
actually securities firms that buy and sell for their own accounts and
engage in various other transactions. To maintain the separation of
commercial banks and investment banks, the investment banks are
11
prohibited from accepting deposits.
In recent years, there has been a collision between the legal
regime separating commercial banks from securities firms and the
intermediate character of commercial paper. 12 Because commercial paper can readily substitute for commercial loans, banks want
to participate in marketing it.
Only the larger, more stable,
corporate borrowers can issue commercial paper, but those are
naturally the customers that banks are most anxious to retain.
Because commercial paper can substitute for corporate securities,
however, the securities firms (investment banks) would like to keep
the banks out of the market. To them, bank participation in
commercial paper transactions represents an incursion into a field
that previously has been their exclusive and highly profitable preserve.

" The prohibition on deposil-taking by investment banks is contained in § 21 of
the Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1988). For a comprehensive discussion of the
Glass-Steagall Act and its implications for commercial banks and securities firms, see
H. PITT, J. WILLIAMS, D. MILES & A. AIN, THE EVOLVING FINANCIAL SERVICES
INDUSTRY (1985).
12 See, e.g., Macey, Special Interest Groups Legislation and theJudicialFunction: The
Dilemma of Glass-Steagal4 33 EMORY L.J. 1, 4 (1984) (noting that "the commercial
paper market is in direct competition with commercial bank loan departments as a
source of credit to top industrial borrowers"); Comment, SecuritiesActivities Underthe
Glass-SteagallAc4 35 EMORY L.J. 463, 463 (1986) (discussing recent conflicts arising
between commercial banks and securities firms).
Most recently, the Federal Reserve Board authorized a commercial bank, J.P.
Morgan, to underwrite equity securities. See Duke & Smith, Fed AllowsJ.P. Moigan to
Underwrite Stocks, Wall St. J., Sept. 21, 1990, at CI, col. 3. The Fed's favorable
response to the Morgan application represented the first time a bank has been
empowered to engage in such underwriting since 1933. See id. The Fed's move
generated controversy in the investment community. See, e.g., Power & Salwen,
Winners, Losers Take Stock of Glass-SteagallBattle: SecuritiesIndustry HasLittle Leverage,
Wall St. J., Sept. 24, 1990, at CI, col. 3 (noting effort by securities industry to
maintain a competitive advantage in light of the decision of the Federal Reserve);
Sease, Winners, Losers Take Stock of Glass-Steagall Battle: Banks Bask in EquityUnderwriting Victoy, but New Role May Prove Symbolic for Now, Wall St. J., Sept. 24,
1990, at CI, col. 5 (noting that while the Fed decision is of strategic importance to
banks, it may not represent an immediate threat to the securities industry).
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The conflict between banks and securities firms in the United
States and Japan emerged from a similar legal background, but
developed differently because of dissimilarities in the economic and
regulatory regimes in the two countries. In the United States, the
existence of commercial paper preceded the separation of banking
and securities firms. There has been a commercial paper market in
America since the end of the eighteenth century.13 It evolved
from the use of bearer promissory notes as short-term financing
vehicles; the merchant would write the note, and a dealer would
arrange its sale at a discount to a third party or, more rarely,
purchase the note with an intent to resell it at a higher price. The
incentive for relying on this mechanism was the endemic credit
shortage in many parts of the country, particularly in the South and
the West. Since American banks were limited to operating in one
state at the most, and often to one city or one branch, credit did
not flow readily from one part of the country to another. The sale
of commercial paper was a relatively effective means of establishing
a nation-wide credit market.
The early dealers in commercial paper tended to be private
money brokers or merchant houses who would bring the buyer and
the issuer together for a suitable commission. In the late nineteenth century, some of the dealers began to purchase the paper for
their own accounts. A few banks dealt in commercial paper as well,
either as brokers or, more frequently, by purchasing the paper and
then reselling it to other banks with which they had correspondent
relationships. For the most part, however, banks were in the
commercial paper market as buyers rather than dealers.
These practices and, indeed, the entire structure of the
American financial services industry, were transformed by the
legislation following the financial crisis of the Great Depression. In
1933, the Glass-Steagall Act 14 effected the separation of banking
and securities dealing, although it is unclear whether the motivation
for passage of this Act was concern about commercial bank
15
insolvency or the lobbying efforts of the investment banks.
13 For the history of the United States commercial paper market, see generally,
N. BAXTER, THE COMMERCIAL PAPER MARKET (2d ed. 1966); A. GREEF, THE
COMMERCIAL PAPER HousE INTHE UNITED STATES (1938); Hurley, The Commercial
PaperMarke, 63 Fed. Res. Bull. 525 (1977).
14 12 U.S.C. § 24, paras. 7, 78, 377-78 (1988).
15 See Macey, supra note 12, at 15-21 (arguing that the Glass-Steagall Act was
enacted as the result of interest-group pressures). But see Langevoort, Statutory
Obsolescenceand theJudicialProcess: The Revisionist Role ofthe Courts in FederalBanking
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Section 16 of the Act limits a commercial bank to buying and selling
securities "without recourse, solely upon the order, and for the
account of, customers, and in no case for its own account ... ,16
Section 21 forbids firms which buy and sell for their own account,
or which underwrite securities, from engaging "to any extent
whatever in the business of receiving deposits ... "17 Technically,
the Glass-Steagall Act applies only to banks that are members of the
Federal Reserve System, and the wording of its provisions is far
from being air-tight. Nonetheless, the Act was long regarded as
barring commercial banks from dealing in commercial paper,
Whether by acting as brokers (placing the paper with buyers) or, as
underwriters (purchasing for their own account with an intent to
resell). This view was so well accepted that banks did not attempt
to deal in commercial paper for nearly fifty years.
The banks' hands-off attitude towards commercial paper
undoubtedly reflected the stability and profitability of commercial
banking during the posi-Depression period. With a rapidlyexpanding economy generating increasing demands for commercial
loans, banks had little economic incentive to enter the commercial
paper market. That market, moreover, had declined precipitously
even before the Depression; between 1920 and 1933 the amount of
commercial paper outstanding fell from one billion to one hundred
and thirty-nine million dollars.' 8 Many dealers left the market or
merged, with the result that market concentration increased rapidly.
By 1938, nine major dealers controlled ninety percent of the
market. These conditions continued through the 1960s, and kept
the commercial paper market from seeming like either a threat or
9
an opportunity to commercial banks.'
In the late 1960s, however, large corporations began to rely
increasingly on commercial paper to fund their short term financing
needs. The spreads and placement costs on commercial paper fell
low enough that a corporation could often save money by going
directly into the commercial paper market rather than by obtaining
funds from a bank or another financial intermediary.2 ° In addi-

Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 672, 716-17 (1987) (arguing that the Glass-Steagall Act
was intended "as much as anything.., to redirect the resources and energies of the
banking industry back to the historic role as provider of commercial credit").
16 12 U.S.C. § 24, para. 7 (1988).
17 Id. § 378(a)(1).
18 See Comment, The CommercialPaperMarket and the Securities Acts, 39 U. CHI. L.
REV. 362, 362 n.2 (1972) (citing N. BAXTER, supra note 13, at 17).
19 See id. at 365-66.
20 From 1964 to June 1971, the savings differential on commercial paper as
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tion, many corporations relying on bank loans for financing were
effectively forced to issue commercial paper in 1966 when bank
credit temporarily dried up as a result of high nominal interest
rates. 2 1 Once having entered the commercial paper market, many
firms were reluctant to return to higher-cost bank financing even
when bank funds became readily available again. 22 Commercial
paper outstanding grew fivefold, from $10.1 billion in 1966 to $52.6
billion in 1976.23 Banks, to their surprise and dismay, began to
see commercial paper as a threatening competitor for their core
24
loan business.
The problem was not simply a-loss of loan revenues, although
this was bad enough. In addition, commercial banks were deprived
of key information about the activities of their loan customers. In
the days when corporations returned to their banks frequently to
roll over commercial loans, banks were able to maintain regular
contact with their customers and thus to obtain reliable, current
information about them. That source of information began to dry
up as blue chip corporations increasingly turned to the commercial
paper market for their short-term financing needs. Faced with these
circumstances, banks began to reevaluate the long-accepted notion
that the Glass-Steagall Act prohibited them from dealing in
commercial paper.
In Japan, the separation of banking and securities firms
preceded the development of commercial paper as a mechanism for
corporate finance. The separation was effected by article 65 of the
Securities and Exchange Law of 1948 (SEL) 25 which was imposed
on Japan during the American occupation. SEL prohibits banks,
inter alia, from underwriting securities, engaging in the public
offering of outstanding securities, and handling the public offering
of new or outstanding securities. 26 This law represented a departure from the pre-war organization of the Japanese financial services
industry. Following the Meiji Restoration of 1868,27 Japan had

compared with the bank prime rate was approximately .93%. See id. at 365 n.10.
21 See Hurley, supra note 13, at 531-32.
22 See id. at 532.
23 See id. at 525.
24
See id. at 525 (noting that "[flor the firms that issue it, commercial paper is an
important substitute for bank credit"); Interview with Thomas A. Parisi, Senior Vice
President, Bankers Trust Company (Apr. 11, 1989) [hereinafter Parisi interview].

Law No. 25 of 1948.
See id. at art. 65, para. 1.
27 The Meiji Restoration, alongwith infusion of Chinese culture and the establishment of the Shogunate, was one of the great turning points injapanese history. The
25
26

380

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 139:369

developed a universal banking system organized along European
lines. Securities underwriting was dominated by government banks,
such as the Industrial Bank ofJapan, and banks that were members
of the great industrial groups, or zaibatsu, such as Mitsui Bank.
Securities firms existed, but acted only as brokers and distributors
of issues to the general public. The imposition of article 65 was a
product of the interesting American belief that a democratic regime
not only required free elections, free speech, and due process, but
28
also antitrust laws and the Glass-Steagall Act.
From the Japanese perspective, article 65 "fulfills no domestic
29
policy purpose and exists only by virtue of historical accident."
As one might expect, engrafting this provision upon an already welldeveloped financial services industry led to different results fromri
those that its original produced in the United States. Most notably,
the old zaibatsu have managed to knit together business alliances,
called keiretsu, and retain many of their pre-war relationships on an
informal basis. These relationships are cemented by a practice of
cross-shareholding, where each member company owns up to 5% of
the equity in the other companies.
Banks participate in this
practice, just as they participated in the erstwhile zaibatsu system.
Gross-shareholding is permissible under article 65 which states that
banks may purchase securities for their "own investment purpose[s]." 30 While the United States Comptroller of the Currency
construed the analogous Glass-Steagall language to permit only the
purchase of marketable debt instruments, not stock, article 65 has
been construed as permitting stock purchases. Moreover, Japanese
banks, unlike American banks, are not forbidden from affiliating
with securities firms. Thus, a securities firm can become a member
of a keiretsu that includes a bank. All of the major Japanese banks

Meiji Restoration marked the downfall of the Shogun and the beginning of a modern
state in Japan, under the guise ofrestoring the Emperor to his throne. For a general
discussion, see, e.g., J.W. HALL, JAPAN FROM PREHISTORY TO MODERN TIMES 265-72
(1970) (discussing political and cultural effects of the Meiji Restoration); P. TASKER,
supra note 1, at 20-23 (describing Western influence on Japan during the Meiji
Restoration); and M. YOSHINO, JAPAN's MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 3-6 (1976)
(explaining the causes and describing the effects of the Meiji Restoration).
28 For a discussion of American sponsored reforms in the Japanese financial
sector, see F. ROSENBLUTH, FINANCIAL POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 39-41
(1989). For a general discussion of legal reforms effected during the American
occupation ofJapan, see E. REISCHAUER, supra note 1, at 105-09.
2 Dale,Japan's "Glass-SteagallAc4"2J. INT'L BANKING L. 138-41 (1987).
30 Law No. 25 of 1948.
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have become informally affiliated with one or more securities
31
firms.
As a matter of practice, it appears that Japanese banks can in
fact participate in underwritingJapanese corporate debt despite the
SEL's specific prohibitions. They do so by acting as "commissioned
underwriting companies," which means they serve as advisor, agent,
and trustee for the issuing corporation. Banks also assume the
default risk in case the issuing company becomes insolvent. This
practice is done not as a legal obligation, since article 65, like the
Glass-Steagall Act, forbids doing so, but as a moral one, legally
unenforceable but well-recognized and well-accepted. 2 American
banks do not assume such moral obligations. Even if they were to
declare that they would assume such obligations, securities buyers
would not believe them. The inability of United States banks to
declare ex ante that they will guarantee corporate debt means that
they cannot compete with investment banks that are permitted to
engage in firm commitment underwriting. Since Japanese banks
can credibly commit themselves to assume the risks of the debt
securities they place, they are able to play a significant role in
underwriting c6rporate debt.
Despite these differences and the more lenient interpretation
Japanese authorities have given their imported article 65, this
provision is not without effect in Japan. The separation of the
banking and securities businesses has led to the evolution of
independent securities firms with their own corporate identity,
markets to defend, and network of political influence. The four
largest firms have evolved into powerful financial institutions. One
of these, Nomura Securities, can reasonably be regarded as the most
formidable (and profitable) company in the Japanese financial
services industry.3 3 Thus, when the conflict over commercial
paper arose,Japanese banks, despite the porous nature of article 65
restrictions, found themselves facing a worthy set of adversaries.
S1 See Dale, supra note 29, at 139 (noting the commonality of the practice); A
Survey
ofJapaneseFinance, ECONOMIST, Dec. 10, 1988, at 13-14.
3
2 See Nagao, The Bond Marke repinted in E. SAKAKIBARA & Y. NAGAO, STUDY ON
THE TOKYO CAPITAL MARKETS 63-64 (1985) (remarking that "in the case of an actual
default ... it is the commissioned bank which has protected the investor by
purchasing such outstanding bonds at par value").
3 See, e.g., A. ALLETZHAUSER, THE HOUSE OF NOMURA xi (1990) (stating that
"Nomura has more assets under custody than ... the world's largest bank; makes
more money than any financial firm in the world; controls 20% of the Japanese bond
market; and dominates the Eurobond underwriting tables").
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This conflict did not emerge until the late 1970s for the simple
reason that there was no commercial paper in Japan. The only
short-term financial markets in existence prior to that time were the
call market, the bill discount market established by the Bank of
Japan in 1971 in which financial institutions trade discounted
promissory notes issued by corporations, and the gensaki market, a
market for bonds with repurchase agreements that gained prominence and official recognition in the 1970s. The call market is
limited to financial intermediaries, while the bill discount market is
further restricted to commercial banks and money brokers.
Moreover, until very recently, the market for short-term Japanese
34
government debt has been insignificant.
Only the gensaki market was open to sizeable investment by nonfinancial corporations. As a market for bonds with repurchase
agreements, however, it does not provide most corporations with a
method for borrowing short-term funds. Only a corporation that
holds a large portfolio of long-term bonds can raise short-term
funds by gensaki transactions, selling bonds with repurchase
agreements. Because of the lack of a commercial paper or similar
market, Japanese industry essentially lacked any alternative to shortterm financing from banks.
Bank borrowing was, and to a lesser extent continues to be, the
dominant method of raising both short and long-term capital for
industry. Banking itself is divided into several distinct markets.
Commercial banks are restricted to the market for deposits of three
years or less duration. Smaller commercial banks, the regional and
mutual banks, generally have a net excess of funds deposited
through extensive branch networks. They supply some of these
excess funds to the twelve large commercial banks called the City
Banks. The City Banks dominate short-term finance to large
corporations by serving as the "main banks" of these corporations.
Several City Banks form the nuclei of the keiretsu. They tended to
be "overloaned" throughout the high-growth era, borrowing from
the smaller banks through the interbank call and bill discount
35
markets and from the Bank of Japan's discount window.
34 See Opening the Door to Japan's Short-Tern Money Markets, ECONOMIST, Apr. 1,
1989, at 65 (noting thatJapan's treasury bill market is only one twenty-fourth the size
of the United States' treasury bill market).
35 See Wallich & Wallich, Banking and Finance, in ASIA'S NEW GIANT: How THE
JAPANESE ECONOMY WORKS 249, 284-90 (H. Patrick & H. Rosovsky eds. 1976); see also
Y. SUZUKI, MONEY AND BANKING IN CONTEMPORARYJAPAN 3-13 (1980) (explaining the

concept of "overloan" and noting that in the early 1970s Japan was the only major
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The seven trust banks and three long-term credit banks are
restricted to the longer-term market segments. Both groups are
permitted to raise medium- and long-term funds in order to provide
longer-term capital for industrial development.
While deregulation has begun to blur distinctions between trust
banks, long-term credit banks, and commercial banks, the City
Banks still dominate short-term finance for large Japanese corporations. Smaller commercial banks, trust banks, and long-term credit
banks therefore did not have much direct interest in the commercial
paper debate. In the controversy described below, the City Banks
did most of the lobbying and negotiating.
II. THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
A. The Bankers Trust Initiative in Placing Commercial Paper
In 1978, Bankers Trust Company, a state-chartered member
bank of the Federal Reserve System, challenged the prevailing view
that the Glass-Steagall Act barred banks from any substantial role in
the distribution of commercial' paper. Bankers Trust did so by
acting as agent for several large corporate customers that wanted to
place commercial paper with investors.3 6 The company's decision
to enter the market was apparently defensive: Bankers Trust was
not seeking to poach on the turf of securities firms, but rather to
protect its core loan business and customer relations against
37
competition from securities firms.
It is not clear why Bankers Trust adopted a "go it alone"
strategy. To be sure, as a major city bank serving the credit needs
of large corporations, Bankers Trust had much to lose from
commercial paper competition. But so did other big banks, such as
Citibank, Chase Manhattan, and Manufacturers Hanover. There
were significant free rider effects in this situation. By acting
unilaterally, Bankers Trust benefitted not only itself, but also its
rival banks which stood to profit from a ruling allowing bank
involvement in the commercial paper market. Furthermore, it

country in which the central bank was a net lender).
36 Banks previously had purchased commercial paper for their own accounts and
had acted for customers in purchasing paper, but had not represented issuers in
distributing it. See Policy Statement Concerning the Sale of Third Party Commercial
Paper by State Member Banks, 46 Fed. Reg. 29,333, 29,334 n.4 (1981).
7See Horowitz, Bankers Trust Moves Ahead in Commercial Paper,Suit by Sui AM.
BANKER, Sept. 23, 1987, at 16, 24.

384

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 139:369

might well have been cheaper and safer for Bankers Trust to seek
prior Federal Reserve Board approval for its commercial paper
activities. Bankers Trust would probably have received the support
of other big commercial banks in any proceeding before the Federal
Reserve, or before the courts on petition for review of the Board's
decision.
Bankers Trust's decision to follow the arguably riskier course of
unilateral action was apparently designed to gain a number of
advantages. First, the decision-makers at Bankers Trust no doubt
understood that a dealer must work in volume to survive in the
commercial paper business. 38 Accordingly, Bankers Trust may
have hoped to get ajump on other commercial banks as a dealer in
commercial paper. If so, its strategy succeeded: even today it is the
leading bank in the market, although its market share falls short of
the leading securities firms.3 9 Second, Bankers Trust believed that
gaining a toehold in the market, while not necessarily profitable in
itself, would allow it to establish lines of communication with
corporate customers that would place it in an advantageous position
for selling other, more profitable, bank services. 40 Third, Bankers
Trust had decided in 1978 to focus on wholesale as opposed to
retail banking, and to develop an in-house investment banking
capability. 4 1 Entry into the commercial paper market was an
important step in this direction. Finally, Bankers Trust may have
38 As of December 1988, Bankers Trust handled approximately $11 billion in
commercial paper outstanding (i.e., unmatured paper placed by a company at any
given time), representing less than 5% of the market. Although it was the sixth
largest player in the market, as measured by the amount outstanding, its market share
was far below those of the four leading securities firms: Merrill Lynch ($70 billion
outstanding), Goldman Sachs ($60 billion), Shearson Lehman Hutton ($55 billion)
and First Boston Corp. ($30 billion). See Neustadt, Big Banks Make Gains Placing
CoiporatePaper,AM. BANKER, Dec. 6, 1988, at 1, 14.
It is not at all clear that even with programs totaling $11 billion Bankers Trust was
able to make a profit. Trading professionals we interviewed believe that the break
even point for commercial paper placement is approximately $25-30 billion, as
evidenced by the fact that Salomon Brothers dropped out of the commercial paper
market with approximately $28 billion of commercial paper outstanding. See
Interview with Richard Fuscone & T. James Smithwick of Merrill Lynch Money
Markets Inc. (Apr. 11, 1989) [hereinafter Fuscone & Smithwick interview].
39 See Neustadt, supra note 38, at 14.
40 See Parisi interview, supra note 24.
41 See id. Traders we interviewed at other firms indicated that Bankers Trust was
known in the market as having a "good trading desk" and a "trading mentality or
mindset," stemming partly from rhe influence of its Chairman, who was widely known
as an innovative force within the banking industry.
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intended to establish a reputation as a dynamic innovator in the
42
financial services industry.
In all likelihood, Bankers Trust consulted informally with
Federal Reserve Board officials before actually entering the
commercial paper market. 43
No law prevented this type of
informal consultation, and the bank could only gain from it, given
the virtual certainty of a legal challenge from the securities industry
which would draw the Board into the decision sooner or later. We
do not know whether or not Bankers Trust received any informal
assurances from Board officials. We are confident, however, that
Bankers Trust would not have proceeded unilaterally if it suspected
that the Board would disapprove, given the Board's enormous
discretionary powers over banking institutions and its reputation for
44
punishing banks which provoke it.
The securities industry quickly sought to quash the Bankers
Trust commercial paper program. The Securities Industry Association (SIA), a national trade association of securities firms, approached the Board on an informal basis to complain of the
activity.45 When the Board declined to act, the SIA-acting on
42 A Bankers Trust officer we interviewed denied this motivation, however. See
id.

41 See id. We learned that the legal department of Bankers Trust engaged in
extensive communications with the regulators, and probably advised them of the
planned entry into commercial paper. It should be noted that these informal
consultations represent a form of "preclearance" which, as we argue throughout this
paper, is more characteristic ofJapanese than American decision-making. However,
Bankers Trust knew that the Board was its ally on this issue; thus the prior
consultation was not a form of conflict resolution of the sort that occurs so widely in
Japan. Moreover, our argument is not that preclearance is absent in the United
States-or postclearance in Japan-but rather that the United States andJapan differ
dramatically in the degree to which the two methods are used.
44 A revealing glimpse into the powers of the Board is provided in a story wellknown in the banking community. The episode involved the Board's treatment of
NewJersey's Horizon Bank in 1985 after that institution had won approval from the
Comptroller of the Currency to relocate a branch across state -lines. Interstate
branching of any sort threatens the Board's regulatory jurisdiction, which operates
principally at the holding company level. See e.g., Miller, InterstateBranchingand the
Constitution, 41 Bus. LAW. 337, 338 (1986) (examining "the constitutionality of state
laws that prohibit entry by branches of out-of-state banks"). The Board reportedly
responded to Horizon's action by threatening to refuse check-clearingservices to the
bank, a move which would have devastated the bank's operations. Not surprisingly,
Horizon dropped the idea of an interstate branch. See Rehm, Bradfield Bids Reluctant
Adieu to the Fed, AM. BANKER, Feb. 21, 1989, at 1. Although the Board official
involved in that matter has departed from the scene, the object lesson about the
Board's powers remains cogent.
45
See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., 468 U.S.
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behalf of the securities iridustry-formally petitioned for a ruling
that the Bankers Trust activities violated sections 16 and 21 of the
47
46
The Board denied the petition in 1980.
Glass-Steagall Act.
Applying a functional analysis, the Board determined that commercial paper was not a "security" subject to the Act since its economic
role is more akin to a standard commercial bank loan than to a
corporate security. The Board did recognize, however, that the
Bankers Trust activities posed potential hazards, and accordingly
issued a "policy statement" restricting the terms under which
48
member banks could enter the market.
The consequence of the Board's decisions was to create a system
of administrative control virtually unfettered by statutory standards.
By first declaring that commercial paper is not a security and then
imposing a relatively elaborate set of discretionary administrative
constraints on bank involvement in commercial paper sales, the
Board maximized its own administrative control of the situation and
retained the flexibility to ease those constraints as the market
evolved. In contrast, if the Board had declared commercial paper
to be a "security" it would have had no choice but to invalidate

137, 140 (1984) [hereinafter Bankers Trust I].
46 Section 16 of the Act provides, in relevant part, that
[t]he business of dealingin securities and stock by [a commercial bank] shall
be limited to purchasing and selling such securities and stock without
recourse, solely upon the order, and for the account of, customers, and in
no case for its own account, and the [bank] shall not underwrite any issue
of securities or stock.
12 U.S.C. § 24, para. 7 (1988). Section 21(a)(1) makes it unlawful for
any person, firm, corporation, association, business trust, or other similar
organization, engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or
distributing, at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate participation,
stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities, to engage at the same
time to any extent whatever in the business of receiving deposits subject to
check or to repayment upon presentation of a passbook, certificate of
deposit, or other evidence of debt, or upon request of the depositor.
Id. § 378(a)(1).
47 See Bankers Trust I, 468 U.S. at 141.
48 The most important restrictions were the following: member banks were
limited to selling "prime quality' paper to "financially sophisticated" investors; they
were not permitted to advertise to the general public; they could not sell paper with
denominations below $100,000; they were required to use due diligence in
investigating the financial affairs. of the issuer; and they were prohibited from selling
commercial paper to fiduciary accounts over which they exercised investment
discretion. See Policy Statement Concerning the Sale of Third Party Commercial
Paper by State Member Banks, 46 Fed. Reg. 29,333, 29,334-35 (1981).
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actions by member banks- which constituted underwriting of
commercial paper.
The SIA petitioned for review of the Board's order declaring
commercial paper to be outside the scope of the term "security" in
the Glass-Steagall Act. The case eventually reached the Supreme
Court, which in 1984 reversed the Board and held commercial
paper to be a "security" for purposes of the Act.49 The Boards
interpretation was flawed, according to the Court, because excluding commercial paper from the definition of a security under the
Glass-Steagall Act would threaten some of the "subtle hazards"
which, in the Court's view, Congress had feared when it enacted the
statute. For example, the Court suggested that a bank's "salesman's
interest" in a commercial paper issue might lead it to enhance the
marketability of the paper by extending backup credit to the
issuer.50 In addition, the bank might purchase unsold paper which
it was distributing, in order to establish its reputation as a reliable
dealer, even if the paper did not meei ordinary credit standards, 51
or market commercial paper issues to its depositors, with the
attendant danger of loss of confidence in the bank if the issuer were
to default. 52 Finally, a bank's interest might cause it to slant its
investment advice to depositors, especially if the proceeds of the
commercial paper issuance were to go towards retiring an existing
loan with the bank.53
The Supreme Court's decision was unusual in that the Court
refused to defer to the views of an expert administrative agency on
a subject within the agency's administrative competence. 54 It is
probable that the Justices in the majority saw two chief problems
with the Board's actions that warranted a departure from the usual
rule of deference.
First, the Board had admitted that bank sales of commercial
paper posed hazards. This was the basis for its order limiting the
49 See Bankers Trust I, 468 U.S. 137 (1984).
50 See id. at 155.

51 See id.
52 See id. at 155-56.
53 See id. at 156.
54 The Court's failure to defer to the Board's intrpretation was the basis for
Justice O'Connor's lengthy dissent; joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens. See
Bankers Trust I, 468 U.S. 137, 160-82 (1984); cf. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984) (stating that deference
should be given to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it
administers, and applying this deference to the Environmental Protection Agency's
definition of a term in the Clean Air Act).
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terms on which such sales could proceed. Since the Board had
conceded that there were hazards, and since those hazards seemed
similar, or identical, to the hazards that motivated Congress to enact
the Glass-Steagall Act, it appeared incongruous that the Board
should reject the applicability of the Act and then seek to control
the hazards by fiat pursuant to its generalized authority to protect
the safety and soundness of member banks. This seemed like a
thinly disguised end run around the statute. The Board's orders
thus "effectively convert[ed] a portion of the Act's broad prohibition
55
into a system of administrative regulation."
The Court's second principal objection was that the banking
industry itself had apparently accepted its exclusion from commercial paper dealings without protest for nearly fifty years. As the
Court observed, "it is certainly not without some significance that
Bankers Trust's commercial-paper placement activities appear to be
the first of that kind since the passage of the [Glass-Steagall]
Act."56 The Court observed that banks had "universally recognized" that underwriting commercial paper fell on the investment
57
banking side of the Glass-Steagall divide.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court's role at this stage of the
controversy appears to have been a conservative one: preserving the
status quo under which banks did not deal in commercial paper,
championing a perceived congressional intent, and resisting
administrative tinkering with the statute for contemporary policy
purposes.
The securities industry's apparent victory in the Bankers Trust I
case did not end the dispute, however. At the end of its opinion,
the Court dropped a suggestive footnote, observing that it was not
deciding whether the activities undertaken by Bankers Trust
constituted the "underwriting" of securities. This was important.
Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act prohibited only commercial
bank involvement in the "underwriting" of securities. 58 Securities
brokerage, as opposed to underwriting, appeared to be expressly
allowed by the Act, which recognized the power of commercial
banks to purchase and sell securities "without recourse, solely upon
the order, and for the account of, customers." 59 Section 21 of the
55 Bankers Trust I, 468 U.S. at. 153.
56 Id. at 159-60.
57 See id. at 160.
58 See id. at 160 n.12.
-9See 12 U.S.C. § 24, para. 7 (1988).
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Act only prohibited firms engaged in "the business" of underwriting
60
or distributing securities from acting as depository institutions.
Bankers Trust's commercial paper operations would not violate the
Glass-Steagall Act if they did not constitute "underwriting" or
"distributing" commercial paper. Thus the Supreme Court's 1984
decision merely represented a battle won by the securities industry,
but did not resolve the war.
On remand, the Board decided that the Bankers Trust placement of commercial paper constituted the selling of securities
without recourse and solely on the order and for the account of a
customer, a practice permitted by sections 16 and 21 of the Act.61
The decision went on to conclude that Bankers Trust was not
"underwriting" securities because the term "underwriting" in the
Act referred only to public offers, not to private placements of the
sort undertaken by Bankers Trust. A federal district court reversed,6 2 but the D.C. Circuit reinstated the Board's decision. It
concluded that the Board's interpretation of the statute was entitled
to deference and that the Bankers Trust program did not pose the
sort of subtle hazards that the Supreme Court had considered in its
earlier decision (Bankers Trust 1).63 Bankers Trust, accordingly,
was free to proceed with its commercial paper placement program.
B. The Bankers Trust Initiative in Underwriting
Commercial Paper
So far, Bankers Trust and, by implication, other member banks
had gained only the power to act as agents in the placement of
commercial paper. Underwriting would clearly be prohibited if
performed by the banks. This meant that as a practical matter
Bankers Trust could not purchase for its own account commercial
paper which it was placing with other investors. According to
Bankers Trust officials we interviewed, this limitation placed
Bankers Trust at a competitive disadvantage relative to securities
firms which were free from similar constraints; 64 Bankers Trust
60 See id. § 378(a)(1).
61 The unpublished opinion is described in Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of
Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., 807 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S.
100562 (1987) [hereinafter Bankers Trust II].
Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., 627 F. Supp.
695 (D.D.C. 1986), revd, 807 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005

(1987).
63 See Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d at 1067-70.
64 See Parisi interview, supra note 24.
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would be required to sell all of its customers' paper on the day of
issue; if any were left over at the close of the day Bankers Trust
could not purchase it. Bankers Trust proposed to the Board that it
be allowed to make up any shortfall with a loan to the issuer at the
commercial paper rate, but the Board refused. 65 Thus, Banker's
Trust had gained a toehold, but not yet a position of competitive
equality with securities firms: it could not underwrite commercial
paper, nor could it make up shortfalls at the close of the day.
Bankers Trust and other large money center banks responded
to this limitation in two ways. First, sometime in 1985, they
developed a new financial product, the short-term securitized loan,
as a partial substitute for commercial paper. 6 6 A bank would
originate a loan with a maturity and interest rate similar to that of
commercial paper, and then sell interests in the loan to other
institutions. The effect is functionally similar to a commercial paper
placement, but because the transaction is structured as a loan
instead of a distribution of securities, the Glass-Steagall Act does
not constrain the originating bank from taking an interest in the
loan-i.e., from acting in a irole functionally equivalent to underwriting.
Second, Bankers Trust applied to the Board of Governors for
permission under the Bank Holding Company Act 6 7 to transfer its
commercial paper activities to a second-tier subsidiary of the parent
bank holding company. The Chicago-based subsidiary, BT Commercial Corporation, was engaged in making and servicing loans and in
commercial leasing, activities previously declared by the Board to be
permissible for nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding companies
under the Bank Holding Company Act. 68 Bankers Trust's motive
65 See id.
66 See id.

67 Section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1843(c)(8) (1988), permits bank holding companies to maintain nonbank
subsidiaries, provided that the subsidiary's activities are "so closely related to banking
or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto .... " Federal
Reserve Board approval is required before a nonbank subsidiary may enter into any
new line of business. At the time of the Bankers Trust application, the Federal
Reserve Board had exempted a number of nonbanking activities either by order or
in its Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. § 225 (1990), but it had never addressed the question
of whether commercial paper placement was permissible for a nonbank subsidiary.
68 See Fidelity American Bankshares, Inc., Fed. Res. Bd. Order, [1972-1973
Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 95,832, at 80,761-2 (Dec. 14, 1972)
(holding that providing and servicing loans is "closely related to the business of
banking" and, therefore, permissible for bank holding companies); Leasing Computer
Equipment and Lease Financing, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep.
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in moving the commercial paper business over to its holding
company did not arise out of a concern for short-term profit; in all
probability, commercial paper placement per se could not be
performed more efficiently out of a commercial finance subsidiary
than out of the bank itself. Moreover, there was no obvious
advantage (and perhaps some disadvantage) to running the
commercial paper operation out of Chicago instead of New York.
Although placing the operation in a nonbank bank holding company
subsidiary offered the potential for geographic diversification free
of restrictions under the Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding
Company Act, 69 there is no indication in the record that Bankers
Trust intended to expand its commercial paper placement operations outside of Chicago. The most likely explanation is that the
application was a strategic move designed as part of a long-range
plan to position Bankers Trust as a leading commercial bank
presence in the investment banking field, and, in particular, to allow
eventual securities underwriting.
Bankers Trust had every reason to expect a favorable response
to its application. The Board itself, and most importantly its
powerful Chairman, Paul A. Volcker, had gone on record as
supporting enhanced securities powers for bank holding companies,
including the power to deal in commercial paper;70 and the
Bankers Trust application provided the Board with a convenient

(CCH) 95,716 (June 29, 1972) (noting that transactions where a lease is the
functional equivalent of an extension of credit to the lessee are permissible for bank
holding companies).
169The Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,12 U.S.C.
§ 1842(d) (1988), permits bank holding companies to own subsidiary banks outside
their home state only if the state where the subsidiary is located has enacted
legislation permitting the acquisition. See also Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of
Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 168-73 (1985) (interpreting the
Douglas amendment).
7 See, e.g., Structure andRegulation of FinancialFirms and Holding Companies (Part
I): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affair of the
House Comm. on Government Operations,99th Cong., 2d Sess. 165 (1986) (statement of
Paul A. Volcker), reprintedin 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 541,549 (1986) (noting that the Board
has long supported an approach that would' permit subsidiaries of bank holding
companies to engage in underwriting and distributing commercial paper); Financial
Restructuring: The Road Ahead: Hearings on H.R. 5342, H.R. 4506 and H.R. 3537
Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications,ConsumerProtection,andFinanceof the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, H.R. REP. No. 144, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984)
(statement of Paul A. Volcker), reprinted in 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 312, 316 (1984) (noting
the need to reexamine the limitations of banking organizations in light of the market
changes, changes in technology, consumer needs, and the regulatory and economic
environment).
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means for accomplishing this policy objective. 71 Indeed, Bankers
Trust probably had received informal prior assurances from Board
staff that its application would not be unwelcome. 72 We were
informed by a Bankers Trust official that the bank frequently
consulted with the Board on a friendly and informal basis on the
73
commercial paper question.
The Bankers Trust application implicated section 20 of the
Glass-Steagall Act, 74 which prohibits affiliations between member
banks and organizations "engaged principally" in the securities
business. 75 The Board held that actions permitted to a bank itself
under sections 16 and 21 should not be denied to a bank affiliate
under section 20.76 Thus, because the Board had previously
approved commercial paper placement activities by the bank itself,
and that approval had been upheld by the D.C. Circuit, 77 the
activity was permissible a fortiori for nonbank subsidiaries of bank
holding companies.
The Board could have ended its analysis of the Glass-Steagall Act
at this point, but it went on to provide an alternative basis for
decision: even if the activities in question did constitute "underwriting" under section 20, they would not violate the Glass-Steagall Act
because the securities subsidiary would not be "engaged principally"
in such activity. 78 The Board held that the term "engaged princi71The Board could, in theory, have proceeded by informal rulemaking, amending
Regulation Y to include acting as agent in the sale of commercial paper as part of the
Regulation Y "laundry list" of activities generally permitted to nonbank subsidiaries
of bank holding companies. However, the Board has traditionally added activities to
Regulation Y only after determining by order in one or more concrete cases that the
activity in question was permissible. Thus an initial rulemaking approach would have
been out of the ordinary course and would have received attention in Congress and
elsewhere. The Board may not have wanted to dramatize its action in this fashion.
72 See supra note 34.
73 See Interview with James Beckley (Apr. 11, 1989).
74 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1988).
75 Section 20 provides, in pertinent part, that "no member bank shall be affiliated
...with any... organization engaged principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting,
public sale, or distribution at wholesale or retail or through syndicate participation
of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities . . . ." See id. Congress
extended this provision to insured nonmember banks in the Competitive Equality
Banking
Act of 1987, Pub L. No. 100-86, § 103, 101 Stat. 552, 566-67 (1987).
76
See Bankers Trust New York Corporation, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 138,139-40 (1987)
(citing Board of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46,
60 n.26
(1981)).
77
See Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005
(1987).
78 See Bankers Trust New York Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. at 145-46.
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pally" meant "any substantial line of business activity." 79 It
concluded that the subsidiary would not be engaged principally in
the securities business if its gross revenues from commercial paper
activities constituted less than five percent of its total gross revenues
and the company's total commercial paper outstanding represented
less than five percent of the average amount of all dealer-placed
80
commercial paper outstanding.
The Board then examined the legal issues arising under the
Bank Holding Company Act.81 It held, first, that the proposed
activities would be "closely related to banking" because commercial
paper placement is similar to the traditional banking function of
arranging loan participations with other banks and other institutional lenders.8 2 It then held that the proposed activity represented a "proper incident" to banking because the public benefits of the
activity (increased competition and greater customer convenience)
outweighed the potential adverse effects (such as unfair competi83
tion, insider trading, and under concentration of resources).
The Board therefore approved the application, subject to several
84
constraints proposed by Bankers Trust itself.
The Board's decision to allow a bank holding company subsidiary to place commercial paper left open the question of whether it
would be permissible for such a subsidiary to underwritecommercial
paper-that is, to purchase such paper for its own account for resale
to customers at a profit. That question came to the Board a few
months later in the form of an application by The Chase Manhattan
Corporation to underwrite and deal in third party commercial paper
to a limited extent through a commercial finance subsidiary. The
Board, relying on its earlier Bankers Trust decision, held that the
71 Id. at 142.
80 See id. at 146.
81 See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
82 Bankers Trust New York Corporation, 73 Fed. Res. Bull, at 147.
8s See id. at 152.

84 Among other limitations, the Board ruled that the subsidiary could place only
prime quality short-term paper in minimum denominations of $250,000; could place
the paper only with sophisticated financial institutions; could not inventory unsold
portions of the paper it placed, nor purchase such paper for its own account; could
not earn revenues from commercial paper placement exceeding five percent of gross
revenues in any given year; could not achieve a market share exceeding five percent
of all dealer-placed paper at any one time; could not back the paper with which it
dealt by letters of credit or guarantees; could not extend credit to issuers to cover
unsold paper; could not provide investment advice to purchasers; and could not have
officers, directors, or employees in common with any of the holding company's
subsidiary banks. See id. at 152-53.

394

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 139:369

Chase subsidiary would not be "engaged principally" in the
securities business, even though it would be underwriting rather
than acting as agent, so long as it adhered to the five percent
revenue limitation. s5 Relying on the Bankers Trust decision, it
held further that the proposed commercial paper underwriting was
a permissible activity for nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding
companies under the Bank Holding Company Act, provided that the
Chase subsidiary adhered to the limitations on operations imposed
8 6
by the Board in the Bankers Trust New York Corporationcase.
C. FurtherBreaches in the Glass-SteagallBarrier
The logic of these decisions was not limited to commercial
paper. If a nonbank subsidiary could sell commercial paper as
agent or underwriter, there was no apparent reason under the
language of the Glass-Steagall Act why such an organization could
not broker or sell all forms of securities, provided that the activity
in question was not so substantial as to run afoul of the proscription
in section 20 against "engag[ing] principally" in the securities
business. 87 Although commercial paper marked the entering
wedge into the securities business, it was clear that applications for
other securities activities would not be far behind.
Indeed, at the time it decided the Bankers Trust New York
Corporation and the Chase Manhattan Corporation cases, the Board
had pending before it just such an application. 88 Three bank
holding companies-Citicorp,J.P. Morgan & Co., and Bankers Trust
New York Corporation-sought approval for nonbank subsidiaries
to underwrite municipal revenue bonds, mortgage-related securities,
consumer-receivable-related securities, and commercial paper. The
subsidiaries designated to engage in these activities were then
engaged in underwriting securities such as U.S. government and
agency and state and municipal securities ("bank-eligible" securities)
that member banks are permitted to underwrite under section 16 of
89
the Glass-Steagall Act.
85

See Chase Manhattan Cori)., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 367, 368 (1987).

86 See id. at 371. The D.C. Circuit upheld the Board's decision in Securities Indus.
Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., 847 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

87 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1988).

88 See Chase Manhattan Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. at 371.

89 See Citicorp/J.P. Morgan & Co./Bankers Trust, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 473, 473
(1987).
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The Citicorp/J.P.Morgan & Co./Bankers Trust cases represented
two further steps by commercial banks into the securities business.
First, aside from commercial paper underwriting, which the Board
had approved as closely related to banking in the Chase Manhattan
Corporation case, 90 the securities involved in the later applications
were relatively far-removed from the traditional banking business.
It was unclear whether underwriting these securities would pass
muster under the Bank Holding Company-Act. Second, because the
subsidiary companies in question were involved in underwriting
government securities, there was a close question as to whether the
existing business of these firms would be considered the "securities"
business for purposes of section 20. If so, then the petitions would
have to be denied because the subsidiary would be principally
engaged (indeed, wholly engaged) in the securities business in
violation of section 20. If, on the other hand, bank-eligible activities
were excluded from the securities business to which section 20
applies, then the petitions might well be upheld because the bankineligible portion of the business might be considered insubstantial
in comparison with the total volume of business conducted by the
firm.
The applications thus raised important issues for the future of
the financial services industry. The three bank holding companies
sought, in essence, to be allowed to operate large-scale investment
banking affiliates engaged in underwriting a wide variety of
securities. Even the stringent five percent revenue test imposed by
the Board in prior cases would not restrict seriously the operation
of these proposed section 20 affiliates, at least not in the short run,
because as primary dealers in government securities the firms
brought in such an enormous amount of revenue that there were
few practical impediments to conducting a full-scale underwriting
business. In short, while approval of these applications did not
quite have the potential of eviscerating the Glass-Steagall Act, it did
create the possibility of allowing the kind of bank involvement in
the securities business that the Act had long been thought to
prohibit.
The Board approved the applications by a split decision, with
Chairman Volcker and Governor Angell dissenting. 9 1 The majority rejected the contention that bank-eligible securities such as U.S.

goSee Chase Manhattan Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. at 368.
9'See Citicorp/J.P. Morgan & Co./Bankers Trust, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. at 505-06.
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government obligations fell within the term "securities" in section
20 of the Glass-Steagall Act, observing that such an interpretation
would be inconsistent with the evident congressional intent to
impose less burdensome restrictions on securities activities by
affiliates than on activities by banks themselves. 9 2 The Board then
applied its five percent gross revenue and market share limitations
to the proposals in determining that the proposed bank-ineligible
activities would not violate section 20's proscription against an
affiliate being "engaged principally" in bank-ineligible securities
9
activities. 3
The Board then addressed the Bank Holding Company Act
issues, and upheld as closely related to banking the proposals for
underwriting commercial paper, 94 municipal revenue bonds, and
1-4 family mortgage-related securities. 9 5 Finally, the Board held
that the public benefits of the proposals outweighed the possible
adverse effects, provided that the activities were limited in scope
and effect as provided in a rather extensive list of "firewall"
restrictions set forth in the Board's opinion. 96 The Board emphasized that these limitations were "prudential" and that it believed it
appropriate to "proceed cautiously" in view of the fact that the
proposals "represent the first major entry of banking organizations
into the field of underwriting and dealing in ineligible securities
.... "97 It warned that it might tinker with the limitations in the
98
future.
Chairman Volcker and Governor Angell dissented on the
ground that bank-eligible securities were "securities" within the
meaning of section 20. They emphasized that they agreed with the
Board's decision as a policy matter, but believed that it contravened
the intent of Congress underlying the Glass-Steagall Act:
The interpretation adopted by the majority would appear to make
feasible, as a matter of law if not Board policy, the affiliations of
banks with some of the principal underwriting firms or investment
92 See id. at 478-81.

93 See id. at 481-85.
" This issue had already been decided in the Chase Manhattan Corporation case.

See Chase
Manhattan Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. at 368.
95

See Citicorp/J.P. Morgan & Co./Bankers Trust, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. at 487. The

Board did not decide on the record before it whether consumer-receivable-related
securities met the "closely related" test.

See id. at 502-05.
97 Id. at 504.
98 See id.
96
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houses of the country. Such a legal result, we feel, is inconsistent
with the intent of Congress in passing the Glass-Steagall Act. 9
The Board's decision in Citicorp/J.P.Morgan & Co./Bankers Trust
represented a severe, although not entirely unexpected, setback to
the Securities Industry Association. But that group had not been
idle. Knowing that the Board was likely to approve further
intrusions by banks into the securities business, the SIA had lobbied
for, and obtained, a provision in banking legislation pending on
Capitol Hill that would impose a moratorium on Board approval
between March 6, 1987 and March 1, 1988 of any application which
would permit a bank holding company to engage in the underwriting or public sale of securities on the basis that it was not "engaged
principally" in such activity within the meaning of section 20 of the
Glass-Steagall Act. The provision passed the Senate on March 27,
1987;100 not coincidentally, the decision in Chase Manhattan Corp.
came down on March 18, prior to the Senate's action but after the
effective date of the proposed moratorium. This provision became
§ 201(b) of the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987.101
Thus the securities industry had obtained at least a temporary
reprieve from the depredations of the Federal Reserve Board.
The SIA then petitioned the Second Circuit for review of the
Board's Citicorp/J.P. Morgan & Co./Bankers Trust order. The
petition could have been taken up to the D.C. Circuit, but the SIA
apparently concluded that its loss in Bankers Trust II did not auger
well for future litigation in that forum. The Second Circuit,
however, proved no more receptive, rejecting the SIA's petition in

9 Id. at 505.
100 See S. 790, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. 4061, 4067 (1987).

101 Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 201(b), 101 Stat. 552,582-83 (to be codified at 12 U.S.G.
§ 1841). The provision states that between March 6, 1987 and March 1, 1988,
[a] Federal banking agency may not authorize or allow by action, inaction,
or otherwise any bank holding company or subsidiary or affiliate thereof...
to engage in the United States to any extent whatever.., in the flotation,
underwriting, public sale, dealing in, or distribution of securities if that
approval would require the agency to determine that the entity which would
conduct such activities would not be engaged principally in such activities
Id.
Section 202 of the statute permitted the Board to issue an order during the
moratorium period pursuant to its pre-existing authority if the effective date of the
order was delayed until the expiration of the moratorium. See id. at 584.
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all respects in February 1988 (Bankers Trust II).102 The Second

Circuit reversed the Board only on its market share limitation-the
subject of a cross-petition by the bank holding companies-finding
no evidence that Congress intended to limit the activities of
securities affiliates under section 20 through any market share
10 3
test.
Meanwhile the securities and banking industries made use of the
one-year moratorium to fight a pitched battle on Capitol Hill over
proposals to reform or repeal the Glass-Steagall Act. The securities
industry's apparent strategy in obtaining the moratorium was to
force the issue of Glass-.Steagall reform onto the congressional
agenda, and to obtain by legislation some sort of accommodation
under which securities firms would be allowed into the banking
business if banks were allowed into the securities business. This
strategy seemed near success when the Chairperson and the ranking
minority member of the Senate Banking Committee, Sen. William
Proxmire and Sen. Jake Garn, proposed legislation that would have
allowed banks to form securities affiliates and securities firms to
form banking affiliates.10 4 However, despite much activity, Congress was unable to agree on legislation and the moratorium
expired. 10 5 The Board's orders remained in effect, however,
although they had been stayed pending Supreme Court action on
the SIA's petition for a writ of certiorari in Bankers Trust III.
Members of Congress began to make statements, apparently at the
behest of the securities industry, encouraging the Supreme Court to
grant the writ of certiorari and imploring the Court not to draw any
inferences from Congress's failure to act during the moratorium 10 6 or to assume that Congress would be able to resolve the
102 Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., 839 F.2d
47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988) [hereinafter Bankers Trust III].
103 See id. at 67-68.
104 See S. 1886, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. 16,659-67 (1987) (remarks
of Sen. Proxmire) (outlining the text of the proposed act and stating that the
legislation is necessary to modernize and constructively reshape our financial
institutions).
105 Seven bills to amend or repeal the Glass-Steagall Act were pending before the
House Banking Committee at one time. The Chairperson of the Committee, Rep. St
Germain, directed the staff to prepare a compromise committee draft, but the
committee was unable to report out a bill. See 134 CONG. REC. E1,473 (daily ed. May
10, 1988) (remarks of Rep. Morrison).
106 See 134 CONG. REc. E1,636-37 (daily ed. May 19, 1988) (remarks of Rep.
Rinaldo); 134 CONG. REC. E1,473 (daily ed. May 10, 1988) (remarks of Rep.
Morrison).
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controversy at any time during the present geologic era. 10 7 The
10 8
Supreme Court, unmoved, denied the writ.
D. Recent Developments
At this point, the initial political battle over commercial paper
was over. Banks and bank holding companies could place an
unlimited amount of commercial paper for the accounts of issuers,
and could underwrite commercial paper through a nonbank
subsidiary up to the point where gross revenues from commercial
paper underwriting and other bank-ineligible securities activities
equalled five percent of the subsidiary's gross revenues. From a
regulatory perspective, the battle now turned to the question of
whether the prudential limits ("firewalls") on section 20 firms would
be lifted, and if so, how soon.
The revenue limitation was not a serious constraint for large
bank holding companies with subsidiaries that functioned as
primary dealers in government securities. The amount of bank-

eligible securities revenues brought inby these firms was s6 large
that even very substantial underwriting was possible within the
revenue cap. 10 9 The same was not true, however, for smaller or
regional bank holding companies that did not control large primary
dealers in government securities. These firms could operate section
20 subsidiaries only at a relatively low volume of business, a factor

which as a practical matter meant that they could not operate
107 See 134 CONG. REC. E1,473 (daily ed. May 10, 1988) (remarks of Rep.
Morrison) ("I hope the Supreme Court will not decline to grant review on the
assumption that this Congress will enact legislation resolving the issues in the case.
While this is what we should and perhaps can do, realistically speaking, the enactment
of banking legislation in this Congress is very uncertain.").
108 486 U.S. 1059 (1988).
109 See Garsson, Limited Value Seen in Power to Underwrite AM. BANKER, Feb. 20,
1990, at 1 (noting that revenue limit has not proved a hindrance at Bankers Trust).
Securities affiliates ofbigbanks earn bank-eligible revenues through acting as primary
dealers in Treasury securities, as well as through bank-eligible private placements
which are likely to increase in number as a result of the newly-adopted SEC Rule
144A, Private Resales of Securities to Institutions, Securities Act Release No. 33-6862,
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,523 (Apr. 30, 1990). This should greatly increase the
attractiveness of private placements by allowing rapid development of a secondary
market in privately placed securities. See Rehm, FedExpected to Ease Limit on Securities:
Ruling Likely to Boost UnderwritingCapacity, AM. BANKER, Oct. 30, 1989, at 1. But see
Will the 144A Market Be Slow Off the Mark? INST. INVESTOR, May 1990, at 25 (noting
that "now it looks as if [Rule 144A which] was touted as transforming the way capital
is raised in the U.S. could take a while to lure significant members of issuers and
investors").
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section 20 securities subsidiaries at all.110 When regional banks
and bank holding companies made their unhappiness with this
situation known,"1 the Board responded by raising the cap to ten
percent, a level which should eventually allow a substantially larger
number of bank holding companies to enter the securities business
112
through section 20 subsidiaries.
Bank holding companies also chafed under the prudential or
"firewall" limitations applicable to transactions between the
securities affiliate and the parent holding company. They claimed
that some of these limitations were unnecessary and that compliance
costs were high. 113 It is widely expected that the Board will
reconsider its firewalls after an appropriate time in which the actual
operations of section 20 subsidiaries can be observed. 1 4
At
present, the stringency of the Board's firewalls is a matter of intense
controversy within the banking and securities industries.
Finally, with respect to banks, the Board in 1989 issued an order
allowing section 20 affiliates to underwrite and deal in corporate
bonds, including junk bonds, and, after a waiting period, in
corporate equity securities as well." 5 The D.C. Circuit upheld
110

See Parisi interview, supra note 24; see also Garsson,supra note 109, at 1 (noting
that except for large money-center banks, even large regional banks cannot generate
enough bank-eligible revenue to make a profit in bank-ineligible activities).
11 See Horowitz, Fed May Expand Securities Powers, AM. BANKER, Sept. 13, 1989,
at 1, col. 1, 18, col. 3 (quoting an official of PNC Financial Corp., a regional bank
holding company: "For a regional company of our size it doesn't make sense to
engage in all four product lines [of bank-ineligible securities authorized by the Board]
unless we can do a large amount in each particular line"); Horowitz, Regionals Go Slow
on Underwriting: They Let Money CenterBanks Take the Lead on Section 20, AM. BANKER,
Aug. 29, 1989, at 5; Rehm, Bank Victories on Securities Mostly Symbolic AM. BANKER,
Apr. 12, 1990, at 1, 13 (discussing Security Pacific Corp., a large regional bank, which
has yet to implement its securities powers because of the burdens of firewall
restrictions).
112 See Modifications to Section 20 Orders, 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 751 (1989).
113 See, e.g., Garrson, supra, note 109, at 1, col. 1 (noting that Bankers Trust was
forced to move clearing operation for non-Treasury securities out of its securities
affiliate because of firewall prohibiting loans between insured banks and securities
affiliate).
114 The Board expressly indicated that it might revisit and revise the firewalls in
the future. See Citicorp/J.P. Morgan & Co./Bankers Trust, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 473,
504-05 (1987).
115 SeeJ.P. Morgan & Co., Inc., 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 192 (1989). The Board's action
was apparently taken with careful attention to its political consequences. As to bond
underwriting, the Board was well aware that many potential opponents of expanded
bank powers had voted during the previous year to allow banks to underwrite
corporate bonds; those members were thus hampered in their ability to complain
when the Board accomplished the same result by regulation. As to equity underwrit-
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Thus, banks are now able, through

their securities affiliates, to engage in a wide range of securities
activities, subject to the requirement that the gross revenues from
the bank-ineligible activities not exceed ten percent of the affiliate's
total revenues, and subject also to the various firewalls against
transactions between securities affiliates and other parts of the bank
holding company. The securities affiliates of banks live againdespite the nearly universal belief for nearly a half-century that they
had been forever destroyed by the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933.
Securities firms, for their part, have faced still further difficulties
over the past few years. First, the legal developments which have
allowed bank affiliates to underwrite securities have not benefitted
them. All the major securities firms are "engaged principally" in
bank-ineligible activities. Accordingly, they cannot affiliate with
banking institutions by setting themselves up as section 20 subsidiaries of bank holding companies. Nor, under section 21, can they
engage "to any extent whatever" in deposit banking either directly
or through a subsidiary. In short, while the Glass-Steagall Act has
proved to be relatively toothless When applied to securities activities
by big bank holding companies, it retains a great deal of bite as
applied to banking activities by the big securities firms.
This suggests that the value of the Glass-Steagall Act in protecting securities firms against bank competition may have been eroded
to the point where the securities industry as a whole might not be
severely damaged by repeal of the Act. In May 1990, the Securities
Industry Association took the fateful step of dropping its opposition
to repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act. 117 The United States appears

ing, the Board, while approving the activity itself, announced that it would not grant
any actual approvals for a year. This deferral ostensibly allowed Congress a period
of time in which to reverse the Board, thus deflecting potential congressional
criticism. Given the paralysis that Congress has displayed on Glass-Steagall issues, few
observers seriously believed that Congress would reverse the Board's order. See
Rehm, Fed Ruling Leaves Congress Leeway, AM. BANKER, Jan. 20, 1989, at 1, 16. As
expected, Congress took no action.
116 See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., 900
F.2d 360 (D.C. Cir 1990) [hereinafter Bankers Trust IV]. The Court held that, having
lost on essentially the same arguments in the Second Circuit in Bankers Trust III, 839
F.2d 47, cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988), the SIA was estopped from relitigating the
issue in the D.C. Circuit.
For a discussion of the potentially greater implications of the Fed's recent
decision to allow commercial banks to underwrite securities, see Sease, supra note 12,
at C1,
col. 5.
I 7 See Securities Industly Accepts Glass-Steagallis Doomed, FIN. TIMEs INT'L BANKING
REP.,June 1990.
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to be taking the first groping steps towards a European-style system
of universal banking in which a single organization offers a full
array of banking, securities, and other financial services.
As a result of the developments recounted above, much of the
conflict between banks and securities firms has now been redirected
from the political to the marketplace arena. It was one thing for
bank holding companies to achieve the formal power to engage in
securities underwriting; it is quite another to establish a section 20
underwriting affiliate able to compete on equal terms with established securities firms. Moreover, the securities industry itself
recently has faced a series of painful shocks, including the market
break of October 1987, the slowdown in corporate takeover activity
starting in 1988, the bankruptcy of Drexel Burnham Lambert in late
1989, the ensuing collapse of the junk bond market, and the
downturn in the stock market stimulated by the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait. Profits of securities firms were down, and a number of
firms had to lay off employees in 1990. Given these developments,
it is hardly surprising that a number of bank holding companies that
obtained permission to open section 20 subsidiaries have not yet
done so, apparently out of concern that they can not compete in an
already packed market.1 16 One bank holding company closed its
section 20 affiliate only two years after its creation.1 19 Those that
continue to operate section 20 subsidiaries have focused their
120
business almost exclusively in the area of commercial paper.

118 See GAO Report: "BankPowers: Activities of SecuritiesSubsidiariesof Bank Holding
Companies," HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on General Oversight and Investigationsof the
House Comm. on Banking,Finance and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1990)
[hereinafter GAO Report] (as of September 30, 1989, 21 holding company
subsidiaries had received permission to conduct bank-ineligible activities, but only 13
had actually commenced such activities).
119 See Leander, Bank of Boston Closes Sec. 20 Uni AM. BANKER, June 5, 1990, at
2.
120See GAO Report supra note 118, at 60-61. Commercial paper represented
approximately 98% of bank-ineligible activities by § 20 firms between the third
quarter 1988 and the third quarter 1989. For example, in the third quarter of 1989,
§ 20 affiliates underwrote $386 million in municipal revenue bonds, $600 million in
mortgage-related securities, $45 million in asset-backed securities, and $67,660 million
in commercial paper. See id. Although a number of§ 20 firms had announced plans
to enter the junk bond field, as of May 1990 none had done so. See Smith, Banks See
Golden Opportunity in Junk, Wall St.J., May 15, 1990, at C1, col. 3. In June 1990,
Citicorp announced that it was terminating its municipal securities underwriting
business. See Guenther, Citicoip Will End Its Underwritingof MunicipalIssues, Wall St.
J., June 5, 1990, at C21, col. 1.
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It is not yet clear whether section 20 firms will te able to survive
in the highly competitive commercial paper market. Market
participants we interviewed said that spreads were so low in 1989
that it was very difficult to make a profit in commercial paper
underwriting.121 An officer at Merrill Lynch Capital Markets
estimated that in the spring of 1989 the three leading section 20
firms, BT Securities Corp. (the Bankers Trust New York Corporation subsidiary), Citicorp Securities Markets, Inc., and J.P. Morgan
Securities, Inc., each had approximately $15 billion outstanding in
commercial paper underwritings, while the break-even point for this
business was approximately $28 billion.122 The section 20 firms
were almost certainly operating at a loss during this period.
Although section 20 firms may not yet be turning a profit, the
trend for bank commercial paper underwriting has been dramatically positive, with total commercial paper underwritten by section 20
firms rising from approximately $12 billion in the third quarter of
1988 to approximately $68 billion in the third quarter 1989.123
Recent press accounts indicate that banks continue to do Well in this
field. 124 Banks such as Bankers Trust and Citicorp show every
sign of being committed to the commercial paper market for the
long haul, both as a means of gaining an initial toehold in the
securities business and as a device for maintaining and enhancing
contact with their prime commercial customers. 125 In short, there
can be little doubt that the government decision to permit commercial banks to enter the commercial paper market had a significant
economic impact.

121 See Fuscone & Smithwick interview, supra note 38; Parisi interview, supra note
24. Spreads have been low for a number of years, forcing niajor players such as
Salomon Brothers and Paine Webber to abandon the business. See Tobin, Players
Reshuffled in CP Market, EUROMONEY, June 1988, at 175.
122 See Parisi interview, supra note 24.
123 See GAO Report, supranote 118, at 106; see also, Quint, Turningthe Tables, U.S.
BANKER,July 1988, at 14 (1988) (reporting the growing number 6f banks successfully
entering the commercial paper market).
124 See Tobin, supra note 121, at 175; Neustadt, supra note 38, at 1, col. 4.
125 See Rehm, supra note 111, at 1, col. 1 (reporting that NCNB Corp., a large
regional bank holding company, decided to activate a securities affiliate because, over
time, the value of bank powers will grow, and because NCNB wanted to obtain
grandfather rights in the event that Congress chose to bar further investment banking
affiliates); see also Garsson, supranote 109, at 1, col. 1 (noting that the most important
aspect of new bank powers is that banks have "an opportunity to become familiar
with corporate debt and equity underwriting in anticipation of full-scale repeal of the
Glass-Steagall Act").
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III. THE JAPANESE EXPERIENCE
A. The Controversy in the Diet
As previously discussed, commercial paper did not exist in Japan
prior to the recent controversy. In fact, the essence of the controversy was not the question of who would control the commercial
paper market, as it was in the United States, but rather whether a
commercial paper market should exist at all. Once this question
was raised, however, the conflict between banks and securities firms
quickly came to the forefront.
That conflict, although built into the structure of the Japanese
financial services industry by the Securities Exchange Law (SEL) and
its article 65, had long remained dormant. The Tokyo Stock
Exchange was bombed into ruins during World War II and had yet
to reopen in 1948, the time of the SEL's passage. Banks were
preoccupied by efforts to stay afloat given the massive damage that
the war had caused. With the general revival of the economy and
the banking sector during the Korean War boom, the banks began
to flourish and became the main suppliers of funds to Japan's everexpanding industrial sector. Throughout the high-growth era, banks
were highly profitable relative to the rest of Japanese industry as
they were able to enjoy the fruits of their regulated market. The
underdeveloped securities market offered few temptations.
In the 1970s, however, changes in theJapanese economy began
1 26
to destabilize the balance between banks and securities firms.
Perhaps the most significant change was the gradual erosion of the
banks' most lucrative form of business-providing credit to Japanese
industrial firms. In a mature economy, these firms were no longer
as desperate for credit as they had been previously. Some, such as
Toyota, amassed huge amounts of surplus cash, and, insulated from
the threat of hostile takeovers, used this cash to finance themselves,
rather than distributing it. to shareholders. Others took advantage
of new ways to raise capital that were more flexible and less
expensive than bank loans, such as issuing convertible bonds or
selling securities in the newly-accessible Euromarket.
A second problem for commercial banks, of a more technical
but still significant nature, came in the area of government bonds.
Government bonds had historically been underwritten by syndicates
of commercial banks, with resales forbidden. Banks were willing to

126 See F. ROSENBLUTH, supra note 28, at 4.
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underwrite the bonds despite their low interest rates because the
Bank of Japan would buy them up in open market operations soon
after issuance, in order to expand gradually the money supply. The
system broke down, however, when the Japanese government began
to issue a huge volume of deficit-finance bonds in 1976-77. The
Bank of Japan could no longer purchase all or even most of the
bonds, as such purchases would have resulted in an inflationary
overexpansion of the money supply. Left holding large, unprofitable government bond portfolios, the banks demanded the ability
to sell these bonds to the general public. There followed a lengthy
debate involving the banking and securities industries, the MOF,
and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). This debate set the
tone and much of the agenda for the banking-securities conflicts
that have taken place since.1 27 In the end, major Securities and
Exchange Law and Banking Law revisions in 1981 allowed banks to
sell government bonds to the public.
During negotiations involving the 1981 Banking Law and
Securities and Exchange Law revisions, the securities industry raised
the commercial paper issue with the MOE. The banks opposed
commercial paper out of well-grounded fear that commercial paper
would further reduce their control of the 'market for corporate
finance. In addition, banks and other interested parties (including
the MOF) apparently expected that if commercial paper were to be
authorized, it would be through designation as a security, 128 and
that banks would be excluded from the market. This expectation
was partially based on the situation in the U.S., the birthplace of
article 65, where banks had only recently attempted to enter the
commercial paper business and challenge the assumption that
commercial paper was a security. In addition, foreign commercial
paper had been designated a security under the Foreign Exchange
and Foreign Trade Control Law (FECL) of 1979,129 which had
partially liberalized the movement of capital in and out of Japan.
127 The details of this debate are recounted in

J.

HORNE, JAPAN'S FINANCIAL

MARKETS: CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS IN POLICYMAKING 98-117 (1985), and F.
ROSENBLUTH, supra note 28, at 128-36 (1989).
128 Commercial paper could have been designated a security either by amendment
to the Securities and Exchange Law, by a Cabinet Order as contemplated by
Securities and Exchange Law, art. 2, § 1, cl. 9, or by a MOF interpretive decision that
commercial paper would be treated as falling within one of the existing categories of
securities, most likely as an unsecured corporate debenture.
129 Gaikoku Kawase oyobi Gaikoku Boeki Kanri Ho, Law No. 8 of 1960, as
amended by Law No. 65 of 1979 (all untranslated Japanese sources are on file with
the authors, who have supplied the corresponding references).
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In arguing for their position, the banks raised the following
policy concerns:
(1) Commercial paper would undermine the traditional rule
requiring collateral forJapanese debt financing. Japanese finance

was based on the idea that strict collateral requirements would
control against losses in the event of default and thereby guarantee
the stability of the financial system. Since commercial paper

would depart from this principle, introduction without adequate
study would endanger investors and raise the potential for chaos
in the financial markets.
(2) Commercial paper would weaken the "main bank" system,
by which one bank acts as a corporation's principal financial
adviser and lender. The "main bank" system had played an
important role in Japanese finance, but would be undermined if
corporations were to raise funds directly from open money
markets.
(3) Commercial paper was a uniquely American product,
necessary in the United States because of the absence of interstate
banking and because of strict limits on bank loans to individual
customers. In Japan, banks had proven able to supply ample
short-term finance at low interest rates, eliminating any need for
30
commercial paper.1
Others argued that a commercial paper market would reduce
the effectiveness of Bank of Japan "window guidance," a leading
tool of monetary policy, 131 and would lead to the collapse of the
system of regulated interest rates. 132 The MOF refused to act in
the face of bank opposition, citing as its reason the lack of issuer
demind for commercial paper given ample availability of bank
financing at low, regulated rates of interest.
The securities industry was not satisfied with this result, and it
apparently asked members of the governing LDP to introduce an
advisory resolution in the national legislature, the Diet. 133 The
130 See T. AMAYA, UGOKIDASIrTA CP 75-77 (1988) (listing bank arguments). The
author of this book is ajunior MOF official and served in MOF's Securities Bureau,
Capital Markets Section during the period of commercial paper's introduction. The
book is representative of MOF views.
1s1 "Window guidance" refers to the Bank ofJapan setting a specific quantitative
ceiling on the aggregate lending of each bank. It is used only during periods of tight
mondy and has the benefit of being a very precise control on the amount of credit in
the economy. See Ackley & Ishi, Fiscal Monetary and Related Policies, in AsIA'S NEW
GIANT: How THEJAPANESE ECONOMY WORKS 153,202-04 (H. Patrick & H. Rosovsky
eds. 1976).
132 Daiki-shoki: Komsharu p 5d, Nihon Keizai Shinbun (Financial Column), May
31, 1985, at 17 [hereinafter Daiki-shok4 May 31, 1985].

s This resolution supported the demands of the securities industry, and yet our

1990]

COMMERCIAL PAPER UNDERWRITING BY BANKS

407

Finance Committee of the House of Representatives passed such an
advisory resolution stating that "in order to advance internationalization and the diversification of financial products, the legal and
practical aspects of introducing commercial paper should be
studied." 13 4 The resolution was plainly directed at the MOF,
since the commercial paper question was under its banking and
securities regulation jurisdiction.
This one-sentence advisory
resolution is the only evidence of Diet involvement in the decision
to introduce commercial paper, and it appears to have had little or
no impact on the final decision. The MOF took no action in
response to it, having already determined not to act on commercial
paper at that time. When the MOF did act after five years, it did so
13 5
for reasons entirely unrelated to the resolution.
The Ministry's steadfastness in the face of pressure from the
legislature is not surprising. While in theory the Diet has great
power over the MOF, in practice the relationship between the MOF
and the Diet is almost the reverse. The MOF has long been the
dominant forum for decisions over financial services. Resort to the
Diet usually takes place at the MOF's behest, when a desired policy
change cannot be implemented under the existing statutes.
One reason for this custom is that the Diet lacks the staff,
expertise, or prestige to pass legislation significantly interfering with
the MOF's freedom of action. Japan has a long tradition of the best
and brightest students entering the government ministries,
particularly the MOF. The MOF recruits heavily from the Law
Faculty of the University of Tokyo, and takes the undisputed cream
of the crop, the top of the clearly defined Japanese educational

interviews with key participants in the process left us uncertain as to its actual origin.
One possibility is that the MOF favored early introduction of commercial paper, but
was unable to overcome strong bank opposition. If that were the case, the MOF may
have acquiesced in or even indirectly sponsored the Diet resolution. The resolution
was vague enough so as not to unduly restrict future MOF action, yet specific enough
to provide MOF a basis for later reviving the commercial paper debate with the
banks. We believe, however, that the evidence points to a source within the securities
industry.
134 Japanese Diet, House of Representatives, Finance Committee Advisory
Resolution (Okura iinkainofutai ketsugi) (May 13, 1981), reprinted in T. AMAYA, supra

note 130, at 68.

135 The question of relations between the Diet and the ministries is an extremely
sensitive one. While the MOF officials we interviewed were quite open and
forthcoming about relationships within the MOF and with interest groups, they would
speak about the Diet in only the most general terms. Of course, this relationship
involves the senior MOF officials.
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hierarchy. The Diet, in contrast, has few specialists,136and its staff
consists largely of privately-funded political workers.
Moreover, in Japan's highly regulated system, MOF decisions
over the powers and activities of the banking and securities
industries are ongoing, since individual firms need the MOF's
permission to receive licenses or to undertake numerous transactions. It is in the interests of both the banking and securities
industries to keep these decisions in a single forum, so as to ensure
even-handedness and predictability. If the MOF were to sacrifice
bank interests to the interests of issuers, investors, or securities
firms in making one decision, the banks would be in a position to

demand assurance of favorable consideration when the next
decision arises. As a consequence, the banks and securities firms
are able to "bargain" through the MOF, and attempt to find
mutually advantageous solutions on a range of issues. The banking
and securities industries have extensive experience dealing with the
MOF and they recognize it is often in their best interests to accept
its decisions. Thus, the MOF can make compromises, and, unlike
U.S. administrative agencies, it can enforce those compromises
without fear of litigation or effective after-the-fact legislative
opposition from either industries within the MOF's jurisdiction or
unrepresented interest groups. If the securities firms were to have
taken the commercial paper issue to the Diet, not only would they
have had no assurance of fair treatment, but they would have had
no way of knowing how the Diet would respond, whether other
issues would be raised oir traded off in response, or whether an
unfavorable result could be compensated for in the future. A
bidding war for influence in the Diet on a single issue would not
have assisted either the banks or securities firms in the process of
ongoing regulatory decisions.
Finally, all the participants in the commercial paper strugglebanks, securities firms, and issuers-were constituents of the
conservative, business-oriented LDP. The LDP's best strategy was
to defer the decision to the MOF, rather than risk a political battle.
Moreover, the Diet contains representatives of opposition parties as
well as of the LDP. Since the LDP, as the ruling party, is closely
allied with the bureaucracy, a shift of resources to the Diet would
only serve to empower the: opposition parties by bringing them into
3

'

6

MOF).

See, e.g.,J. HoRNE, supra note 127, at 193-98 (describing career patterns at the
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the debate, and would diminish the ultimate control exercised by
13 7
LDP constituencies.
Although the 1981 Diet resolution did not induce the MOF to
act, issuer and securities interests made one further effort to move
the debate forward. In 1982, the commercial paper issue was taken
up in the Industrial Structure Council of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). 3 8 MITI has authority over the
manufacturing industry generally, as well as the trading companies
who were expected to (and have in fact) become the largest issuers
of commercial paper. It generally represents the concerns of its
industrial constituency in interagency debates and could be
expected to lobby on their behalf. But bank representatives also sat
as members of MITI's Industrial Structure Council, and their strong
opposition to commercial paper led the Council to issue a final
139
report citing divided opinion over the commercial paper issue.
This inconclusive result, and the feeling that it would be fruitless to
continue discussion without the participation of the MOF given its
primary jurisdiction over banking and securities regulation, led
MITI to drop the issue. 140 Thus, the first round ended with the
MOF refusing to act, and two efforts to circumvent its authority
coming to naught.
137 For this reason, when the Diet does become involved, the meaningful debate
often takes place not in the formal Diet committees, but in the LDP's party
committees. The opposition parties have not taken advantage of the apparent
opportunities to gain support from consumers of financial services by opposing MOF
and LDP positions.
138 The Industrial Structure Council is one of the MITI's standing advisory
councils, orshingikai. These councils provide formal advice to the ministries. Their
membership is chosen by the relevant ministry, and generally includes industry
representatives, academics, journalists, elder statesmen, and even an occasional
consumer advocate. They meet regularly, receive presentations from ministry
officials, and are consulted as proposals are prepared.
Shingikai provide a check on agency action, as legislative or regulatory proposals
generally do not go forward without the approval of the relevant shingikai, and the
shingikai operate based upon consensus. Perhaps equally important, the shingikai
legitimize bureaucratic decisions by giving them the imprimatur of a group of
respected citizens outside the bureaucracy.
Formal standingshingikai, created by statute, advise either individual bureaus or
entire ministries. When useful to the bureaucracy, ad hoc shingikai have been formed
to study particular issues, or to provide viewpoints which the standing shingikai do
not support. The commercial paper case provides one example of the various
shingikai in operation.
139 See T. AMAYA, supra note 130, at 68; Daiki-Shoki May 31, 1985, supra note 132,
at 17.
140 See Interview with Yoshiaki Koyama, Director, Research Division, Banking
Bureau of the MOF, and with other MOF officials in Tokyo (June 24, 1988).
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B. The ChangingLandscape: FinancialLiberalization
from 1982 to 1985
After these events, little further formal discussion concerning
the introduction of commercial paper took place until early 1986.
In this interval, however, the environment in which the commercial
paper debate took place changed drastically.
Japan had undergone gradual financial liberalization since the
late 1970s, including revisions of the FECL in 1979141 and the
Banking Law in 1981,142 and numerous regulatory changes instituted by the MOF. New financial markets had opened up as
regulators and regulated parties alike determined to make Tokyo an
international financial center.
Banks were allowed to issue
negotiable certificates of deposit in 1979; this new market quickly
joined the call, bill discount, and gensaki markets as one of the
principal short-term money markets. The 1981 Banking Law clearly
defined bank powers to deal in government bonds, and retail sales
of public bonds by banks began in April 1983. The system of
regulated interest rates came under pressure from new, market-rate
products, as liberalization of foreign exchange rules gave large
borrowers and investors a way around the regulated domestic
markets, and new domestic products such as money market
certificates were introduced.
Liberalization proceeded slowly, however, due to a lack of
regulatory momentum. This momentum was soon provided by
foreign pressure (referred to in Japanese by the term gaiatsu).
During 1982 to 1984, the U.S. global trade deficit and the bilateral
deficit with Japan reached unprecedented levels. 143 Part of the
blame for U.S. trade performance fell on the strong dollar and weak
yen, a phenomenon that might have been explained by high interest
rates brought on in part by the U.S. federal government budget
deficit, but which some U.S. officials preferred to attribute to
closed, regulatedJapanese financial markets that depressed demand
for the yen and increased demand for the dollar, and even to
market manipulation by a mysterious Japanese conspiracy. This
supposed link between restricted Japanese financial markets, an
141

SeeJ. HORNE, supra note :[27, at 153-64.

142 See id. at 107-12.
143 See KEIzAI KOHO CENTER, JAPAN INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
AFFAIRS, "JAPAN 1985: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON" 48 (1985).

1990]

COMMERCIAL PAPER UNDERWRITING BY BANKS

411

overvalued dollar, and poor U.S. trade performance led to U.S.
144
demands for Japanese financial liberalization.
Financial liberalization received top priority during President
Reagan and Treasury Secretary Regan's visit to Japan in November
of 1983. Ajoint U.S.-Japanese press statement listed eight areas of
potential liberalization and announced that MOF and the Treasury
Department would establish a Working Group on Yen/Dollar
Exchange Rate Issues. The Working Group met during the Spring
of 1984, and on May 29, 1984 issued a report detailing a variety of
deregulatory measures. 145 One result of this activity was to revive
the debate on whetherJapan should authorize a domestic commercial paper market.
Although U.S. demands appear to have acted as the catalyst for
this chapter of Japanese financial deregulation, the influence of
domestic interests favoring deregulation should not be underestimated. These interests welcomed foreign pressure that would help
them achieve their goals. Japan has a long tradition of domestic
groups using foreign pressure to serve, their interests, going back to
the time Commodore Perry forcedJapan open to the outside world.
In the commercial paper case, the large banks and securities firms
faced slowly declining benefits from the old system of regulation,
and saw great opportunities from deregulation and the emergence
of Tokyo as an international financial center. The smaller, less
competitive financial institutions and other interests favoring the
status quo would have vetoed such change under normal circumstances. By overriding such opposition, the foreign pressure tipped
the scales in favor of accelerated liberalization. Once the Yen/
Dollar discussions had begun, the MOF quickly prepared a report
that covered other liberalization measures, and released it contemporaneously with the Yen/Dollar Report.
During the period up to 1984, one aspect of the debate over
financial liberalization which provided an important precedent for
domestic commercial paper was the decision to allow sales of
foreign commercial paper to investors in Japan. The participation
of banks and securities firms in these sales was much discussed.
The 1979 revision of the FEGL relaxed the regulation of monetary
144 See, e.g., F. ROSENBLUTH, supra note 28, at 50-95 (discussing foreign pressure

for liberalization); KINYf: JIYUKA TO EN NO KOKUSAIKA 79-95 (Kinyii Zaisei Jij5
Kenkyfikai ed. 1985) (recounting events leading up to the establishment of the
Yen/Dollar Working Group, and the various proposals put forward by that group).
145 For a discussion of the Regan visit, see F. ROSENBLUTH, supranote 28, at 73-75.
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flows in and out of Japan and raised the possibility that, when the
proper regulations had been promulgated, Japanese investors could
purchase foreign commercial paper and other short-term financial
instruments. The revised FECL defined "security" by a list of
traditional securities similar to that in the SEL, and, also as in the
SEL, allowed for designation of other instruments as securities by
Cabinet Order. The MOF used this catch-all provision of the
FECL's security definition to designate foreign commercial paper a
security for purposes of the FEGL. The securities firms asked the
MOF to designate similarly foreign commercial paper a security
under the SEL, which, pursuant to article 65, would have excluded
banks from sales of foreign commercial paper in Japan. But the
banks lobbied successfully for equal participation in sales of foreign
commercial paper. The MOF completed draft rules for foreign
commercial paper sales in 1982.
In the end, introduction of foreign commercial paper was
delayed because of bank unhappiness over the plans of securities
firms to sell foreign commercial paper that performed as if it were
yen-denominated commercial paper, and thereby to hedge exchange
risk. Banks saw such a yen-based instrument as direct competition
for their large-scale domestic deposits and a threat to their control
over short-term money markets.
After the U.S. pressure for
liberalization increased, the MOF finally arrived at a compromise
between the two industries. On April 1, 1984, the foreign commercial paper sales went forward under the 1982 rules, with the
exception that securities firms were required to maintain special
accounts with authorized foreign exchange banks in order to receive
payments. 1 46
This special account requirement gave banks a
share of the business, even if it was unnecessary for providing
1 47
adequate service or investor protection.
One final change between 1981 and 1986 occurred not in Japan
but in Europe. France, England, and the Netherlands all responded

146 See, T. AMAYA, supra note 130, at 55-61 (describing details leading up to the
opening of sales of foreign commercial paper).
147 Other decisions regarding bank-securities firm competition were made during
this period. In March 1985, MOF negotiated an agreement involving entry into
several new areas of business. Banks were allowed to become full dealers of
government bonds, and to enter the market for bond futures. Securities firms were
allowed to trade CDs, and to intermediate transactions in yen-based bankers
acceptances (BA). The banks were said to have gotten the better of this deal. See CP
Donyfl to Chfkoku F no Shohin Kaizen ga Nihonbashira,Kinyai ZaiseiJij6, Feb. 10, 1986,
at 34-35.
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to the growth of Euro-commercial paper markets by establishing
domestic commercial paper markets during 1985 and early 1986.
These new European markets may have influenced the decision to
establish a commercial paper market in Japan in several ways.
First, the banks had argued in 1981 that commercial paper was
unsuited to the unique Japanese financial system. Commercial
paper could be considered an American aberration, a product made
necessary because of the United States' fragmented interstate
banking system and used mainly by the United States' proliferating
non-bank financial service companies. Domestic Japanese liberalization, with the prospect of further deregulation of interest rates
and financial products, had made the Japanese financial system
seem less unique by 1986. The rapid growth of Euro-commercial
paper and introduction of domestic commercial paper markets in
Europe eliminated any argument that commercial paper was an
American aberration.
More substantively, the desire that Tokyo become a competitive
financial center, and the deep-seated fear of being left behind by
western competitors, made the introduction of commercial paper in
major European markets an incentive for similar action in Japan.
These markets also proved useful models for those in Japan who
were considering what shape a Japanese market would take.
in Japan display
Writings on the introduction of commercial paper
1 48
keen awareness of the new European markets.
C. The Commercial PaperDebateResurfaces
The commercial paper issue resurfaced in early 1986 when
Keidanren149 established a Capital Markets Group to study introBanks are represented in
duction of commercial paper. 150
Keidanren, as they had been in MITI's Industrial Structure Council
during that group's 1982 discussion. But the banks did not actively
oppose introduction of commercial paper in Keidanren.15 1 Japan's
leading financial newspaper, Nihon Keizai Shinbun, explained that
148

See T. AMAYA, supra note 130, at 36-43; Y. KAWAMURA, CP=KoMASHARU PRPA

(CP=Commercial
Paper) 113-37 (1987).
49
' Keidanren is the Federation of Economic Organizations, roughly analogous to
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce but far more influential. It representsJapanese big
business on matters of public policy, among other activities.
150 See Y. KAWAMURA, supra note 148, at 160 (noting the establishment of the
Capital Markets Group).
151 See CP, Togin mo Denya Kiun, Nihon Keizai Shinbun, May 28, 1986, at 1
[hereinafter Nihon Keizai Shinbun, May 28, 1986].
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the Chairmen of Fuji and Sumitomo Banks had been appointed
Keidanren Vice-Chairmen and, in these positions of responsibility,
needed to act impartially and consider the requests of the group as
a whole, leaving banking concerns without an advocate. In the end,
no banking or securities representatives were included in the
Capital Markets Group, so that the group would focus on the needs
of issuers instead of the interests of the two industries. 152 Not
surprisingly, the result was that the Group recommended early
153
introduction of commercial paper.
By late March 1986 the Nihon Keizai Shinbun recognized that the
commercial paper question was becoming a hot policy topic. A
Nihon Keizai financial column came out repeatedly in favor of
introducing commercial paper, claiming that three changes since
1981 had made the Japanese financial system a more hospitable
environment for commercial paper. First, unsecured debt financing
in Japan had become far more widespread than in 1981, with
relaxation of MOF regulations on the issue of bonds without
collateral. Second, bond rating agencies along the lines of Moody's
Investor's Service and Standard & Poor's Corporation had been
introduced intojapan, promising to make unsecured corporate debt
a less risky, more marketable product. Third, the MOF had
continued along a path of gradual deregulation of interest rates,
replacing some regulated rates and credit rationing with a market
54
in which commercial paper could be a competitive product.
Securities industry representatives suggested that issuer
demands for a commercial paper market should be satisfied. 155
In May 1986, the Japan Securities Industry Association announced
its own commercial paper proposal. The main features were (1)
commercial paper would be introduced; (2) it would be treated as
a promissory note rather than a security; (3) underwriting and
trading would be limited to securities firms; (4) bank back-up lines
would be mandatory; and (5) banks would be used as payment
agents. 156
Independent observers criticized the proposal as
152 See id.
153 See id.

154 See Daiki-Shoki: CP no S6setsu ga Isoge, Nihon Keizai Shinbun, Mar. 29, 1986,
at 15; Daiki-Shoki: Ki ga Nessuru CP Dinyft Rong, Nihon Keizai Shinbun, July 10,
1985, at 17; Daiki-Shoki: KomesharuPjp, Nihon Keizai Shinbun, May 31, 1985, at 17.
155 See Yiizd o Fukumeta Rokvjyfzgojylron o Tenkai Shiy6, KinyfU ZaiseiJij6, Feb. 10,
1986, at 30-32 (Interview with Mr. Chino, Chairman, Japan Securities Industry
Association).
156 See CP Hakk6 Tegata Hshiki, Nihon Keizai Shinbun, May 16, 1986, at 1. The
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carving up the market, giving the securities firms the lion's share of
the business but requiring mandatory bank back-up lines and using
banks as payment agents. In that sense, it provided a nod in the
direction of banks, while ignoring the interests of issuers. 157 The
securities firms presented their proposal to the MOF and the MOF
Securities Bureau's standing advisory council, the Securities
Transactions Council. At nearly the same time, the Bond Underwriters Association (another securities industry group) announced
a survey of issuers showing widespread support in industrial circles
158
for introduction of commercial paper.
These actions by Keidanren and the securities industry signaled
widespread interest in commercial paper and support for its
eventual introduction. Nihon Keizai Shinbun hinted that if the banks
did not shift their stance on commercial paper, they would lose the
chance to influence the details of the commercial paper market and
maybe lose the chance to participate in the market, as the securities
industry proposal would exclude banks.' 5 9 These developments
necessitated some kind of bank response.
The major banks considered the issue again during the summer
at the July 1986 City Bank Roundtable (toshiginki konwakai). There
was no formal or announced change in bank opposition to commercial paper. Bankers continued to insist on the need for further
study of experience abroad with commercial paper. Likewise, they
cited recent failure of the newly established market in yen-based
bankers' acceptances as evidence that short-term financial markets
were not yet mature enough to support a commercial paper
1 60
market.
Nevertheless, bank opposition appeared to weaken. Some banks
changed their positions, recognizing that banks' traditional lending
to corporate customers had become less profitable as the biggest
corporations could gain access to capital markets directly. Within

the major banks, those departments interested in expanding their
proposal was a result of a series of meetings of vice presidents of the Big Four
securities firms, beginning in March 1986. See Kokunai CP Ronsd ni Kishi o Ila
"Shhkenshlan" no Hamon, Kinyii Zaisei Jij6, June 2, 1986, at 14.
157 See Kokunai CP Rons6 ni Koshi o Ira "Shkenshian"no Hamon, supra note 156.
158
See CP D6nyZ ni Kigyd wa Sekkyokutek4 Nihon Keizai Shinbun, May 10, 1986,
at 13.
159 See Nihon Keizai Shinbun, May 28, 1986, supra note 151, at 1.
160 See Daiki-Shoki: Kononareru CP Yfz4 An, Nihon Keizai Shinbun, Aug. 1, 1986,
at 17; Kokunai CP: ShichigatsuReikai made ni "Kangaekata"oSakusei,Kinyfi ZaiseiJij6,
July 7, 1986, at 32 [hereinafter KinyFi Zaisei Jij, July 7, 1986].
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securities activities began to look upon commercial paper as a
possible business opportunity. This was partially a result of the
record profits Japanese securities firms were making at the time,
and of the growth of the Tokyo securities markets. But Japanese
bankers also were acutely aware of the Bankers' Trust litigation in
the United States, 16 1 which was reported regularly in the Japanese
financial press, as well as of the intense lobbying in the United
States for abolition of Glass-Steagall. There were at least some
reports that the efforts of U.S. banks to enter the commercial paper
market led Japanese banks to see commercial paper as a new
62
business opportunity.'
Now the banks' first priority was not to foreclose a commercial
paper market entirely but to "stop the rogue securities industry
proposal." 163 Bank opposition did not formally end until after
the internal MOF compromise of February 1987 described below, 164 but, according to the financial press, there was a private
memorandum circulated among the major banks at the July 1986
City Bank Roundtable detailing reasons for a shift toward a neutral
position. 165 Finance Ministry and Bank of Japan (BOJ) officials
told us that bankers presented them with widely diverse views on
the question.
There was also significant official support for creation of a
commercial paper market; the BOJ began to champion this position
and it issued an official report to that effect in January 1987.166
The BOJ shift from neutrality toward active support was partially
motivated by new CP markets in Europe. BOJ officials expressed
the concern that if commercial paper was not introduced within the
domestic Japanese financial markets, financial transactions would
167
simply move overseas.

161 See, e.g., Bankezu no CP Gy~mu ni Goh6 Hanketsu, Kinyfi Zaisei Jij6, Jan. 19,
1987, at 72-73 (reporting the decision in Bankers Trust II, discussed supra note 77 and
accompanying text).
162 See CP wa Tegata Atsukai, Nichigin, Kokunai D5nyf e Kenkai, Nihon Keizai
Shinbun, Jan. 21, 1987, at 11 [hereinafter Nihon Keizai Shinbun, Jan. 21, 1987]
(claiming U.S. banks' stance to be the source of scatteredJapanese bank support for
commercial paper).
163 Kinyfi ZaiseiJij6, July 7, 1986, supra note 160, at 32.
164 See infra text following note 166.
165 See Kokunai CPShij6 "Kokkakuzu"no K6zaikaibo, Kinyfi ZaiseiJij6, May 4, 1987,
at 38.
166
See Kosugi & Dickinson, The Creation of a Domestic CommercialPaperMarket in
Japan,27 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 91, 109 (1988) (citing TANgi SHIJ6, THE SHORTTERM67FINANCIAL MARKET 288 (Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha ed. 1987)).
1 See Nihon Keizai Shinbun,Jan. 21, 1987, supra note 162, at 11. Officials at the

1990]

COMMERCIAL PAPER UNDERWRITING BY BANKS

417

D. The Ministry of Finance Decision
Against the background of this private sector and official
activity, the commercial paper question came under official scrutiny
for the second time in 1986. With powerful forces favoring the
creation of a commercial paper market and the bank opposition
weakening, MOF officials were now more amenable to the idea than
they had been in 1981. But they faced a practical problem in
developing a procedure for deciding the issue. Under ordinary
circumstances, administrative decision-making in Japan follows welldefined channels, with each ministry within the government and
each bureau within each ministry having clearly defined areas of
jurisdiction. It was respect for this clear division ofjurisdiction that
made MITI, the BOJ, and even the Diet reluctant to force the issue
in the early 1980s when the MOF decided not to take action. The
problem now lay within the Ministry. Two of its most important
bureaus are the Banking Bureau and the Securities Bureau, and the
commercial paper issue fell between them. Moreover, the fact that
it fell between them was not simply an accident of administrative
organization, to be resolved by a mixture of decisive action and
feather smoothing; rather, it was the very essence of the conflict.
To assign the task of creating a commercial paper market to the
Banking or Securities Bureau would have effectively decided the
question at issue: is commercial paper a banking function or a
security?
The internal structure of the Japanese bureaucracy served to
heighten the conflict. Japanese officials, who have the most
prestigious educational credentials in the nation, are appointed to
a ministry for their entire careers in government, and their
professional success depends upon their effectiveness in their
assigned positions. Although they are rotated from one bureau to
another every two or three years to avoid developing ingrained
attitudes, they devote their intelligence and energy, as well as sixty
to eighty hours of work per week, to their position at the time, and

BOJ suggested that their report, prepared in late 1986, had been leaked to the press.
As an influential institution and one responsible in part for regulating the banking
sector, BOJ's support for commercial paper could easily have had an impact on the
banks' position. Further, the BOJ report was the first official, governmental support

for commercial paper.
The major features of the BOJ proposal were that commercial paper be
considered a note rather than a security, that credit rating agencies rate the
commercial paper, and that back-up credit lines be required.
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often measure their success by their ability to take charge of
problems and develop new statutory or administrative solutions. In
addition, each bureau has. extensive contacts with members of the
industry it regulates and tends to serve as an advocate for its
interests, as well as a regulator of its activities. 168 Thus, a conflict
between two major bureaus within the Ministry was not something
that either insiders or outside interest groups would take lightly.
The MOF's solution, riot surprisingly, was to have the chiefs of
the two relevant Bureaus, Mr. Hirasawa of Banking and Mr.
Kitayama of Securities, meet together in late 1986 or early 1987 to
agree upon a decision-making procedure. The precise nature of this
procedure, and the exact chronology of events, are lost within the
misty confines of the MOF. Hirasawa and Kitayama did not sit in
the same room and discuss the details of the proposal; they were
too senior to do so and the potential for direct conflict would have
been too great. Rather, they assigned the task to their immediate
subordinates-for the Banking Bureau, Mr. Nakahira of the Banking
(i.e. big banks) Section and, for the Securities Bureau, Mr. Uchida
of the Capital Markets Section. Nakahira and Uchida, however,
were also too senior to meet together.
They assigned their
assistants to deal with the issue and it was apparently at this level
that the bureau-to-bureau contacts within the Ministry occurred.
These contacts proceeded duringJanuary and February of 1987
under the direction of Nakahira and Uchida, the two section chiefs.
Our information suggests that Uchida was probably the guiding
force. In hammering out a compromise, the officials consulted
extensively with their industry contacts, generally on an ex parte
basis. They were motivated by a desire to find a solution that was
acceptable to both industries, so that the final decision would rest
with the MOF, and neither side would appeal to the Diet for new
legislation, as the securities industry had apparently done in 1981.
In addition, they wanted to have an agreement on their records
before June 1987, when many of them would be rotated to new
positions. This was particularly important to the officials in the
Banking Section, who had not undertaken any major initiatives
during the previous years.
The negotiations proceeded quickly, and the MOF informally
indicated that it had decided on a proposal in February 1987.1r 9
168 See F. ROSENBLUTH, supra note 28, at 19-20 (discussing the prestige that
attaches to a position in the Japanese bureaucracy).
169 For accounts of the progress of the negotiations, see, e.g., CP Rfiru Sakusei
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This decision, as one might expect, represented a compromise
between banking and securities interests.
First, as had been suggested in both the securities industry and
Bank ofJapan proposals, commercial paper would be introduced as
a promissory note and not a security. This would enable the market
to go forward immediately, without involvement of the Diet to
create a new legal form. The promissory note approach allowed
both banks and securities firms to participate in the market, an
essential element to a successful compromise. It also allowed more
favorable tax treatment for commercial paper than for securities
under existing laws, as a graduated stamp tax would be levied
instead of a securities transaction tax. The alternative-treatment as
a type of corporate bond or debenture under Japanese law-was
unacceptable. Bank participation would have been foreclosed,
onerous disclosure requirements would have applied, and the
Corporations Law170 would have required board of directors
approval before each issuance of commercial paper.
Second, "direct paper" (commercial paper sold directly from
issuer to investor) would not be allowed. Only "dealer paper"
(commercial paper underwritten by a bank or securities firm) would
be accepted. This was described to us as allowing banks to maintain
an advantage over non-bank competitors at raising funds, considered an important point by the MOF until the terms of bank
competition with non-bank financial services companies are
resolved. In fact, since non-bank finance companies were not
permitted to issue commercial paper, this explanation seems
inadequate. Prohibiting direct paper obviously favors the banks and
securities firms, and may have been part of the effort to protect
banks and alleviate bank opposition. It also is in the interests of the
MOF, since the MOF has little regulatory authority over issuers, and
could not easily control a market where issuers dealt directly with
Ozume, Nihon Keizai Shinbun, Apr. 7, 1987, at 5 (reporting that there would be 180
eligible issuers, and that back-up lines would probably be required for most issuers);
CP Hakk6 kigy6 100-sha Zengo: Rfiru Katamaru, Nihon Keizai Shinbun, Mar. 19, 1987,
at 3 (reporting that only dealer paper would be permitted, predicting that only 100
corporations would meet the requirements for issuance, and noting that the MOF
planned to complete product design by June and open the market by the end of
1987).
170
See SH6H6, art. 296. For a discussion-of this provision ofJapanese corporate
law, see Yoshikawa & Harada, Kokunai CP Shij6 $setsu ni Tsuite, Kiny-i Zaisei JijS,
Nov. 23, 1987, at 34, 35.
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investors. Only issuers and investors, under-represented in the
MOF decision-making process, have reason to favor direct paper.
After the February agreement, the Banking and Securities
Bureaus began to work together on the other elements of the
commercial paper market. The major decisions were made over the
next few months with further ex parte contacts between the MOF
and the two leading industry groups. Other groups were not fully
aware of the progress of events until the February announcement,
and needed quickly to organize their position. The large trading
companies, which have turned out to be the most active issuers of
commercial paper, established a commercial paper working group,
and by the end of March, had submitted a very liberal proposal to
17 1
the MOF.
Another element in the MOF's decision-making process was the
meetings of the Commercial Paper Advisory Group. Virtually every
bureau of every Japanese Ministry has a standing advisory council
(shingikai)that meets to consider proposed changes in that bureau's
regulatory activities. The precise role of these advisory councils is
a matter of debate among people we interviewed; the advisory
councils may be important sources of new ideas, or provide
guidance and information for the officials who make the decisions,
or help these officials obtain assent to decisions the officials alone
have made, or serve a purely decorative function. Whatever their
role, the MOF's standing advisory councils were of limited value in
the commercial paper decision, since each related to a single
bureau. These relations significantly constrained their advisory
functions. The Securities Transactions Council of the Securities
Bureau had issued a report in 1986 that vaguely proposed further
study, but lacked a clear recommendation. 172 The Financial
System Research Council of the Banking Bureau had not issued any
report at all. Thus, when the joint Banking-Securities process was
initiated, the MOF decided to create the Commercial Paper
Advisory Group, an ad hoc council selected from those members of
the two advisory councils who lacked any direct stake in the banking
or securities
industries. The members and their positions were as
17 3
follows:
171See Kokunai CP An wa Riyusha no Shiten o Kaite Iru, Kinydi ZaiseiJijS, May 25,
1987, at 35 (interview with official of Mitsui & Co.); Shisha ga Kokunai CP Hakkd ni
Tsuite no Y6btshj o Teishutsu, Kinydi ZaiseiJij6, Apr. 20, 1987, at 9.
172 See Shokentorihiki Shingikai, Shasai Hakk6 Shiji no Arikata ni Tsuite (Dec. 12,
1986), repiinted in T. AMAYA, supra note 130, at 85-86.
173 See T. AMAYA, supra note 130, at 89.
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Akio Takeuchi
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Professor Emeritus, Tokyo University Law Faculty
(Chairperson)
Advisor, Kansai Electric Power Co., Ltd.
Chairperson, Hakuhodo (advertising agency)
Professor, Tokyo University Law Faculty
Executive Vice President, Nihon Keizai Shinbun, Inc.
President, International Management Consultants, Ltd.
Professor, Cakushuin University
Professor, Osaka University
Director General, General Affairs Bureau, Bank ofJapan

This ad hoc Advisory Group met only twice, once on April 23,
1987 and again on May 14.174 At the second meeting, it approved
the MOF proposal in its entirety. The limited number of meetings
and the absence of proposed amendments or lengthy debate gave
the ad hoc group the appearance of a rubber stamp. It is commonly
said that in Japan formal debate (such as presentation to an advisory
council) often follows most of the actual negotiation; this certainly
appears to have been the case with the Advisory Group. Its role was
apparently to add legitimacy to the MOF decision. Particularly in
light of trading company complaints that the proposal favored the
interests of banks and securities firms, it was important that a
neutral group lacking banking or securities representatives approve
the result. The appearance of neutrality was important for the MOF
to maintain its ability to negotiate enforceable compromises, and to
discourage the regulated industries from seeking help in the Diet or
some other forum.
This explanation of the Advisory Group's role may be a bit too
simple, however. The officials who negotiated the compromise
among themselves knew they would need to obtain the assent of the
industry groups. Moreover, the terms of the discussion in the
Advisory Group may have served as an intellectual framework for
the officials' analysis of the issue. There has been an ongoing
debate amongJapanese law professors about corporate finance, with
the theoretical school maintaining that the law should place all
corporate debt and equities in strict categories, and the pragmatic
school maintaining that the law should follow business practices. 175 Professor Akio Takeuchi, of the University of Tokyo Law
Faculty, was the leader of the pragmatic school, and many of the
MOF officials, being graduates of that school, had studied under
174 See 6kurash6, CP Kondankai de Shohin Genan o Teiji, KinyFi ZaiseijiJ5, May 4,
1987, at 31.
175 See Interview with Professor Takeuchi (June 28, 1988).
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him. Takeuchi was a member of the Advisory Group, and the
discussion in the Advisory Group focused on the merits of the
pragmatic 'approach.
These discussions, therefore, may have
reflected the discussions among MOF officials rather more than the
temporal order of the two would suggest.
Six days after the Commercial Paper Advisory Group approved
the MOF proposal, the standing advisory councils of the Banking
and Securities Bureaus also approved the proposal. The details of
issuing, transferring and redeeming commercial paper were worked
out between May and October, and uniform dealer contracts and
commercial paper certificates were developed. On November 2,
1987, the two Bureaus issued nearly identical notifications to their
respective industries, explaining the MOF's requirements for
issuing, underwriting, and trading commercial paper. 176 These
notifications provide the only basis for the commercial paper
market. They are not based on any explicit statutory directive, and
77
have no binding legal effect.
No one was wildly enthusiastic about the final result. Potential
issuers of commercial paper were disappointed by the MOF's
various restrictions, including a minimum one month maturity date
and a restriction on the number of issuers, as well as the prohibition
on direct paper already discussed. They saw these restrictions as
efforts to keep the commercial paper market from replacing too
much of the banks' short term lending business, just as they saw the
prohibition on direct paper as an effort to include banks in
whatever commercial paper market did develop. They also objected
to the Ministry's graduated stamp tax, amounting to 0.24% of the
face value for a one billion yen issue with a one month maturity
rolled over for one year. 178 They noted that this tax put commercial paper at a disadvantage vis-i-vis bank lending, to which no such
tax applies. No stamp tax, minimum maturity, issuer restriction, or
176 See Ministry of Finance, Banking Bureau, Notification No. 2825, Nov. 2, 1987,
trans. in Kosugi & Dickinson, supra note 166, at 133-34; Ministry of Finance,
Securities Bureau, Notification No. 1830, Nov. 2, 1987, reprinted in Kinyf2 Zaiseifijd,
Nov. 9, 1987, at 72-73 and Kinyii H6muJij6, Nov. 25, 1987, at 37-38 (also reprinting
various other documents of interest to market participants).
177 The MOF has ample discretionary powers over the banking and securities
industries to enforce such compromises. It does not, however, have such powers over
non-financial corporations. As Kosugi and Dickinson remark, this lack of MOF
control over issuers is one reason that direct paper is prohibited. See Kosugi &
Dickinson, supra note 166, at 115.
178 See id. at 113.
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back-up line requirements exist in the U.S. commercial paper
market.
Securities firms also expressed dissatisfaction with the MOF
proposal. They felt that bank participation had been accepted for
purely political reasons, without any discussion of the policies
behind article 65, or the potential for conflicts if the same bank
underwrites commercial paper, provides the back-up line, and ends
up holding unsalable paper. 179 Securities firms also worried that
the bank monopoly on back-up lines and payment agency business
would allow banks to gain advantage in the marketplace.
Meanwhile, the banks had lost out in their effort to prevent a
commercial paper market from being established. Their proposal
that the market be limited to fewer than one hundred corporations
had also been rejected, and instead nearly twice that number would
be eligible to participate from the beginning. Banks felt that shortterm finance was properly their monopoly, and saw commercial
paper as an invasion of their turf by the securities industry.
MOF officials considered this result-some dissatisfaction on all
sides, but with all parties willing to acquiesce in the proposal-the
best that could realistically be expected. In fact, all parties we met
with saw this dissatisfaction as evidence that a fair compromise had
been reached.
One additional detail of the MOF proposal also helped to
alleviate the mild dissatisfaction all parties felt. The proposal stated
that the structure of the commercial paper market would be
reviewed after one year of operation. Those who felt the market
was too restrictive realized that, as in other newly liberalized areas
ofJapanese finance, the review would probably result in a relaxation
of requirements. On the other hand, the banks knew that if
commercial paper caused serious trouble for short-term bank
lending or bank profitability, they would have an opportunity to
present their case to the MOF.
E. The Commercial PaperMarket In Practice
The Japanese domestic commercial paper market opened on
November 20, 1987, exactly six months after approval of the MOF's
proposal by the two standing advisory councils.1 80 On its first day
179

See Gink3 ni Yoru Kokunai CPnoJikohoyf,ni Mondai wa Nai ha, Kinyli ZaiseiJU6,

July 27, 1987, at 17.
80 See Yoshikawa & Harada, supra note 170, at 35.
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of operation 800 billion yen ($6 billion) of commercial paper was
issued.18 1 The market grew at a steady pace with the amount of
commercial paper outstanding reaching 4 trillion yen ($30 billion)
by the end of April 1988. By the end of August 1988, it had
reached 5.641 trillion yen ($42 billion), surpassing the bill discount
market in size,1 8 2 and following the one-year review's relaxation
of requirements, it grew to over 10 trillion yen ($75 billion). 8 3
Banks and securities firms were initially willing to underwrite
commercial paper at unsustainably low rates, well below the margins
required for profitable dealing. Although rates increased gradually
throughout 1988, approaching the rate for CDs, commercial paper
distribution remained unprofitable. Underwriters purchased and
distributed commercial paper only as a way to ensure a share of the
issuer's other business, deeming commercial paper "charity paper"
or "connection paper. " 1 84 Participants reported to us that issuers
engaged extensively in arbitrage: they would issue commercial
paper and then place the funds obtained from the issues into higher
yield bank time deposit accounts or Cds. Such arbitrage was
estimated to account for the lion's share of commercial paper, up
to eighty or ninety percent, at least until the interest rates paid by
commercial paper issuers began to increase in the summer of
1988.185- The largest purchasers of commercial paper were investment trusts, followed by the smaller regional and mutual banks,
which found that commercial paper gave a higher yield on their
186
funds than the call market.

181 See id.
182 See RitoJ6shj de Kugatsumatsu wa Genshd, Nikkei Kinyfil Shinbun (The Nikkei

Financial Daily), Sept. 19, 1988, at 1.
183
See CP-ope Raishfi ni moJisshi, Nihon Keizai Shinbun, May 16, 1989, at 1.
18 4 SeeJapanCommercial-PaperMarket Grows Although Criticsof System Abound, Wall
St.J., Oct. 31, 1988, at C23, col 1.
185 This was revealed through conversations with securities and banking industry
participants inJune 1988. The arbitrage was widely reported in the financial press.
See, e.g., Nikkei Kinyfi Shinbun, May 3, 1988, at 1 (noting that issuers were taking
advantage of "blood letting" rates and placed proceeds of issuance in large-scale time
deposit accounts); see Nikkei Kinyfi Shinbun, June 29, 1988 (reporting that the gap
narrowed between commercial paper rates and the effective interest rate on bank
borrowings, and predicting an end to arbitrage issuance). Although margins have
narrowed, arbitrage issuance continued to dominate the market into 1990. The
amount of funds in large-scale time deposits at any time is closely correlated with the
amount
of commercial paper outstanding, evidencing this widespread arbitrage.
18
6See Kokunai CPShija ni Kekkan, Daga Ni-Ch En i, Nihon Kinyii Shinbun, Feb.
19, 1988.
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The market in commercial paper sold under repurchase agreements (gensaki commercial paper) grew even faster than the
underlying commercial paper market, and proved a welcome
supplement to the existing gensaki market in government bonds.
For the month of August 1988, total gensaki commercial paper
1 7
transactions totalled over 50 trillion yen ($375 billion).
During the first few months of operation, banks and securities
firms underwrote commercial paper in relatively equal shares. As
time progressed, however, the banks' share of commercial paper
underwriting business increased to around seventy percent, leaving
securities firms the remaining thirty percent.18 8 In September
1988, the Bank ofJapan announced that it would begin open market
operations in commercial paper to increase its control over short18 9
term financial markets and interest rates.
The commercial paper market appeared to be a success with its
growth exceeding most expectations.
MOF officials expressed
general satisfaction with the development of the market and no
awareness of any great problems. The banks were pleased that
commercial paper had not cut into their basic businesses as much
as might have been feared, and that they had won a large share of
the commercial paper market. The securities firms, however, were
less happy with the development of the market. They claimed that
the banks' large market share was based not on the merits of
competition, but on regulatory advantages. Market observers and
participants expressed concern with the widespread existence of
arbitrage and the apparent failure of corporations to use the market
to meet their actual needs for short-term funds. The heavy stamp
tax, along with the small number of eligible issuers, limited the
commercial paper market's potential. 190 Further, the market was
closed to finance companies and securities firms, the non-bank
commercial paper issuers who dominate the market in the United
19 1
States.
87

1

See CPRyfztsfi Shijd ga Kyfikakuda, Nihon Keizai Shinbun, Sept. 17, 1988, at 7.

This statistic was provided by MOF officials, and confirmed by market
participants.
189 See JapaneseMoney Markets: Coming Home, ECONOMIST, Nov. 19, 1988, at 93
[hereinafter Japanese Money Markets]; Opun Shijd Arata na Chdsetsu Shudan, Nihon
Keizai Shinbun, Sept. 15, 1988, at 11.
190 See Wall St.J., Oct. 31, 1988, at C23, col. 1.
191 For a general discussion, see Guidelinesfor Domestic CP and Its Revision,
188

ZENGINKyo FIN. REV. No. 4 (1989).
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As promised in the MOF commercial paper proposal, the market
was reviewed in November 1988, after one year of operation, and,
as before, the decision-making process was confined to the MOF,
and involved extensive discussions with industry representatives.
The securities firms and trading companies took similar aggressive
positions in favor of market liberalization. The securities firms
proposed that the requirements for qualification as an issuer be
relaxed, with the implementation of a rating system for commercial
paper, and any commercial paper issue allowed that received one of
the two highest ratings. Issues would not be limited to corporations
listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, but would be permitted for
other corporations which provide continuing disclosure.
A
subsidiary corporation not meeting the requirements for issue
would be allowed to issue based upon a guarantee by its parent

corporation or a financial institution. Most importantly, securities
firms and finance companies would be allowed to issue commercial
paper.19 2 The trading companies' proposal, presented through a
193
trade association, differed. little.
Under both proposals, the stamp tax would be fixed at 200 yen
per certificate, as with yen-based bankers' acceptances, the minimum maturity of one month would be dropped, and the maximum
maturity would be expanded from six months to one year. Back-up
lines would be optional for all commercial paper issues receiving the

highest rating. The minimum denomination would decrease along
with that of the CD, recently relaxed from 100 million to 30 million

yen.
The banks opposed nearly all the suggested changes. They took
a passive or neutral position on implementing a rating system. They
found no need to increase the number of eligible issuers, as this
would reduce bank lending; and they found no need to expand the

scope of permitted maturities, as the greatest issuer demand
94

appeared to be for three month paper.1
The banks' strongest opposition was focused on proposed
changes in the basic structure of the market. If securities firms and
non-bank finance companies were allowed to issue commercial
192 This was revealed through discussions with Nomura Securities personnel,June
1988, and review of their preliminary draft of proposal for the one-year review. See

(Shokenkai Kara no) CP no Minaoshi ni Tsuite no Ydbihjiko (An), May 1988 (Securities
Industry Draft Proposal for One-Year Review of the CP Market).
193 See Nonbanku CP ni Hantai,Nikkei Kinya Shinbun, Sep. 29, 1988, at 1.
194 See id.
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paper, that commercial paper would resemble and compete with the
banks' negotiable CDs. The banks argued that issues based on the
guarantee of a parent company should be prevented in order to
maintain confidence in a stable, orderly financial system. Issue of
direct as well as dealer paper would be "premature," from the
195
standpoint of market confidence and investor protection.
The result of the one-year review was announced in November
1988. The MOF sided largely with the banks on the most fundamental issues, and reserved for further study proposals for any
changes in the basic structure of the market. On proposals for
expanding the scale of the market, the MOF compromised. A rating
system was introduced, and standards for issuance were relaxed so
that approximately 450 corporations would qualify. The number of
issuers without mandatory back-up lines was likewise increased, and
the MOF stated plans to limit back-up lines to some portion of
issued commercial paper. The minimum maturity was shortened
from one month to two weeks, and the maximum was lengthened
from six to nine months. Otherwise, the market was to continue in
operation as before. 196 These changes accompanied the Bank of
Japan's liberalization of the short-term interbank money markets,
including BOJ trading in commercial paper. 197 The BOJ began
trading commercial paper, shortened maturities in the bill discount
market from one month, and announced plans to trade one-week
and three-week bills for its own open market operations. The
longest maturity of the call market was expanded from three weeks
198
to six months. ,
The gradual approach that MOF adopted toward regulatory
change held three advantages from the Ministry's perspective. First,
it eased the impact of the changes on the affected institutions,
thereby allowing them to adjust. This was a benefit in itself and also
made it easier to pursue regulatory change in the future. The result
195 See id.
196 See Yen Commercial-PaperMarket: Chinked Armour, ECONOMIST, Dec. 10, 1988,
at 91-92. A second review of the CP market was completed on February 15, 1990.
The number of eligible issuers again increased, to 530 firms. More importantly,

beginning in October of 1990, no bank back-up line will be required if acceptable to
a rating agency. Also, a tax law revision effective April 1, 1990, drastically reduced
the stamp tax burden on CP. The tax on a 100 million yen CP certificate decreased
from Y40,000 to Y5,000. See CP Shij6 no Genji Rf2ru Minaoshi ni Tsuite, K6shasai
GeppS, Feb. 4, 1990, at 15-27; Kokunai CPSaiminaoshino Inpakuto, KinyTi ZaiseiJij6,

Feb. 2, 1990, at 16-23.

197 SeeJapanese Money Markets, supra note 189, at 93.
198 See id.
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of this lessening was that the ferocity of opposition from the
beneficiaries of regulation was reduced. As a general matter, the
institutions that rely on protected market niches may grudgingly
accept gradual change although they would fight desperately to
avoid the overnight destruction of their niche.
Second, the gradual approach also gave the MOF time to assess
the impact of a regulatory change on the financial system. This in
turn permitted the MOF to achieve its prime regulatory goal of
maintaining the stability of the financial system.
A gradual
approach by regulators eases worries of financial chaos and collapse
when major changes, such as the deregulation of interest rates,
introduction of unsecured corporate bonds, or establishment of a
commercial paper market, take place.
Finally, the gradual approach resulted in a steady stream of
MOF decisions, and thus made regulatory policy-making an ongoing
process. This added to the MOF's power over the regulated
industries and made resort to the Diet as protection from the MOF
less practical. Even if an interest group could persuade the Diet to
make a satisfactory initial decision, the MOF could later change the
details. For the regulated industries, maintenance of a good
relationship with the MOF remained the preferred approach. 199
IV. ANALYSIS
Having described the events in Japan and the United States, we
turn now to a comparison of the two case histories and, in particular, to the process of administrative decision-making in these two
large, highly industrialized nations. The comparison is facilitated by
the similarity between the two nations, not only in the statutory
scheme, but also in the underlying market forces.
In both nations, commercial paper represented a threat to the
core bank business of providing short term credit to large business
enterprises. To be sure, in Japan the commercial banks so dominated the short-term credit business that there was no commercial
paper market at all prior to 1987,200 whereas in the United States
199 The gradual approach contrasts with London's "Big Bang" of October 1986,
when, following a major legislative revision, British regulatory authorities deregulated
and reorganized the London securities markets in one massive event. See, e.g.,
Marshall, The Big Bang Rocks Lqndon, L.A. Times, Oct. 27, 1986, §4, at 1, col. 2
(noting, "collectively, the changes [associated with the Big Bang] are the most
sweeping ever undertaken by any major financial center").
200 See supra text accompanying notes 126-30.
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a commercial paper market had always existed, although its dimensions were relatively modest until fairly recently. 20 1 This meant
that in Japan banks were in the position of guarding a rent as to
which they had a near-monopoly, whereas in the United States
banks were attempting to recover a rent which had been partially
appropriated by the securities industry. Thus, in Japan, banks were
in the conservative posture of resisting change, while in the United
States they assumed the role of agitators, for reform. These
different roles, however, should not obscure the underlying reality
that in both countries banks were resisting inroads into their core
businesses of providing short-term business credit.
In both countries the fight over commercial paper was merely
one part-although a central part-of a broader set of dynamic
developments in politics and financial markets.
Advances in
information and communications technology meant that sophisticated institutional investors could evaluate the creditworthiness of
major industrial corporations without the need to rely on the
expertise of a commercial bank or other financial intermediary.
These technological and market developments greatly increased the
degree to which commercial paper could displace commercial.bank
loans as a source of short term credit to industry. More generally,
as the efficiency of direct investments increased, banks became
interested in entering the securities business in a variety of ways, of
which commercial paper was only the most important initial
20 2
product.
In both countries the commercial paper decision was influenced
by the globalization of financial markets. In the case of Japan, the
decision to establish a commercial paper market was partly a
response to pressure from the United States and other western
governments. These governments believed that the lack of short
term credit markets in Japan impeded the growth of the yen as a
truly international currency. The Japanese were also acutely aware
of developments in the American and European commercial paper
markets. 203 Events in the United States were not influenced by
these sorts of international considerations; nevertheless, the
argument for American bank entry into the securities business was
greatly strengthened by the fact that the largest American banks
were already underwriting securities in overseas markets to which
201 See supra notes 13-24 and accompanying text.
202 See supra notes 10 & 14-27 and accompanying

text.

203 See supra notes 143-48 & 161 and accompanying text.
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the provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act do not extend. It was also
significant that American banks were competing in a global
marketplace which included powerful European banks with broad
securities underwriting powers. Thus, although the globalization of
world financial markets affected the United States and Japan
differently, the general fact remains that events in both c6untries
were deeply influenced by developments in world financial markets.
Given these similarities of underlying market forces and
economic consequences, we can trace the similarities and differences in the American and Japanese decision-making process. At the
outset, any hypothesis about a higher level of consensus inJapanese
society must be rejected. In both countries, consideration of the
issue was accompanied by intense interest group lobbying, with the
big banks squaring off against the big securities firms. Although the
conflict was more public in the United States, it was no less intense
in Japan, notwithstanding the fact that is was played out in a private
rather than public arena. Measuring the strength of interest group
pressures is difficult, but the ferocity of the conflict in Japan was
remarkable and may actually have exceeded the intensity of the
American struggle.
A. The Preclearance-Postclearance
Distinction
While the level of conflict was equally great, the means by which
the conflict was expressed and resolved in America and Japan were
distinctly different. We believe that the most important underlying
difference between the two histories can be captured in the
distinction between what we call "preclearance" and "postclearance"
methods of conflict resolution. The event of "clearance" may be
identified as a generally-announced decision by the decision-maker
who is officially assigned to resolve the issue. Within a corporation,
this decision-maker might be the officer assigned to a particular
area of operations, and the general announcement might be a
business report to the CEO. In the government, the decision-maker
will often be the administrative agency that has primary jurisdiction
of the area, and the announcement will be the first official decision.
As is apparent, clearance is a relative concept. If one identifies
the firm in its entirety as -thedecision-maker, rather than one of its
officers, and its first statement to the public or to the government
as the announcement, rather than a report to that officer, the
amount of conflict resolved at the preclearance and postclearance
stages will be different. Similarly, one might regard subdivisions of
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the responsible administrative agency as the decision-makers, and
statements to the agency head as the announcement; this again
would affect the distribution of events between the stages. The
reason is that clearance, as we use the term, is not a real-world
event. It is not a concept consciously available to the actors.
Rather, it is an interpretation, a means of understanding patterns
of decision-making and comparing them to one another. Its value,
therefore, is not derived from the precision with which it can be
located, but rather from its usefulness for understanding the
process in question.
One useful hypothesis that might be derived from the concept
of clearance, when it is applied to a given institution, is that the
level of preclearance conflict resolution increases as the event of
clearance is set higher in the institution's hierarchy. For example,
in a corporation, more conflicts will be resolved before a statement
is made to the public by the corporation's CEO than are resolved
before a statement is made to the CEO by the chiefs of corporate
sub-units. If empirical data indicate that this hypothesis is valid, it
would suggest that the concept of clearance is a useful one for
understanding institutional decision-making.
We believe that the concept of clearance is useful for making
cross-cultural comparisons between analogous decisions. Specifically, it is our hypothesis that when the event of clearance is set at
equivalent levels of government, Japanese government officials
resolve more conflicts at the preclearance stage than American
officials. The question of equivalence is a complex one, of course,
often beset by all the difficulties of cross-cultural comparison. In
our case study, however, the answer to this question is facilitated by
the similarity of the issue in both nations, and the consequent ease
in identifying equivalent government decision-makers.
The U.S. government decision-maker that was initially assigned
to resolve the commercial paper issue was the Federal Reserve
Board. The Board's jurisdiction derives from direct statutory
authorization. In Japan, the decision-maker was the Ministry of
Finance, which possesses comprehensive jurisdiction over all
activities by financial institutions. Clearance occurred when each
agency announced its interpretation of the governing statute
regarding the ability of commercial banks to deal in commercial
paper.
Interestingly, the decisions that constituted clearance in each
case were essentially equivalent. In 1980, the Fed declared that
commercial paper was not a security for purposes of the Glass-
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Steagall Act and that banks could therefore buy and sell it for their
own account. Because of the potential hazards, however, the Board
imposed a number of restrictions aimed at insuring that the paper
was high quality, and that it was sold to sophisticated investors, not
to the general public. 20 4 The MOF's decision, announced in May
1987, and officially promulgated in November of that year, was also
that commercial paper was not a security, and that banks could
therefore participate in the newly-created market. The MOF also
imposed restrictions, the principal ones being limited issuer
eligibility and mandatory bank back-up lines to ensure the quality
20 5
of commercial paper issues.
In both cases, therefore, the agency adopted a similar approach,
ostensibly as its best interpretation of the statute, but also as a way
of going forward with deregulation, while avoiding statutory
20 6
language that could only be changed by legislative action.
Moreover, restrictions were imposed in both cases that were
ostensibly designed to decrease risk, but also intended to satisfy
conflicting interest groups, while retaining the agency's control over
20 7
the market.
There was, however, a dramatic difference between the two
decisions, despite their substantive similarity. The Federal Reserve
decision was simply the first stage in an extended decision-making
process that involved two levels ofjudicial authorities, a subsequent
decision by the Fed, and a variety of subsidiary actors and events.
The MOF's decision, however, was final; once it was announced, all
the Japanese participants agreed that there was nothing further to
be done at the time. There was a one-year review, but this was
planned by the MOF, and followed the Ministry's format.
This account describes the external appearance of events and
also reflects the views of those who participated. The Federal
Reserve made the decision that constituted clearance on the basis
of a complaint filed by a trade association representing the
opposing side. As soon as it undertook the decision-making
process, it knew that it would be sued by the loser; as soon as it
issued the decision, it knew the plaintiff would be the SIA, and that
its decision favoring Bankers Trust would be reviewed in federal
court. It also knew that the loser of the federal court battle would
See
See
206 See
207 See
204

205

supra note 48 and accompanying text.
supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
supra notes 45-46 & 168-71 and accompanying text.
supra notes 48 & 168-71 and accompanying text.
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appeal to Congress. Undoubtedly, the Fed hoped it would prevail
in both these forums, but it knew that it had not finally resolved the
conflict at the preclearance level, and that there would be a great
deal of decision-making activity following its action.
The MOF, in contrast, worked hard to resolve the conflict
before it issued the decision that constituted clearance. It vigorously utilized an extensive network of contacts, at both the formal and
informal level, with both sides in the dispute, and used both existing
and specially created study groups to persuade the opposing groups
to accept the solution it devised. Once the MOF acted, it expected
its decision to be final. Those with whom we spoke agreed that it
would be virtually inconceivable for any of the industry groups to
bring legal action against the MOF. An appeal to the Diet might
have been conceivable, but, for reasons discussed above, it would be
20 8
unlikely to succeed and might well backfire.
The fact that the conflict between opposing forces was principally resolved at the preclearance level in Japan does not mean that
Japanese authorities were necessarily more effective in resolving the
entire conflict than authorities in the United States. The American
process reveals a range of postclearance conflict resolution
mechanisms that were not present in Japan, most notably litigation
and judicial decisions. It is a mistake to see the resort to litigation
as a breakdown in the decision-making process; rather, it was an
integral part of that process. The various participants, both private
and governmental, were able to argue their positions in the courts
and the judges added their views in developing the ultimate
resolution.
If litigation was not a breakdown in the American decisionmaking process, neither was it the endpoint of that process. The
final resolution (here, as inJapan, subject to reconsideration in light
of subsequent events) was announced by the Federal Reserve, and
approved by the courts. In other words, litigation may be viewed as
one step in the decision-making process, one that is not qualitatively
different from other steps, but is rather a natural part of a postclearance conflict resolution. The courts themselves perceived their
decisions in this light. When the Supreme Court reversed the
Federal Reserve Board's first decision, and declared commercial
paper to be a security,209 it added the broad hint that it was not
208 See supra notes 133-37 & 199 and accompanying text.
209 See Bankers Trust I, 468 U.S. 137, 140 (1984).
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deciding that Bankers Trust's commercial paper operations
constituted underwriting.2 1 0 It thereby invited the Board to issue
a new decision on this point, a decision which could-and did-produce an opposite result from its own. 211 Similarly, when the
Second Circuit approved this later Board decision, it recognized
that this decision could be altered or reversed by congressional
21 2
action.
While litigation and legislation should thus be regarded as
conflict resolution mechanisms, like the various study groups and
planning efforts that the Japanese employed, their use points to
some basic differences between the preclearance and postclearance
approaches. Postclearance decision-making is segmented into a
series of distinct stages, with formal boundaries between them and
a decision of some sort being announced at each stage. Preclearance decision-making, in contrast, is agglutinated into a continuous
process of compromise and reconsideration, without boundaries or
tentative decisions.
These relationships follow naturally from the character of
clearance as the distinguishing event. Once clearance has occurred,
and the initially responsible decision-maker has issued its announcement, the focus of decision-making must move to some other
entity, generally one withjuridical power to reverse the original one.
If the process is to be coherent, that power cannot be invoked until
the initial decision is announced; that is the reason that American
appellate courts will generally deny jurisdiction until a "final"
agency decision is made. 2 13 In contrast, if the conflict resolution
process occurs at the preclearance stage, the interactions between
participants must remain fluid and informal.
Otherwise, the
decision-maker's position will become apparent, and it will be
unable to organize a compromise that is acceptable to the participants.
210 See id. at 160 n.12.
211 See Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d 1052, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (describing the

Federal Reserve Board's unpublished opinion), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987).
212 See Bankers Trust III, 839 F.2d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059
(1988).
213

See, e.g., Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-51 (1967)

(discussing interpretation of "finality" for purposes ofjurisdictional question); see also
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988) (providing that"[a] preliminary,
procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject
to review of the final agency action").
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In essence, preclearance decision mechanisms are inherently
fluid and informal, while postclearance mechanisms are inherently
formal and segmented. Thus, to the extent that a particular society
opts for preclearance mechanisms, it will tend to adopt informal
strategies as well. Similarly, if a society opts for postclearance
decision procedures it is also likely to choose formal strategies.
Conversely, as a society adopts formal or informal strategies, it will
tend to adopt postclearance or preclearance mechanisms. It is the
linkage that is being asserted, not the direction of causality. In fact,
the relationship that forges this linkage is almost certainly a cocausal one.
Litigation, the source of Derek Bok's recriminations against
American society, 214 is clearly a central and intrinsic element in
a postclearance strategy of conflict resolution. However, to ascribe
the choice between preclearance and postclearance strategies to a
preference for litigation is too simple. That choice relates, rather,
to the ideals and the conceptual patterns of the relevant actors. For
Japanese decision-makers, the ideal seems to be rational planning
and consensus building. Open conflict is anathema to them; they
would regard a public challenge to their announced decision as
either an insult or a disgrace. Preclearance conflict resolution
satisfies this ideal, because it seems to follow an orderly, administrative planning process which suppresses open conflict.
In
contrast, the ideals of American decision-makers are openness,
fairness, and adherence to principle. They choose to make their
decision and then defend it in a public arena. To be challenged or
sued by a trade association like the SIA is a sign of independence,
not disgrace. The informal preclearance decision-making that the
Japanese employ would smack of backroom deals and supine
corruption in the American context.
This does not mean that Americans are willing to relinquish any
claim to consensus and rational planning, or the Japanese are
willing to concede that they are unfair or corrupt. But choices
between decision-making models must be made, and each choice
naturally shades toward a particular ideal. The need to make a
choice which actuates one ideal, when combined with the desire to
retain the other, causes each model to incorporate some elements
of the other, sometimes consistently, sometimes not. For example,
while the Japanese process did occur largely within the confines of

214

See Bok, supra note 8, at 575-76.
1
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the MOF, its deliberations were hardly a closely guarded secret. To
the contrary, all parties to the dispute were well-informed throughout the MOF's deliberations, and the essential facts were widely
reported in leading financial journals. 215 The widespread sharing
of information among participants in a preclearance decision
process is, indeed, essential to the effective function of that process
with respect to decisions of any complexity, which will ordinarily be
made through a series of subsidiary decisions. The process of
vetting and consultation would not work effectively unless all parties
knew which matters have been decided already, which have been
excluded as not currently at issue, and which matters are presently
under active consideration. The point is not so much that the
dispute in Japan was resolved through a process that was secret as
that the mechanism for resolving the dispute was private-it involved
informal proceedings and extensive vetting of positions in advance
and in place of public confrontation.
Nor was the American experience wholly a confrontational,
public, litigation-driven phenomenon. There was a close working
relationship between the Federal Reserve Board and Bankers Trust
throughout the process; although the Board undoubtedly refrained
from inappropriate ex parte contacts with Bankers Trust while cases
were pending before it, there was nothing to stop private consultations between the bank and the agency prior to the initiation of
contested proceedings. 216 The same cannot be said, however, for
the big U.S. securities firms, which did not have the same sort of
privileged access to the Board and which adopted an essentially
confrontational and hostile position towards the Board throughout
the proceedings. These firms would have enjoyed better access to
the Securities and Exchange Commission, but that agency had little
power to influence the outcome of the Board's deliberations-unlike
the Securities Bureau of the MOF, which was able to influence the
outcome in Japan by virtue of being a division of the agency
217
charged with making the decision.
Thus informal contacts were important in the United States,
and, conversely, the Japanese controversy was not wholly devoid of
the type of public, confrontational, formalized process which we
have associated with a postclearance approach to dispute resolution.
These convergences between models are natural ways of satisfying
See supra notes 155-69 and accompanying text.
216 See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
217 See supra text accompanying notes 167-70.
215
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conflicting ideals, but they do not alter the predominant preclearance and postclearance character of the two models as a means
of explaining the different characteristics of the dispute-resolution
process we observed in the two settings.
B. ComparingPreclearanceand PostclearanceApproaches
Having characterized the decision-making process in Japan and
the United States, the question that presents itself is how those two
processes should be assessed. This is a question of both practical
and theoretical significance.
From the practical perspective,
policymakers in both nations undoubtedly want to improve their
government decision-making mechanisms. In addition, the two
nations compete for worldwide markets, and the quality of their
decision-making will affect their relative success in this arena. From
the theoretical perspective, the quality of government decisionmaking in both countries should tell us a great deal about the
effectiveness of their social organizations, and about institutional
behavior in general. Since controlled experiments in governance
strategies are generally impossible, an investigation of the different
approaches adopted by two nations that possess a roughly equal
material culture, and confront similar economic problems, represents the closest possible approach to such an experimental
situation.
Assessments of this sort are, however, extremely complex.
While superficial conclusions such as Derek Bok's broadside against
litigation in America may attract attention and contribute to our
current orgy of social self-flagellation, they provide no criteria for
a real assessment. 218 If we try to take a more focused approach,
however, we are confronted with the difficulty that the criteria to be
applied are themselves the product of decision-making styles. Thus,
in Japan, excellence in government decision-making is measured by
the institution's ability to achieve consensus and develop a rational
plan. In the United States, an excellent process is regarded as one
that is fair, open, and principled. The criteria for excellence, not
surprisingly, correspond closely with the ideals which guide the
decision-makers and structure their institutions. In order to make
a relative assessment of the two approaches, we need transcendent
criteria, that is, criteria that exist apart from the ideals of particular
218

See supra note 8.
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societies. For all practical purposes, however, there are no such
criteria.
Lacking any ready means for making a global assessment, the
best that can be done is to look at specific qualities, or virtues, of a
governmental decision-making process. While we cannot determine
the relative importance of each virtue, we can at least trace the
extent to which each one is fulfilled. The virtues that we will
discuss are the coherence of the process, its responsiveness to
circumstances, its efficiency, its political accountability, and its
fairness.
The coherence of the decision-making process might initially
seem greater in Japan, particularly since it resembles the ideal of
rational planning to which Japanese decision-makers aspire.
Surprisingly, however, events in the two countries reveal substantially similar results in this area. The Japanese process was orderly
and rational; at each step all participants were in general agreement
about what had already been decided and was no longer open to
question, what was currently on the agenda for decision in the short
term, and what had been deferred for later action. TheJapanese we
interviewed showed exquisite sensitivity to these matters and
displayed remarkable unanimity as to the current status of particular
questions.
Surprisingly, however, the American process also turned out to
evidence a fairly orderly and well-understood decision process. The
Federal Reserve Board controlled the agenda of cases that came
before it in order to move the process forward in a gradual fashiondeciding first the issue of bank commercial paper and a few other
low-risk debt instruments, then corporate bonds, and finally
corporate equities. In the same fashion as the MOF, the Board
proceeded with great deliberation to allow the market to develop
only under tight prudential limitations, which the Board, like the
MOF, indicated could be loosened over time if the initial experiment with bank commercial paper activities proved successful. The
Board was thus able to achieve a policy objective through a welldefined process of gradual deregulation.
It may seem as if postclearance events, particularly the litigation
and the court decisions, disrupted the Fed's decision-making
process to an extent that did not occur in Japan. But the Fed
managed to move forward despite the Supreme Court's reversal of
its initial decision that commercial paper was not a security. One
might conclude that the Fed was able to recoup its position by using
a different set of interpretive arguments. A stronger thesis, which
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might well be justified, is that the Fed managed to incorporate the
Supreme Court decision into its own decision-making process. It
experimented with the solution of excluding commercial paper from
the category of securities. Having been informed by the Supreme
Court that this solution would not work-much as the MOF might
have been informed by the law professors in its study group-it then
pursued another approach. The Supreme Court certainly contemplated such a course of events, and its invalidation of the Fed's first
resolution does not seem to have diverted the agency from its basic
plan.
Conversely, the Japanese process, despite its well-planned
appearance, reveals a heavy imprint of interest-group involvement.
Powerful private organizations such as Keidanren (the Federation of
Economic Organizations), the Securities Industry Association, and
the City Bank Roundtable were in regular contact with MOF
decision-makers. While these decision-makers undoubtedly thought
that they were acting for the nation's benefit, they also knew that
they had to satisfy these groups, and their decision-making process
revealed several significant changes in direction as a result. For
example, the entire planning process seems to have been initiated
in response to pressure from Keidanren and the Securities Industry
Association. Furthermore, the decision to allow only dealer paper
backed by banks was clearly an effort to de-fuse bank opposition.
While the process appears more orderly because these pressures and
counterpressures were played out at the preclearance stage, the
difference between the Japanese process and the American process
may be precisely one of appearance. It may, in fact, reflectJapan's
greater devotion to an ideal of rationality, rather than any significant difference in the level of rationality itself.
Apart from the orderliness and rationality of the decisionmaking process, another virtue of that process is its responsiveness
to outside circumstances.
Here, the American version' seems
superior. Because it was segmented, with a relatively smaller
proportion of the total process occurring at the preclearance stage,
it was easier to initiate. One firm, Bankers Trust, was able to attract
the regulator's attention by sticking out its corporate neck, and the
subsequent objection by a trade association quickly produced the
first decision, the event of clearance in our terminology. The
postclearance events that led to the final decision followed in fairly
rapid succession.
In Japan, there was much more regulatory inertia. The MOF,
perceiving commercial paper as an unwelcome intrusion into the
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orderliness of its administrative dominions, remained immovable
throughout the early and mid-1980s.
Neither the securities
industry, Keidanren, the 'Diet, nor the United States of America
could induce the MOF to take action. Without action by the MOF,
a commercial paper market could not develop. A private institution
taking action on its own, as Bankers Trust did in the United States,
was simply inconceivable. In short, the Japanese preference for
resolving all relevant conflicts at the preclearance stage gave the
agency responsible for clearance a virtual stranglehold on the
initiation of the decision-making process. The Japanese ideal of
consensus made MOF's decision-making rational and orderly once
it began, but it also made the process difficult to start as long as the
MOF or its principal interest group, the commercial banks, did not
want it started.
The concept of efficiency involves the cost required in reaching
a particular result. One might attempt to measure the cost of the
Federal Reserve and MOF decisions in terms of the general social
goal of wealth maximization, but that is simply too difficult, and
would carry us far beyond the scope of a study on government
decision-making. For our purposes, efficiency simply means the
costs involved in reaching whatever result was reached.
The
conventional wisdom, reflected in Derek Bok's charges, is that the
American process is less efficient because of the high cost of
litigation. 219 Once again, however, this is much too facile. Both
systems are costly in the sense that real social resources are devoted
to them. The costs of the American postclearance system are more
obvious, but that is simply because they are more public. The costs
of litigation-the expensive attorneys, the voluminous briefs, the
elaborate hearings-are there for all to see. In Japan, such public
displays of disaffection are assiduously avoided, but doing so is itself
a costly process. If the conflict is to be resolved at all, there must
be extensive meetings, conferences, and social contacts with all the
interested parties. Furthermore, experts must be carefully selected
and consulted to confer legitimacy on the clearance decisions.
There is, moreover, an element of patterning which increases
costs in both systems. Patterning is meant to describe the phenomenon whereby each step in a decision-making process comes to
resemble the whole of the process. The phenomenon results from
the fact that the totality has moral force; it represents the society's
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general image about the right way to make decisions, and thereby
operates as a consciously available ideal for the decision-makers who
design each stage. Thus, in the United States, each separate stage
of a segmented postclearance process becomes segmented itself.
There are hearings and decisions on preliminary motions, interlocutory appeals, and preliminary decisions. When the Federal Reserve
Board failed to act on the SIA complaint, the SIA followed with a
formal petition, triggering a final decision. This was a rather
expensive way to initiate the clearance decision that was, in the
American model, only the first stage of an extended process. In
Japan, on the other hand, the preference for preclearance conflict
resolution tends to generate preliminary negotiations prior to
meetings that are themselves preliminary. The purpose of the
shingikai (study group) meetings, for example, was to lay the
groundwork for the ultimate clearance decision. The participants,
however, were unwilling to come into open conflict at these
purportedly preliminary meetings.
Thus, each meeting was
preceded by extensive negotiations, discussions and informal
contacts, often occurring over expensive dinners or in other costly
settings, that increased the cost of the decision-making process
generally. Similarly, substantive decisions were forced further down
the administrative hierarchy because any open conflict or disagreement at the higher level was deemed unacceptable.
Another argument in favor of the conventional wisdom that
postclearance conflict resolution mechanisms are less efficient
involves the costs that the decision imposes upon private parties.
The lack of finality in the American decision that constituted
clearance undoubtedly imposed certain costs, as uncertainty about
legal rules will generally do. But this does not mean that the period
of uncertainty will always be longer in a postclearance system. A
particular matter can be under consideration as long or longer at
the preclearance stage, during which a similar uncertainty will
prevail. In fact, the decision-making process occupied approximately the same length of time in the U.S. and Japan, as measured
from the time the issue was raised until the time a sense of final
resolution was achieved.
There is, moreover, a countervailing phenomenon that may
reduce the cost of postclearance conflict resolution to private
parties. In the preclearance scenario, where the crucial decisions
occur in private, one party or industry group can readily possess
superior information about the final outcome. This will tend to
produce anticompetitive effects, and increase total costs to private
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parties. When issues are resolved in the open, public forums
characteristic of postclearance resolution-and assuming the
decision-makers are honest, as they generally are in the U.S. and
Japan-the parties will have: essentially the same chance of predicting
the outcome.
Another element of a decision-making process, apart from its
internal features such as coherence, responsiveness, and efficiency,
is its relationship to outside actors. Part of this relationship can be
captured by the notion of political accountability. In both Japan
and the United States, the primary decision-maker-the one
responsible for clearance-was an administrative agency staffed
exclusively by appointed officials. In both nations, moreover, the
agency was answerable to the legislature. This was true in Japan
because it has a parliamentary system, and it was true in America,
despite our presidential system, because the Federal Reserve is an
independent agency. 2 20 In both countries, moreover, the agencies
were implementing an explicit statutory scheme. As a result,
political accountability can be measured largely by the extent to
which the legislature and the statutory scheme controlled the
decision-making process.
As we have noted, both Japan and the United States operate
under statutes which broadly separate commercial and investment
banking, although as the commercial paper dispute vividly illustrates, the separation is breaking down in both countries. Nevertheless, our study reveals subtle differences between the Japanese and
American approaches to statutory interpretation. While combinations between banks and industrial firms are illegal in Japan as in
the United States, banks in Japan have used informal networks of
contacts, traditions, and cross-ownership to maintain the keiretsu
that continue to perform many of the same functions as the pre-war
zaibatsu combinations of banks and industrial firms. Similarly,
banks in Japan are prohibited from operating securities affiliates by
virtue of the Antitrust Law, which effectively bars holding companies of any sort. Yet as we have seen, Japanese banks do maintain
de facto securities affiliates, again through informal mechanisms of
control. In addition, although article 65 expressly prohibits banks
from underwriting securities, banks in practice do underwrite
220 We do not address here the vexing constitutional question underlying the
concept of "independent agencies." See, e.g., Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SuP.
CT. REV. 41 (discussing the constitutionality of independent agencies).
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corporate bonds by making a "moral commitment" to the issuer to
purchase any unsold securities and cover issuer defaults.
There are, in other words, extra-legal, or "moral" arrangements
in Japan that, in practice, appear as binding as any legal contract,
and that allow banks to circumvent some of the putatively applicable
statutory commands. These moral commitments are characteristic
preclearance mechanisms in that they depend on a private system
of incentives and enforcement rather than on any threat of resort
to the courts. The official, apparently binding command of the
sovereign is respected in form, but in substance may be subordinated to more informal arrangements.
Based on the data we studied, it would appear that in the United
States, the legislative commands regarding bank securities activities
carried somewhat more force than the analogous rules in Japan.
American courts define their task as enforcing the "intent" of the
enacting legislature. In commercial cases especially, American
courts have occasionally stepped in to overturn private arrangements that preserved the appearance of allegiance to the statutory
command while in substance circumventing the law.2 2 1 American
courts may even insist on adherence to the statutory language when
an administrative agency has proposed a different reading; Bankers
Trust I is an example.2 22 And American courts will sometimes
enforce a statute in the face of seemingly perverse results, 223 at
least as long as the outcome is not absurd. 2 4 These are interpretative doctrines characteristic of a postclearance system of dispute
resolution, in that the publicly-announced sovereign command is
given greater weight in the determination of applicable rules than
221 See, e.g., Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 690 (1985) (holding
that stock transferred pursuant to the sale of a business is a "security" for purposes
of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934); SEC v.
WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946) (stating that the definition of "security"
under the Securities Act of 1933 requires that form be disregarded for substance and
that222
emphasis be placed on the economic reality of the instrument).
See Bankers Trust I, 468 U.S. 137, 150 (1984) (rejecting the Board's view that
commercial paper is not a "security" for purposes of the Glass-Steagall Act).
223 See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) (stating that
the function of the Court is to discern the meaning and intent of enacted statutes and
to apply them accordingly, rather than to balance the equities between the litigants).
See, e.g., Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of'Justice, 109 S.Ct. 2558, 256567 (1989) (stating that it would be absurd to interpret the word "utilize" in the
Federal Advisory Committee Act to extend the Act's requirements to any group of
two or more persons from whom the President or an executive agency had sought
advice).
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informal understandings that might have evolved among the parties
to the rules.
We do not mean to overstate this distinction as it applies to
legislative interpretation. Private arrangements often do receive
sanction in the United States, even when they might appear
inconsistent with the purposes of the enacting legislature-as
illustrated by Bankers Trust III and Bankers Trust IV, decisions that
allow U.S. banks to operate large-scale securities affiliates despite
the apparent intent of the Glass-Steagall Act. Conversely, the
statutory language and perceived intent of the legislature are
important in the Japanese system. The difference is subtle, and one
of degree rather than kind. Moreover, the present study considers
only a statute that was in effect imposed on the Japanese by the
American occupation forces; it is possible that the Japanese
response to an indigeneously-generated statutory command might
be quite different from that observed here. Nevertheless, we believe
that the distinction between preclearance and postclearance does
have explanatory value as applied to statutory interpretation in the
two countries. This suggests that American administrative decisionmaking is more politically accountable to the non-executive
branches than is decision-making in Japan. The result is not
surprising, but its link to preclearance decision-making styles is
significant.
A final consideration, which involves another aspect of the
decision-maker's relationship to outside actors, is fairness, that is,
how fully each affected party was able to make its views known and
participate in the decision-making process. Where individuals are
involved, we in the United States recognize this consideration as due
process, and we have concluded that it offers benefits for both the
accuracy of the result and the subjective feelings of the participants.
The same is probably true for institutional participants such as those
involved in the commercial paper conflict.
Fairness is an explicit ideal of American decision-makers, but in
a number of ways the Japanese process achieved this ideal more
successfully. The primary decision-maker in the United States was
almost exclusively concerned with the welfare of the banking
industry. While the Federal Reserve is a conscientious regulator
and cannot be described as being "captured" by the banking
industry, the restrictions the Fed imposes, like the latitude it allows,
are designed to foster the safety and soundness of banks. Securities
firms are largely outside the Federal Reserve's concern and were
thus forced into the role of the decision-maker's adversary. The Fed
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allowed this situation to prevail because it did not need to resolve
the conflict at the preclearance stage; other decision-makers
participated after the event of clearance, and the Fed played the
role of advocate before those decision-makers, leaving them to
provide a forum for participants like the securities firms. Given the
Fed's dominant role, however, and its ability to control the result
despite the presence of other decision-makers, its adversarial stance
toward the securities firms left them largely excluded from the
essential aspects of the decision-making process.
The MOF was placed in an essentially different position. To
resolve the commercial paper conflict effectively at the preclearance
stage, it was obligated to respond to the concerns of both banks and
securities firms. It was able to do so because it regulated both fields
and thus possessed direct channels of communication with the
major industry participants. Often, the relationship between MOF
officials and members of the private firms dated back to their
college years, especially to the law department at the University of
Tokyo from which many participants in the controversy had
graduated. Large banking and securities firms also maintained good
relations within the MOF by deputizing junior officers to spend a
year working there at company expense. In the other direction,
senior MOF officials are generally required to retire from government service at age 55, after which they often find important and
225
profitable positions in the private sector.
Within the MOF itself the Banking Bureau and the Securities
Bureau came into intense competition over the issue of commercial
paper. Both bureaus viewed their mandate, in part, as representing
the interests of their industry segment within the MOE. At the
same time, the MOF's internal policy is to move policy-making
officers from bureau to bureau every two or three years. Thus,
MOF officials do not come to identify their personal interests totally
with the interests of their bureau; the extensive circulation of
individuals from bureau to bureau allows the development within
the MOF of a network of relationships that permits a form of
preclearance within the agency. Thus it was possible for the
fundamentals of the commercial paper compromise to be established by a simple process of negotiation between banking and
225 The process is known colloquially as "amakudari"(descent from heaven). See
E. REISCHAUER, supra note 1, at 187 (noting that "[iUn a ministry, when one of the
members of a class reaches the top bureaucratic post of vice-minister probably in his
early fifties, all the others must be retired").
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securities bureaus, without the intervention of any outside
force.226
The MOF's ability to respond to the concerns of all participants
was not simply the product of its broader jurisdiction, but represented a conscious decision-making strategy. This is demonstrated
by the existence of another group of participants who lay outside of
the MOF's jurisdiction-the industrial firms that would become the
major issuers of commercial paper. InJapan, their presence was felt
through Kaidanren, essentially their trade association, and through
the formidable agency that possessed regulatory jurisdiction over
their activities, MITI. The MOF was able to include MITI in its
decision-making process, and thereby respond to groups that are
outside its jurisdiction. Certainly, the groups MITI represented did
not have as much influence as the banking or securities industries,
but they did have a channel for expressing their views, which is
more than was available in the United States.
Thus, the Japanese process seems more fair than the American
one, despite the fact that fairness is an explicit value of American
decision-making, and a principle by which our decision-making
process is designed. But the American process is just as coherent
and probably more responsive to changing circumstances, even
though these characteristics are an explicit ideal in Japan. Perhaps
the irony is too tempting here and suggests caution about these
conclusions. The main point, however, is that decision-making is a
complex process, and one cannot take a nation's statements about
itself, either positive or negative, at face value. This leads us to our
final question, namely, the extent to which differences in decisionmaking strategy reflect differences in culture.
C. The Influence of Culture
As we have seen, neither preclearance nor postclearance conflict
resolution is obviously superior as a decision-making strategy. Each
has its virtues, and each has its disadvantages. More important,
perhaps, is that the differences between them are subtle ones; both
strategies exhibit roughly similar abilities to handle complex
226 One set of relationships was not marked by extensive networks of informal
contacts: those between the banking and the securities industries themselves. Those
relationships were apparently conceived of as fundamentally rivalrous, so that the
maintenance of contacts would have been fruitless. Industry officials we talked to
indicated that a private settlement of their dispute without the intermediation of the
MOF would be virtually inconceivable.
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administrative problems. This suggests that the choice between
them may indeed be a matter of cultural preference, and not an
indication that one nation is more rational or more efficient than
the other.
Other studies of Japanese and American society suggest that
their choices of decision-making strategies are reflections of much
broader cultural styles. 2 27 The Japanese concern with consensus
and their desire to avoid open conflict are well-documented.2 28
Perhaps they derive from the homogenous and highly-centralized
nature ofJapanese society, its need is to find modes of cooperation
in a densely-populated region, and its emphasis on tradition and
efficient governance as sources of legitimacy. America, in contrast,
displays a penchant for formalized decision-making and structured
confrontation, perhaps a product of a pluralistic, widely-dispersed
society that derives its legitimacy from concepts of law and
individual autonomy. Generalizations of this sort are dangerously
malleable, but the basic pattern has been repeatedly observed.
Despite the possible cultural origin of the Japanese and
American decision-making processes, one cannot simply conclude
that we are dealing with two different kinds of human beings. To
assess the similarity or difference between decision-makers in Japan
and the United States, we must decide whether differences in
culture operate as a conceptual framework or a situational context.
If they operate as a conceptual framework, then people in the two
countries really are different in an essential way. They think
differently, and strategies that come naturally to one people are
literally inconceivable to the other. The Japanese themselves often
take this position. A number of the people we interviewed stated
that it would simply be inconceivable for a bank to begin issuing
commercial paper without regulatory approval, the way Bankers
227 See, e.g., E. REIsCHAUER, supra note 1 (noting that "the dictatorial power of the
occupation and the dire economic conditions of the time produced ... a more
comprehensive and delicate system of cooperation between government and business
than had ever existed before"); P. TASKER, supra note 1, at 47 (remarking that "the
strength of the consensus model is ... a habit of thought shared by households,
bureaucrats, managements and workers, confirmed by the systems and customs by
which the social group functions").
228 See, e.g., E. REISCHAUER, supra note 1, at 188 (stating that "[i]f the Japanese
have a special decision-making process, it is the system of careful and extensive
consultation before a decision is arrived at by general consensus"); P. TASKER, supnra

note 1, at 68 (stating that "[i]mportant decisions are made at middle-managcmcnt
level through a process of consensus-building").
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Trust did, or for a trade association to sue a regulator, which the
American SIA did quite often, and with enthusiasm.
But culture may also operate as a situational context in which
decision-makers and decision-making agencies must function. Given
a culture that generally values consensus and that has organized its
institutions around compromise, a rational decision-maker would
seek to achieve its goal through compromise and consensus. This
behavior might not stem from an inability to conceive of alternatives, but rather from a recognition of the prevailing realities. It
would have been senseless for the MOF to abandon its study groups,
eliminate its carefully established network of industry contacts,
release its control of the process, and seek a resolution in court.
The MOF had a system of conflict resolution that worked reasonably
well, and there was no good reason to dismantle it. Similarly, the
Federal Reserve was prepared to reach an initial decision in
response to an industry complaint, and then defend that position in
court. There was no reason to establish an elaborate system of
negotiation, since the Fed would probably have been sued anyway,
perhaps by both sides instead of one. Moreover, efforts to negotiate
with industry representatives might have been seen as illegitimate
ex parte contact or unsavory overinvolvement with private interest
groups.
Proponents of the cultural approach could argue that the
rational decision-maker model fails as an explanation because it
artificially isolates the decision-maker from its surroundings. The
norms of decision-making in Japan and America are different
because the two cultures are different; to posit the entire, preexisting culture as a given, and then look at a single, isolated
decision may not make much sense. But there is a certain validity
to this approach from the decision-maker's perspective. If the
decision-maker's conceptual framework is totally structured by
cultural norms, alternative strategies will not even be considered;
they will be inconceivable in a very real sense. In contrast, if the
decision-maker is choosing, as a rational actor, to follow certain
rules because they are cultural norms, alternative strategies will be
conceptually available. For the most part, they will be rejected, but
they will be considered arid occasionally adopted. In other words,
when culture operates as an external constraint, rather than as a
conceptual framework, its control is looser, its admitted suzerainty
less absolute.
As might be expected, the commercial paper conflict indicates
that both situations occurred: the decision-makers were rational
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actors on some occasions and cultural actors on others. Our
Japanese informants said that litigation against the MOF was
inconceivable, but the very fact that they could say it meant that
they could conceive of it at some level and simply regarded it as
very, very inadvisable. In fact, the securities firms apparently did try
to circumvent the MOF's decision-making process by appealing
directly to the Diet. Had the Diet acted, that would have constituted the event of clearance, and MOF implementation of the new
statute would have constituted a series of postclearance events. The
securities firms knew that Diet action was unlikely, but they
appealed to the Diet in order to put pressure on the MOF.
Essentially, they could conceive of and use alternative strategies.
Conversely, the Federal Reserve was in contact with the securities
firms, and was willing to compromise by placing restrictions on the
commercial paper activities of banks. A preclearance resolution was
presumably conceivable in this situation, and we know that such
solutions are often reached by American regulators.
In the final analysis, however, distinctive cultural patterns did
prevail. The Japanese resolved the issue in private, through a series
of preclearance negotiations within a single agency, while the
United States resolved the conflict through a succession of administrative and judicial adjudications of a relatively formal and adversarial character.
Thus, there is no simple answer to the debate between cultural
and rational actor explanations of American andJapanese decisionmaking. The reason is that both systems of explanation acknowledge the crucial role of the institutional setting in which decisions
are made. For cultural theorists, the institutional setting is the
embodiment of culture, and particular decisions reflect that same
culture in a fashion that makes them continuous with, and indistinguishable from, their setting. For rational actor theorists, the
institutional setting creates the framework of rewards and punishments, of opportunities and constraints, which serves as the only
possible basis for evaluating action.
In other words, human
behavior is contextualized in a decisive way that precludes any
global distinction between actions controlled by culture and actions
based on independent motivations whose consequences are defined
by culture.
One might attempt to retrieve crisp distinction between cultural
and rational actor explanations by using them to account for the
institutional context itself. Clearly, institutions are products of
human behavior, and those behaviors presumably lend themselves
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to cultural or rational actor explanation. The problem, however, is
that there is no initial state, no moment beyond history when
institutions are created and then set in motion. Thus, the behaviors
that cause institutions to develop are themselves contextualized in
precisely the way that precludes the distinction between culture and
rational action. The commercial paper decision, although it is the
subject of the present study, and can thus by regarded as occurring
against a particular institutional background, was also a stage in the
development of institutions that will affect further actions.
Government officials and. executives of banks, investment banks,
and issuing corporations -will have their behavior conditioned by a
set of institutions which includes the new commercial paper market,
or will need to take that market into consideration when determining their own self-interest, or-most likely-will do both.
Even if one were prepared to choose a primary force in shaping
institutions, that choice might not determine the contours of those
institutions in a decisive way. A new way of looking at dynamic
systems, called chaos theory, suggests that very small discrepancies
between two similar systems will tend, over time, to produce major
differences-differences so great, in fact, that the end result of the
two systems will have no resemblance to each other, despite their
initial similarity. 229 Thus, a minor admixture of cultural influences in a rational action system, or rational actor influences in a
cultural system, may be sufficient to destroy the predictive value of
23 0
the primary explanation.

But all of this is a dilemma only if one accepts the framework of
current scholarship, that is, if one feels obligated to choose between
cultural and rational actor explanations. A better approach is to
regard these two models of explanation as alternative means of
accounting for observed phenomena. One can apply each in turn,
or better still, one can apply them simultaneously, and accept
accounts that can be justified only by both explanations. This
recognizes the fact that we perceive behavior in both cultural and
rational actor terms, and that the actors themselves respond to both
types of motivations.
We have proposed precisely this kind of dual explanation for the
distinction between Japan's preclearance conflict resolution and
American's postclearance approach. The distinction emerges from
22 9

See generally, B.

MANDELBOT, THE FRACTAL GEOMETRY OF NATURE

PEITGEN & P. RICHTER, THE BEAUTY OF FRACTALs (1989).
230 SeeJ. GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE 59-80

(1987).

(1977); H.
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the cultural proclivities of executives and officials in the two
nations, but each mode of behavior made sense to the participants
in rational terms, and could be justified in those terms. This dual
approach does not abandon the enterprise of explanation, but
rather increases its possibilities. By using both approaches, we can
treat individuals as rational actors, whose behavior is predictable at
the individual level and comprehensible to other human beings
from different cultures. At the same time, we can discern general
patterns that distinguish cultures, and that reflect differences in
attitude as well as circumstances.
Simultaneous explanation is particularly important when dealing
with sophisticated nations that interact with one another. To
account for interactions of this nature, one must recognize cultural
difference and yet allow for comprehension and learning between
cultures. This is certainly true of the commercial paper decision.
Japanese and American decision-makers were aware of each other's
actions, and their own behavior was affected by that knowledge. At
the technical level, the Federal Reserve knew that America's major
commercial competitors, including Japan, allow their commercial
banks to engage in a wider range of securities activities. Its decision
to authorize the Bankers Trust program, therefore, was partially
designed to move American banks closer to the European-Japanese
mode. The MOF, on the other hand, was directly influenced by the
existence of commercial paper markets in the United States and
other countries, and understood the industrial firms' desire to
increase their access to capital markets.
Thus, each nation's
decision-makers were able to learn from each other, and respond
rationally to the challenges its economic rival presented. At the
same time, they interpreted what they leai~ned in their own cultural
context, and offered culturally distinct responses.
More generally, decision-makers in both nations are aware of
each other's decision-making styles. Derek Bok's complaints are just
one reflection of the self-evaluation which any large, sophisticated
society undertakes. Knowledge of other cultures provides a means
of conceptualizing different approaches, of standing apart from
certain culturally embedded patterns and evaluating their desirability. Decision-makers in each culture continue to evaluate other
cultures from their own cultural perspective, of course, but the
interplay of perspectives is capable of releasing creative energies,
and improving the decision-making process according to the
decision-makers' own criteria. This paper is an effort to contribute
to that process of cultural self-evaluation.
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CONCLUSION

We have examined the method by which both Japan and the
United States allowed banks to enter the business of underwriting
and distributing commercial paper at about the same time. These
developments, which are enormously significant for financial
markets in both countries, present a unique vantage point for
comparing and contrasting their administrative processes for
dispute resolution. We find that the marketplace dynamics in the
two countries were remarkably similar: in both countries, commercial paper represented a threat to the core banking business of
extending short term credit to large business firms. In both
countries, the banks sought to protect that core business against
inroads by the securities industry. Both cases involved intense
interest group lobbying, and in both, the outcome of the process
was a period of cut-throat price competition between new bank
entrants and the existing underwriters. Both cases were affected by
globalization of financial markets, although in different ways.
At the same time, the case studies present some remarkable
differences between the two countries' approaches. In Japan, the
process was largely contained within the four walls of a single
agency, the Ministry of Finance, although other agencies did play a
marginal role. In the United States, the Federal Reserve Board
played a dominant role at the agency level-a somewhat unusual
situation in American banking regulation with its multiplicity of
agencies-but the process -was heavily influenced by the inevitability
of judicial challenge to the Board's decisions and by frequent
appeals to Congress to resolve the situation. In Japan, the process,
although influenced by private action, was tightly controlled by the
MOF, whereas in the United States, the appearance, at least, was
that private firms were responsible for driving the process forward.
The decision process in Japan was generally private, informal, nonlitigious, and not publicly confrontational. In the United States, the
process was public, formalized, litigious, and confrontational.
We proposed that these differences can be partially captured by
the observation that the commercial paper controversy was resolved
in Japan by means of a preclearance method, whereas in the United
States, the process can be described as one of postclearance dispute
resolution.
We cautioned that the preclearance-postclearance
distinction should not be overdrawn, in that postclearance features
are evident in Japan and preclearance features are evident in the
United States. Nevertheless, we believe the distinction between
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preclearance and postclearance does capture something important
about the differences between the two countries in their treatment
of the commercial paper dispute. We speculated that the Japanese
and American preferences might reflect cultural attitudes-the
relatively homogenous and geographically centralized nature of
Japanese culture, and the pluralistic, relatively geographically
dispersed nature of American culture. At the same time, the
choices made by decision-makers in the two nations might be
rational responses to an existing institutional context. Neither
method is necessarily more "efficient" at resolving disputes than the
other; rather, each method may be better adapted to different
underlying features in the society.

